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Hence, to the extent that the mind is unable to juxtapose 
consciously a larger number of ideas, each coherent group of 
detailed constituent ideas must be reduced in consciousness to a 
single idea; until at last the mind can consciously juxtapose them 
with due attention to each, so as to produce its single final idea. 
 
From: Wigmore, J.H., Principles of judicial proof or the process of proof as given by logic, psychology, and 
general experience and illustrated in judicial trials (2nd ed. . Boston: MA, Little, Brown and Co, 1931.  
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
The citation of Wigmore, which serves as a motto for this work, stems from a period in 
which logic, psychology and human experience could be referred to as equivalent sources for 
legal proof. To help overcome the limits of cognitive capacity Wigmore presents a notation 
for the graphical representation of legal argumentation in proof. Today we would call such a 
tool a ‘cognitive tool’. 
The psychological and educational interest in graphical representations of conceptual 
structures such as argumentation, seem to follow a cyclical pattern. About twenty years ago, 
‘spatial learning strategies’, such as concept mapping or schematizing, attracted the attention 
of several researchers. During that period I was a member of the COWO team that was 
further developing and evaluating the techniques of schematizing, a method to graphically 
represent the concept structures in study texts. A few years later the research community lost 
its interest in these representations, until they made their comeback as ‘cognitive tools’ or 
‘mindtools’. 
 
Many persons have contributed to the realization of this PhD thesis, in particular my 
promotores, Wim Jochems and Paul Kirschner. Wim Jochems expressed his confidence in 
this doctorate project, without batting an eyelid, and without having any description of the 
subject available. Dear Wim, I thank you for always keeping up your support even when the 
progress of the project did not seem to warrant it. Dear Paul, you offered to be my daily 
advisor without knowing the research topic or realizing what you were doing to yourself. 
Sorry for the latter. We shared years of interesting research, laughs, personal sadness and … 
Fawlty Towers. I had never before enjoyed the company of a guest that orders a pair of 
pliers! 
 
Dear Otec colleagues, forgive me for not mentioning all of you here by name. You created 
the  supportive environment needed to complete these type of projects. Wim van der Vegt 
and Wim Slot provided technical support: the problems reported in chapter 3 had nothing to 
do with your fine work. In the completion phase of this thesis the Otec secretaries, Marina 
Pongraz, Alice Boereboom-Pierey and in particular Ingrid Jonkman, provided important 
assistance in the type-writing. Thanks for that! Data scoring and coding were done by 
Andrea Rau, Femke Kirschner and Marijn Bruinink and I hope I can count on you for future 
projects. 
 
Finally, dear spouse and children - Diny, Carine, Guido and Leonie – you have been the 
main victims of this project. I’m back! 
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 1 General introduction 
The Open University of the Netherlands is aiming to realize competency-based education 
with its students mastering complex skills. To realize this goal, students need to be 
confronted with authentic tasks that closely mimic those encountered in professional settings. 
A foundation claim of this thesis is that ‘social science problems’ (Voss, Tyler, & Yengo, 1983) 
or ‘wicked problems’ (Kunz & Rittel, 1970; Rittel & Webber, 1984) are excellent examples of 
these types of tasks. Examples of this type of problem are ‘How can we reduce traffic 
fatalities?’, ‘How can we reduce aggression in commuter traffic?’, ‘How can we reduce 
school drop-out?’, ‘How can we stimulate self-regulated learning?’ or the now classic 
problem ‘How can we increase Soviet crop production?’.  
Solving social science problems is often the task of (multidisciplinary) teams, which in the 
context of higher distance education will mean that we make use of collaborative learning 
settings. It is here where the student population of the Open University of the Netherlands 
offers interesting, though challenging, opportunities. Many, but certainly not all, of our 
students are already occupied in jobs in or closely related to the domain of their study. 
Therefore, although they may not yet operate on the level of (academic) domain experts, they 
certainly cannot be compared to novices in the domain. Other students of the Open 
University of the Netherlands, however, have no such domain experience. They are indeed 
novices in the domain. These different students may find themselves in the same team that 
tries to solve a social science problem.  
 
The initial question of the work reported here was how external representations could be 
used to facilitate collaborative solving of ill-structured problems in computer-supported 
asynchronous settings. This is a rather broad question, and we therefore have to clarify and 
specify several of the elements contained in it, in particular the: 
 
1 type of ill-structured problem to be supported 
2 content and form of the external representations: what is represented and how it is 
represented 
3 role that external representations play in the problem solving process 
4 intended audience – who the problem solvers are that will use these external 
representations, and the context in which they will use them 
5 extent to which we design and implement a computer-based environment to support 
problem solving with external representations. 
 
First¸ the type of ill-structured problem needs to be clarified. To be more specific, the kind of 
ill-structured problems that we are dealing with have been referred to as social science 
problems (Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983; Voss, Tylor, et al., 1983). The classic example 
problem used by Voss is that of how to increase the crop production in the Soviet Union. 
Voss, Tyler, et al. describe the characteristic problem solving strategy for social science 
problems as “Identify the cause(s) of the problem and solve by eliminating the cause(s)” 
(Voss, Tylor, et al., 1983, p. 208). They found that a typical expert solution consisted of a few 
rather abstract solutions, whereas novices tried to isolate different causes and defined 
solutions in terms of eliminating these individual causes. 
Another characteristic of social science problems is that one cannot be certain beforehand 
that a solution will work, because it may take years before a solution is implemented and 
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produces observable results. Voss, Tylor, et al. (1983) use the concept delayed evaluation to 
describe this characteristic which prohibits the solver of social science problems to prove that 
a solution will work. The problem solver can only provide arguments as to why a solution 
can be expected to work, or why one solution is more likely to work than another and thus 
should be preferred over another. In other words, solving, or rather evaluating the solution 
of social science problems requires argumentation and since there is no way to provide 
formal proof that a solution will work, one needs to rely on informal reasoning. 
Elsewhere, this kind of problem has been called ‘wicked problems’ (Kunz & Rittel, 1970; 
Rittel & Webber, 1984). The descriptions of social science problems and wicked problems 
overlap to a large extent, but there are some differences in accent. Research in social science 
problem solving has typically used single agent settings. In contrast, wicked problems are 
seen as problems that always involving many agents, or stakeholders, each of whom may 
bring a particular viewpoint on the problem. It makes no sense to study wicked problems 
using single agent settings. In chapter 2 we give a more detailed overview of these two 
approaches. 
More recent psychological research has studied the way in which teams of problem solvers 
coordinate their problem solving activities involves sharing of data and/or problem solving 
operators (Boshuizen & Tabachneck-Schijf, 1998). As an example of these coordination 
mechanisms, Alpay, Giboin, and Dieng (1998) describe the use of several (shared) 
representations in multi-disciplinary accidentology teams. We will demonstrate in chapter 2 
that by using a multiple agent, multiple representation perspective, the approaches of social 
science problem solving and wicked problem solving can be merged.  
 
Second, we have to clarify what is meant by external representations that support the 
problem solving activities. In particular, we have to be clear as to what is represented in these 
external representations and in what way (visual, auditory…) it is represented. Here, what is 
represented is the argumentation related to the analysis and solution of the problem. As stated 
above, when one solves a social science problem one has to deal with delayed evaluation and 
this is achieved by supplying arguments as to why a particular solution should be preferred 
above another (it has worked in the past, it is similar to a known solution, et cetera). This 
argumentation is used to strengthen a solution. Argumentation can also play a role in 
problem solving activities. In their discussion of wicked problems Kunz and Rittel (1970) 
describe the entire problem solving process as an issue-based argumentative activity. 
 Given the core importance of argumentation to the process of solving these problems, the 
support that we try to offer is primarily aimed at the representation of the argumentation 
underlying the solution of this kind of problem. We will, however, not limit the support to 
the argumentation dealing with the delayed evaluation of social science problems. From the 
perspective of wicked problems both analysis and solving a problem need argumentation 
and we intend to use external representations of argumentation for these activities as well. 
Using external representations to represent argumentation sets the work aside from an 
important line of research dealing with solving problems using (multiple) representations, 
such as simulations, modeling, diagrammatic representations, or charts (Van Someren, 
Reimann, Boshuizen, & de Jong, 1998). We are not dealing with those kinds of 
representations at all. For the time being - more accurate terms to describe various 
characteristics of external representations are introduced in chapter 2 – we describe the way’ 
in which we represent argumentation as being graphical, using sets of symbols that denote 
the objects and relations in the argumentation. Other terms to describe this use of external 
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representations are ‘graphical argumentation’ (Buckingham Shum, MacLean, Bellotti, & 
Hammond, 1997) or ‘argumentation visualization’ (Kirschner, Buckingham Shum, & Carr, 
2003), that is, the expression (by the users or a technical mediator) of an argumentation with 
the use of graphical symbols. 
If one intends to use an external graphical representation of argumentation, one has to 
decide on the particular objects and relations that are available for use. The objects and 
relations and the rules for combining them are referred to as the ‘representational notation’ 
(Suthers, 2001; Suthers, in press). Each representational notation is biased, in other words 
one notation allows expression of some aspects of reality better or more smoothly than 
others. Depending on what needs to be expressed (by whom) a general set of objects and 
relations may suffice. Such a general set can be as simple as allowing the user to express a 
claim and its supporting or contradicting reasons, as is the case in ReasonAble® (Van Gelder, 
2003). An example of a general set that is more complex is a Toulmin structure (Toulmin, 
1958), where warrants and backings can be used to add support to a claim and qualifiers and 
rebuttals are available to narrow down the claim. One may also use domain-dependent sets, 
such as Decision Representation Language that was defined to support qualitative decision 
making (Lee & Lai, 1991). There are many trade-offs to be considered here, but we will limit 
ourselves to a single one here. Although domain-dependent representational notations will 
allow, in principle, the most accurate representation, these notations need to be mastered 
before they can be applied smoothly. Thus, one of the most important questions that need to 
answered is what the representational notation of the external representations must contain. 
What are the objects and relations in the notation? What, if any, are the rules about how they 
can be combined? The question here is not what is needed to (formally) represent 
argumentation, but rather how to define a representational notation that is workable – close 
enough to what problem solvers already do - to make it easier to include in their activities 
and adding new elements that add to their activities. 
 
Third, one may ask whether there are any indications that external representations can play a 
support role in collaborative problem solving and if so, what that role is. There are indeed 
areas that indicate that problem solvers can benefit from using external representations. The 
first of these areas is that of computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL). Research on 
CSCL environments for scientific inquiry provides evidence that the use of external 
representations of argumentation helps learners to maintain focus in problem solving 
(Suthers, in press; Veerman, 2000). Maintaining focus is identified as one of the success 
factors in collaborative problem solving (Erkens, 1997). The research in CSCL is limited in 
that it only addresses scientific questions, or the why-part of problem solving. A second area 
that offers relevant insights is aiming more at the how-part of problem solving in areas, such 
as human-computer interaction. Work on design rationale provides examples of how design 
argumentation can be modeled and stored for re-use. Much of the research and system 
development in this area is influenced by the seminal work on argumentative problem 
solving among stakeholders by Kunz and Rittel (1970) which, with the exception of Goel and 
Pirolli (1992), slipped the attention of the psychological community for many years. 
The social science problems that we deal with here, are neither scientific problems nor 
design problems. They often involve the development of programs and projects to change 
the environment, people or organizations. From the area of evaluation research we used a 
number of important concepts to describe the argumentation underlying solutions to social 
science problems. The various backgrounds from which we have drawn elements to use in 
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our research are described in chapter 2. We relate problem solving processes to demands on 
the communication environment and in particular on the representational notation that 
should support the problem solvers. This is where the main questions for our work are 
developed: What representational functions are needed in a computer environment that 
supports collaborative solving of social science problems? What is the content of a 
representational notation that is aimed to support problem solvers? In chapter 2 we review 
several different notations that have been embedded in computer-based environments. We 
relate their characteristics to the support that these environments offer to specific problem 
solving activities. 
 
Fourth, the intended audience or user needs to be made clear; in other words who are the 
problem solvers that we intend to support? Is this the whole gamut of students of the Open 
University of the Netherlands (OUNL), as sketched above, with their different backgrounds 
and levels of expertise? Or is it more likely that the support offered presupposes a certain 
level of domain knowledge before the support can be profitably used? The environments for 
graphical argumentation that we will discuss in the next chapter are developed for different 
audiences. CSCL environments often aim to support young learners. The tools, including the 
interfaces and the representations they offer are developed so as to allow learns to work with 
these tools. The representations offered match the limited domain knowledge of the learner. 
In contrast, environments for professional use may offer rich and complex functionalities 
and representations, because they are often used in a context in which a mediator handles 
the technicalities so as to ensure that the professionals can concentrate on content. In the 
OUNL context we have to deal with novices as well as with beginning experts. The learning 
arrangements offered to them may use face-to-face or synchronous meetings or may be 
restricted to asynchronous modes of collaboration. 
 
Fifth, and finally, we need to be more specific about the computer-based environment that 
we envisage. Although we started, as stated in the first sentence, with the idea of supporting 
asynchronous environments, this idea was quickly dropped. In chapter 2 we try to relate 
problem solving activities to support services and there we indicate that some of the activities 
are best performed in synchronous environments, whereas others can profit from having 
asynchronous modes of operation. Although the ultimate goal of the research reported here 
is the design and implementation of a computer-based system that supports collaborative 
solving of a particular type of ill-structured problems using external representations, the 
goals we set out here are more modest. Kirschner (2002) describes six stages in the 
development of a CSCL environment. The first three stages are concerned with (1) 
determining what the learners actually do (2) determine what can be done to support the 
learners and (3) determine the constraints of the learner, the learning situation and learning 
environment and the conventions that already exists. In the work reported here we will 
mainly be concerned with stages (1) and (2), leading to a set of functional requirements that 
will be presented in chapter 6.  
Overview of this thesis 
As is amply clear for the experienced reader, chapter 2 presents the major theoretical and 
practical underpinnings of this thesis. It discusses the psychological approach to solving ill-
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structured problems as well as the work on wicked problem solving. It goes on to show how 
the two can be brought together in a multiple agent model. A model for solving ill-structured 
problems is put forward that links a number of problem solving states with specific 
communicative and cognitive demands. These demands are subsequently translated into a 
number of facilities or ‘services’ offered by environments for Computer-Supported 
Argumentation Visualization (CSAV). This chapter ends with a first definition of a 
representational notation to support solving of social science problems.  
 
Our first empirical study aimed to use an existing CSCL environment and make some minor 
changes so as to have it support solving social science problems. We started with an 
experiment in which we attempted to determine whether manipulating the number of 
objects and their semantics available in Belvédère®, a well-known environment for 
collaborative scientific inquiry using evidence diagrams, would trigger second year 
Education students to give more attention to the ‘how’ questions of solving an ill-structured 
social science problem. The experiment and its results are reported in chapter 3. Thanks (!) to 
a series of technical problems we learned that for these students working together using a 
simple representational notation was more profitable than if they had to use a richer 
representation. This effect was especially manifest when a richer representation was 
combined with a mode in which students worked on physically separate machines. 
The outcomes of this experiment gave little hope that novices could work with the 
complexity of the representational notation that we had derived from theoretical 
perspectives. We therefore decided to not have a series of similar experiments, but rather 
concentrate on explorative studies using small samples of students from different 
educational backgrounds that can be considered to be beginning experts. Explorative studies 
were conducted using beginning experts from different domains. These explorative studies 
are reported in chapters 4 and 5. 
 In chapter 4 we describe a study where we take a first step towards the validation of the 
representational notation. We analyze the dialogues of teams from different backgrounds 
that try to solve an ill-structured social science problem and check to what extent they use 
concepts introduced in the representational notation. The analysis showed that many of the 
concepts were indeed used. It also showed some remarkable difference in problem-solving 
approaches between the groups which in some cases seemed to have worked 
counterproductively. 
This led to an exploratory study reported in chapter 5. This study replicates the previous 
one, but changes two important factors. First, the participants, who came from different 
educational and national backgrounds were grouped such that they formed 
multidisciplinary groups. Second, and most important, these were not only beginning 
experts in their respective disciplines, these were also students trained in the essentials of 
Logical Framework Analysis. Although the scale of the study is modest, its participants are 
as close to the intended audience as we can get. The study showed that with these 
participants the representational notation can account for more of the dialogues and that 
more of the dialogues were on task. Further improvement seems possible however. 
In chapter 6 we review the work reported in the previous chapters and then draw two 
different kinds of conclusions. The first part of the conclusions is in the form of global 
functional requirements for a computer-based system that can be used by (beginning) 
experts to assist in solving social science problems. The second part describes directions for 
further research and development. 
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 2 Visualizing argumentation for solving 
ill-structured problems1 
In this chapter we review the functionalities of a number of computer-based systems that 
offer visualization of argumentation to support collaborative problem solving. We will refer 
to these systems as offering Computer Supported Argumentation Visualization (CSAV), or 
CSAV environments. To review the support offered by CSAV environments we first identify 
a number of cognitive and communicative demands of collaborative problem solving. We 
discuss two traditions of problem solving and the demands that can be derived from these 
approaches. 
The typical way in which CSAV environments aim to support problem solving is 
obviously in the representational facilities that they offer, but they offer communicative 
facilities and sometimes more advanced functions as well. To better understand the 
representational facilities we present and discuss a number of characteristics of external 
representations. 
As stated in the previous chapter our concern is with social science problems that can only 
be solved using argumentation and informal reasoning. We concentrate on the visualization 
of qualitative argumentation and do not address the representation of formal models or 
simulations of the reality that the problem solvers may use. Neither will we discuss several 
hypertext or CMC applications. We refer the reader to a recent overview of the roots of 
CSAV for a more complete coverage of that subject (Buckingham Shum, 2003). 
Two approaches to problem solving 
Two approaches to solving social science problems are relevant to our work. The first 
approach is rooted in the psychological tradition (Voss, Greene, et al., 1983) while the second 
has its origins in work in planning and design (Kunz & Rittel, 1970). 
The psychological tradition: solving ill-structured problems 
CSAV is primarily used for the solution of ill-structured problems (Newell & Simon, 1972; 
Reitman, 1965) as opposed to well-structured problems. Well-structured problems (Newell & 
Simon, 1972) have (1) complete and unambiguous problem specifications; (2) clear criteria 
and procedures to evaluate whether a solution has been reached; (3) all of the knowledge 
necessary to solve the problem represented in one or more problem spaces with at least one 
problem space that can represent the initial state, the intermediate states and the goal state; 
and (4) an associated set of operators that can change a problem state into another state. 
Examples of these types of problems are the Tower of Hanoi, tic-tac-toe, theorem proving, 
and traditional school book problems. The problem solving process for such well-structured 
problems often follows a progression through three distinct stages, namely orientation where 
a problem representation is constructed, solution, where operators are applied to transform 
the problem state into a goal state, and evaluation where the solution and use of operators are 
evaluated. 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on Van Bruggen, Boshuizen, and Kirschner (2003) and Van Bruggen and 
Kirschner (in press). 
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Ill-structured problems, in contrast, (1) have an ambiguous and incomplete problem 
specification; (2) lack clear-cut criteria to evaluate whether a solution has been reached 
implying that there are no stopping rules; (3) make use of several potential information 
sources that may be used to represent problem spaces although it is unclear which ones 
should be used and how they should be integrated; and (4) have neither a complete 
enumeration of applicable operators nor a predetermined path from initial state to goal state. 
Examples of ill-structured problems are music composition, design tasks, planning tasks and 
management problems. When solving ill-structured problems, problem solvers do not 
progress in a linear way through the stages described, but rather work on partial solutions, 
return to refine their problem representation, evaluate, revise criteria, et cetera.  
In a series of investigations, Voss and his colleagues (Voss, Greene, et al., 1983; Voss, Blais, 
Means, & Greene, 1986; Voss, 1991) applied a combination of Newell and Simon's (1972) 
information processing model and informal reasoning to problems in such diverse fields as 
social sciences, medicine, mathematics and foreign policy. Voss, Green, et al. analyzed the 
protocols of experts trying to find a way to increase crop production in the Soviet Union2. 
The problem solving process was decomposed into a problem representation stage where the 
subjects formulated the nature of the problem and a problem solution phase, where they solved 
the problem. In their analyses they distinguished between a problem solving structure with 
associated problem solving operators and a reasoning structure with a set of (informal) 
reasoning operators. Examples of problem solving operators are ‘state constraint’, ‘state 
subproblem’, ‘state solution’, ‘evaluate’. Examples of reasoning operators are verbal actions: 
‘state argument’, ‘state assertion’, ‘state fact’, ‘state reason’, ‘state outcome’, ‘state conclusion’ 
or ‘state qualifier’ - and operators such as ‘compare/contrast’, and ‘elaborate/clarify’. Note, 
that the reasoning operators are domain specific. The analysis of the reasoning of a person 
who studied a juridical case used operators like ‘state claim for defense’, ‘state fact favoring 
defendant’, et cetera. 
To solve an ill-structured problem, problem solvers still have to represent the problem, 
define constraints, apply operators and evaluate proposed solutions, but since none of these 
are given, they first have to draw upon other knowledge sources to determine relevant or 
beneficial representations, constraints, operators and criteria (problem structuring) and then 
justify the decisions made both to themselves and to others. The problem solver, thus, also 
depends on informal reasoning to establish constraints and criteria and to underpin the 
likelihood of success of proposed solutions. 
The kinds of problems are such that the problem solver, in general, cannot be sure that the 
solution (s)he is formulating will actually work. It may take years before the effects of an 
intervention will materialize. Voss, Tylor, et al. (1983) refer to this as delayed evaluation. In 
other words, a proposed solution cannot, in general, be evaluated on the basis of 
demonstrated effectiveness, but has to be evaluated using an (informal) argumentation that 
will establish the likelihood of the success of the intervention as well as its acceptability. An 
argument cannot be evaluated in terms of whether it is right or wrong. It requires the 
                                                     
2 For those readers who are younger than the author, the Soviet Union is the former northern Eurasian 
empire (1917/22–1991) stretching from the Baltic and Black seas to the Pacific Ocean and, in its final 
years, consisting of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics such as Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It had a centralized plan economy (5-
year plans) that was known for its non-ability to meet the goals of the plans, especially with respect to 
agriculture. 
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evaluator to make use of other criteria such as perceived plausibility (acceptability) of the 
claim, perceived support that a reason leads to a claim, and the quality of the argumentation 
judged by taking counter-arguments into account. This informal reasoning requires the 
application of an argumentation structure consisting, minimally, of a claim with support 
(e.g., evidential reasoning). Here, as well as in the statement of the problem constraints, 
individuals may differ in the evaluation of relevancy or importance (Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 
1999). 
The last point raises questions on how multiple agents can collaborate to solve a problem. 
We will return to that issue after discussing the approach to problem solving defined in the 
planning and design tradition. 
The planning and design tradition: solving wicked problems 
Based on analyses of (urban) planning and design methods and practices, and independent 
of the psychological research of those days, Horst Rittel - a mathematician and statistician 
who worked on developing socioeconomic prediction models and evaluating sociological 
field research - emphasized that the ‘wicked’ nature of problems in these domains requires 
an argumentative approach to problem solving (Kunz & Rittel, 1970). The kind of problems 
that “planners deal with - societal problems - are inherently different from the problems that 
scientists and perhaps some classes of engineers deal with. Planning problems are inherently 
wicked” (Rittel & Webber, 1984, p. 135-136). Rittel and Webber formulated a number of 
characteristics of such wicked problems, namely that they have no definitive formulation in 
that the information needed to understand the problem depends on one’s idea for solving it; 
that possible solutions cannot be tested and revised (e.g., obviously one cannot ‘try out’ a 
trajectory for a freeway before building it); and that they have no stopping rule in that “the 
planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for reasons inherent in the ‘logic’ of the 
problem. He stops for considerations that are external to the problem: he runs out of time, or 
money, or patience”. “Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good or bad.” 
(op. cit., pp. 136-139). Kunz and Rittel saw the solution process as inherently argumentative, 
in which the problem solvers continually raise questions and argue with themselves and 
others over the advantages and disadvantages of alternative positions taken with respect to 
these questions.  
Consider the following description of a wicked problem within the car industry, namely 
determining the features of a new car (taken from Conklin and Weil, 1997): 
1. The actual problem is not understood until a solution has been developed. In the 
design of a car, some features interact with others. Adding structural support in the 
doors, for example, makes the car safer from side impact, but the added weight increases 
the cost, changes the fuel economy and ride, and requires adjustment to suspension and 
braking systems. Making the car safer also impacts marketing, raising issues such as 
pricing and demand - "How much do people really care about side-impact survivability?" 
And all these problems interact. 
2. There are different stakeholders in how the problem is resolved. There are two clearly 
defined and opposing camps: the people who know what is needed (Marketing or Sales) 
and the people who know what can be done (Engineering or Manufacturing). Virtually 
all product features and design problems fall squarely into both camps. One side argues 
that there is no point building the product if it doesn't have Feature X; the other argues 
that Feature X is so expensive, complex, time consuming, untested, or otherwise 
impossible that it should not be tackled on this project. Management has its own stake in 
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these decisions, as do many others in the organization. Some key stakeholders, such as 
customers and regulatory bodies, are generally not even represented in the design 
meetings. 
3. The constraints change over time. Almost all solutions have the constraints of time (the 
problem must be solved before some critical date, condition, or event) and money (the 
solution must be cost effective). Quality is usually another key constraint. In the case of 
car design, some decisions, such as the addition of side-impact reinforcements, might be 
forced by unpredictable constraints, such as the need to impress a politician or a Wall 
Street analyst with the company's commitment to safety. 
4. The problem-solving process ends when resources run out. Whatever is finally 
decided, it will be hard to claim that it was the right answer. No amount of study, 
laboratory experiments, or market surveys will indicate the ideal solution. At some point, 
the design team will have to make a decision. Inevitably, once the car is produced, critics 
will point out that the doors are heavy and difficult to open, while people injured in side-
impact accidents will file law suits against the company. 
As can be seen in the example:  
(a) Wicked problems are composed of an interlocking set of issues and constraints, rather 
than a definitive statement of the problem itself. These problems are often not fully 
understood until a solution has been developed. 
(b) There are many stakeholders who have expertise in different aspects of the problem to be 
solved, making effective problem solving more a social process than a cognitive one. 
Obtaining the right answer is less important than having the stakeholders accept the solution 
that emerges. 
(c) The constraints on the solution change over time because everything one does is done at a 
faster pace in a changing world. Stakeholders come and go, communication is often 
incomplete, and rules invariably change. 
 
Wicked problems are formally a subset of ill-structured problems: their goals are unclear (the 
problem is ill-defined), their search space is not well defined (and ill-structured) and neither 
the applicable operators nor the constraints are given. There are also a number of unique 
features to wicked problems however. In the first place, as stated earlier possible solutions 
cannot be tested and revised. Second, not even the description of a wicked problem is 
without implicit, often political, assumptions. Is the trajectory of the freeway a transport 
infrastructure problem, an economic problem, or an ecological problem? According to Rittel, 
wicked problems are inherently multi-disciplinary, involving stakeholders from different 
backgrounds, and there is no monopoly on expertise. He used the provocative term symmetry 
of ignorance to describe this state of affairs (Rittel, 1984). 
Solving wicked problems thus involves different actors (stakeholders) that entertain 
different problem representations, and none of the stakeholders dominates the problem 
definition or structure. To deal with these issues, Kunz and Rittel (1970) proposed a 
methodology called Issue Based Information Systems (IBIS) that tried to ensure that all 
stakeholders could put forward their issues. Essential to the IBIS method is the absence of 
premature problem structuring: the argumentation structure consists of a number of topics 
(issues) and positions that the stakeholders hold with respect to these issues and there are no 
means in the method to, for instance, create problem decompositions. IBIS contains none of 
the domain dependent operators that Voss c.s. used to describe the problem solving behavior 
16 
Chapter 2 
 
of experts and novices. Several CSAV environments such as gIBIS (Conklin & Begeman, 
1988) Mifflin® and Compendium® (Selvin, 2003) were inspired by Rittel’s IBIS method.  
Rittel also added an important aspect to the problem context, namely that there are many 
stakeholders whose views on the problem may vary (Rittel & Webber, 1984). Thus, the idea 
of multiple agents with multiple representations was implicit in this seminal perspective. In 
psychological terms, Rittel described a problem solving context where multiple actors, 
having different representations of the problem, are trying to solve the problem. 
Understanding the role of CSAV environments in the problem solving contexts that Rittel 
sketches forces us to rethink how informal reasoning and argumentation proceed if more 
agents from different backgrounds enter the scene. Somehow, their different views, 
knowledge and operators have to be coordinated. This brings us to the question how 
multiple agents, using multiple representations can collaborate to solve problems and how 
visualizing argumentation fits into this problem solving process.  
Coordination problems for multiple agents 
There are several reasons to assume that collaborative problem solving will only work if the 
problem solvers succeed in coordinating their problem representations, their data, and the 
operators that they use. Visualization of argumentation can facilitate this problem solving in 
a number of ways. First, it is a means of explicating and sharing representations among the 
actors which may help them to build the partially shared representations that may be 
essential for collaborative problem solving (Alpay et al., 1998). Second, it may help the 
problem solvers maintain focus, one of the success factors of collaborative problem solving. 
Finally, it may help problem solvers maintain consistency, accuracy and plausibility – three 
important aspects on which solutions are evaluated (Alpay et al., 1998). 
The amount and kind of knowledge and skills that must be coordinated between agents 
are the sources of problems that make cooperation problematic. Superficially, it may seem 
that involving more people in problem solving increases the chance that someone has the 
knowledge to solve the problem. Unfortunately, incomplete understanding and 
misunderstanding between agents are the more likely outcome, especially if the agents have 
varying levels of expertise within a single domain or if they come from different 
backgrounds. In these cases the agents will have different problem representations manifesting 
themselves in different data, formats and operators that they apply. Agents may also differ 
in the criteria they apply to evaluate solutions and the arguments that underpin claims. 
Misunderstandings due to differences in representation are not easy to avoid, especially 
between experts who have spent thousands of hours mastering their fields and novices 
whom they may be working with. Discussions between experts and novices have been 
shown to be notoriously difficult (Bromme, Nückles, & Rambow, 1999). Specific issues 
cannot be explained at the required level of understanding to a novice, and when the expert 
tries to explain more, the novice is overwhelmed. This is not only due to the nature of the 
knowledge to be conveyed, but also because experts tend not to be able to ‘tune in’ to the 
level of novice understanding. This is not only true when dealing with very different fields 
like law and microbiology where one person can be an expert in one field and know 
absolutely nothing about another. Boshuizen and Tabachneck-Schijf (1998) found that 
cooperation problems also occur when different experts have fields of expertise that partially 
overlap and partially differ in content, concerns and/or paradigm. They call this ‘distributed 
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or multiple representations in multiple agents’ and define it as the circumstance where 
multiple human or artificial agents have dissimilar representations about an object, person, 
interaction or situation. They describe how representations may vary along the dimensions 
of data, format and operators.  
When people think differently about an object or have different perspectives on it, their 
representations vary along the data dimension. Data is what we call content in everyday life. 
Since the content mastered by an expert is vast and highly integrated, it is virtually 
impossible for a novice to learn that which is relevant for solving a certain problem. This is 
compounded by the fact that even when two people have mastered the same concepts, they 
still might not understand each other. Different people can have different perceptions or 
have different prototypes of the same concept. This is painfully apparent in the differences 
exhibited between the understanding of concepts via ‘real physics’ and ‘lay physics’, a 
phenomenon often labeled misconception. Other differences stem from different domain-
specific representations: stakeholders of a wicked problem often represent problems in 
different ways, thus a problem in the production of a lawn mower is a logistics problem for 
the planner, a design problem for the industrial designer, a personnel problem for the 
human resources manager and a financial problem for the accountant. Recognizing such 
differences at the conceptual level can often take more time, result in more surprises and be 
more of a nuisance than is the case when people entirely lack each other’s concepts. Different 
contents of representations can also be the source of many misunderstandings, for example 
the scheduling of a meeting between an English and a Dutch delegation at ‘half ten’, which 
in Dutch means 9:30 and in English 10:30. 
A second dimension along which representations may vary is format, for example when 
one representation is propositional and the other visual (e.g., mathematical notation vs. Venn 
diagrams). Note that argument visualization is a means of forcing the use of the same 
format, or surface representation as Stenning (1998) calls it, on different people. Stenning 
points out that using the same surface representation may help to unravel differences in 
conceptual structures.  
The third dimension reflects that representations may differ regarding the operators 
applied. Differences along this dimension may appear unexpectedly and may lead to 
conflicts because one person thinks that the other's reasons are ‘unfair’. Boshuizen and 
Tabachneck-Schijf (1998) give an example of the use of different sets of operators: a legal 
approach toward solving a misunderstanding between people versus using more common-
sense ideas about solving it.  
Another source of misunderstanding stems from differences in the criteria that agents use 
to evaluate solutions and arguments. While a blueprint for a containment construction may 
convince engineers that the container is an acceptable solution to an environmental problem, 
it is not likely that an environmentalist will accept this as a solution. Differences in criteria 
between agents can be so fundamental that they lead to the complete rejection of specific 
approaches to problem solving or to certain reasoning patterns. An example is an abortion 
rights activist who considers life to begin at birth and a member of the clergy who considers 
life to begin at conception, if not earlier.  
Data, formats, and operators can form extended procedures or lines of reasoning (macro-
operators) which are needed for problem solving. We define such macro-operators as 
sequences of operators learned during past (problem solving) experience which can be 
shared by domain area experts (i.e., mathematical procedures, juridical reasoning). 
Argumentation strategies for a specific line of reasoning reflect common values and goals for 
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solving problems in a specific domain and the role of argumentation therein. Scientific 
researchers, for example, attempt to achieve consensus based upon the exchange of arguments 
that are open for critical debate while lawyers try to win a conflict by convincing a ruling 
authority that their claims should be honored above those of the other party. However, even 
within a discipline, striking differences can be found in argumentation. More formal 
reasoning styles, for example, are tightly linked to scientific paradigms and are often not 
accepted by scientists with a different background. 
What this suggests, is that there are serious coordination problems when dealing with 
multiple agent, multiple representation situations. In the next section we try to formulate the 
coordination needs as part of the broader cognitive and communicative demands of 
collaborative problem solving. Before detailing these demands, we define a number of 
important preconditions and make a distinction between three stages of problem solving 
through which problem solvers move back and forth.  
Cognitive and communicative demands of collaborative problem solving 
Preconditions 
Before specifying cognitive and communicative demands put on CSAV environments we 
spell out a number of more or less social preconditions underlying collaborative problem 
solving, namely certain minimal levels of shared understanding, accountability and trust that 
must exist before any collaborative problem solving may occur.  
The first precondition is a minimum of shared understanding: Shared understanding is the 
state where two or more people have equivalent expectations about a situation: Their 
explanations of the situation and their predictions for how it might develop are the same. In 
the lawn mower example, the agents share the understanding that there is a problem which 
they have to solve together and which they can solve together, namely that a lawn mower 
needs to be manufactured. Before they can tackle the problem of how best to manufacture 
(and market) it, they must first develop a minimum shared understanding of how the 
problem can be represented and which operators and reasoning schemes are admissible for 
solving the problem (as in the example of the linguistic vs. psychological explanation).  
A second precondition is accountability. Accountability is the social mechanism underlying 
responsible behavior between people, for example that one team member does not plagiarize 
a fellow team member, take the credit for work done by another team member or work to the 
disadvantage of a fellow team member. This precondition does not imply that agents 
necessarily have the same goals. Even in situations of adversarial collaboration (Cohen, 
Cash, & Muller, 2000) parties adhere to standards for exchanging and sharing views and 
information.  
A final, but also very important factor is trust. Trust is the perceived ability to rely on the 
character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something and is the deciding factor in a 
social process that results in a decision by an individual to accept or reject a risk based on the 
expectation that another party will meet the performance requirements (Zolin, Fruchter, & 
Levitt, 2002).  
Problem solving states 
Research on problem solving distinguishes three general states in problem solving (Newell & 
Simon, 1972) namely an orientation state to determine what the problem is, a problem solving 
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state which entails the actual problem solving process, and an evaluation state which 
determines both whether the problem has been solved and whether the ‘right’ problem has 
been solved. Note that each state needs information that is often lacking in ill-structured or 
wicked problems. In such problems, the problem description and constraints are ambiguous 
at best; the applicable operators are not given, and the criteria to evaluate solutions are 
absent. This straight-forward, linear process through the three stages is only possible when 
solving well-structured problems using well-known algorithms. When dealing with ill-
structured problems, problem solvers move back and forth between orientation, problem 
solving and evaluation. Trying out a partial solution (or rather a mental model of it), for 
example, may help the problem solvers to better understand the problem and may lead to 
adding or refining constraints and criteria (Norman, 1998). Visser (1990) described the 
activities of software designers as being guided by a data-driven and opportunistic control 
strategy rather than as following a plan or routine as reported by the problem solvers 
themselves. Although Goel and Pirolli (1992) found a somewhat more linear progress 
through sub-states of the problem solving state, they describe the control strategy as ‘limited-
commitment-mode control’ which allows the designer to put work on an unfinished design 
module on hold at any time and redirect attention to other modules or tasks. 
In the orientation state, participants structure the problem, clarifying the problem 
description, constraints and criteria for solution and evaluation. Participants ask themselves 
whether the actual problem is the one stated (surface level) or whether the real problem lies 
deeper, hiding behind the problem as it appears to them. Participants also need to clarify, 
and often state themselves, the boundary conditions and constraints, the context(s) in which 
the problem is embedded and who the owners of and stakeholders in the problem are, and 
so forth. Using the results of intermediate and partial solutions, the problem solvers will 
review and revise their understanding of the problem, its constraints and the criteria to 
evaluate a solution. In the solution state participants plan how to solve the problem and then 
try to execute the solution in a more or less systematic way. As previously described, this is 
often a data-driven process with a loose control strategy that lets problem solvers move back 
and forth between partial solutions, problem structuring and evaluation. In the evaluation 
state both process and outcome will be checked, that is the participants not only check the 
correct application of the operators, but they also determine whether the problem as 
intended has been solved. Since there is no clear-cut criterion to evaluate solutions or the 
correct application of operators in ill-structured problems, the problem solvers have to 
define, review and revise their criteria. 
Orientation seems crucial for collaborative problem solving, because the representations 
of the problems which are made here are closely linked to the type of acceptable 
argumentative reasoning that can be used in the solution. In multidisciplinary teams, 
differences of interpretation of what the problem is and of what the problem solving strategy 
should be may lead to great difficulties if the different viewpoints do not converge. This is 
the point – in our opinion - where argumentation is most important and where the design 
and use of CSAV plays the greatest role. Cognitive and communicative demands vary across 
the states of problem solving (Duffy, Dueber, & Hawley, 1998) and these variations have 
important consequences for the design of CSAV environments. In their first efforts to 
structure a problem, the problem solvers often have different or only partially overlapping 
representations of the problem and need to work on at least a minimal shared understanding 
of the problem. The communication between the problem solvers is relatively unfocused and 
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issue-based, leaving room for them to explore interpretations of the problem, the constraints, 
and so forth (Duffy et al., 1998).  
Others question whether the use of argument visualization tools such as external 
representations in this stage will facilitate the problem solving process. Van Gelder (2003) 
avoids using argument visualization in the early stage of problem representation while 
Selvin (2003) starts using visualizations immediately, which has the additional advantage of 
creating a record of the problem structuring activities. Whatever the preferences, if external 
representations are used at this stage, then their representation of the argumentation has to 
be non-committal, that is the representational notation must allow expression of different 
perspectives on the problem. 
One might also question whether the notations used to express the solutions should also 
be non-committal. Voss c.s. seem to hold that since problem solvers use domain-dependent 
operators and macro-operators when solving problems, the solution process carried out 
should not be hampered by representational notations that lack such expressive power; a 
view that encourages the use of domain-specific representational notations and discourages 
the design and use of generic tools. But there is a trade-off here. In a situation where several 
agents are involved and where we want to use external representations as a means of 
mediating the problem solving process, the representation has to be such that it can be, in 
Selvin’s words, ‘put in the middle’. This requires that the representation be sufficiently 
understandable to all actors, and thus not too domain-dependent.  
A direction towards a resolution of this apparent contradiction can be found in Alpay et 
al. (1998) who - in studying how interdisciplinary teams of engineers and psychologists used 
multiple representations to analyze traffic accidents - identified a number of characteristics 
and dimensions of these representations. One dimension is a permanent – temporary axis, 
where permanent representations correspond to systems, procedures and models that the 
experts use on a regular basis in standard situations and temporary representations are 
representations built dynamically during the analysis of a specific accident. A second 
dimension is a shared – unshared axis where, for example, a simple functional model of the 
driver involved in an accident was shared by engineers and psychologists, while a richer 
version was only shared between the psychologists in the team. These two dimensions are 
extremely important, since permanent and shared representations seem to be the core of the 
representational coordination. If we are to design and develop powerful CSAV 
environments, we cannot neglect that along with the permanent, shared representations, 
these environments should also allow for temporary, unshared representations. Another 
important coordination mechanism that they found relates to the distinction between control 
representation and topic representation. Control representations are representations that guide 
operations on topic representations such as models, phase decompositions, et cetera. Selvin 
(2003) makes similar distinctions and formulates requirements such as preservation (i.e., 
maintain information as well as conceptual frameworks), rigor (i.e., support rigorous 
methods) and repeatability (i.e., afford easily reproducible methods) all of which hint at 
common structures and control representations. Selvin’s requirements not only stipulate the 
re-use of structures such as tasks, Toulmin structures, or stages, but also the definition and 
representation of emerging structures. He provides examples of support built into the tools 
such as using databases to maintain consistency and the continuity. He also formulates 
relevant requirements. His reframing requirement can be seen as a means to (re)build 
consistency and plausibility. We should, however, keep in mind that his description of 
operators and requirements have been generated on the basis of studies in a professional 
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context, that is with experts, and experts are known to have available more, accurate 
representations which they can switch between with great flexibility. 
The style of communication during solution formulation is more focused and topic-based 
(Duffy et al., 1998; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Van Gelder, 2003). The capability to maintain focus is 
one of the major success factors in collaborative problem solving (Barron, 2000; Erkens, 1997; 
Veerman, 2000). Maintaining focus and coherence is often problematic, especially in 
asynchronous discussions where discussions tend to get scattered and lose coherence 
(Herring, 1999). 
Evaluating whether the problem as intended has been solved, whether the operators that 
have been used have also been applied correctly and whether the constraints have been met 
is a continuous process when solving ill-structured problems. This process will not only lead 
the participants back to the solution states, but will also lead to reconsidering the evaluation 
criteria as well. A strategy often applied in this oscillation between solution and evaluation is 
satisficing (introduced by Herbert A. Simon in Models of Man, 1957: To obtain an outcome 
that is good enough; as opposed to maximizing which seeks the biggest, or optimizing which 
seeks the best) where the problem solvers repeatedly evaluate their (partial) solutions against 
the constraints, leading to continual refinement. Solutions often seem to emerge more or less 
effortlessly out of this process (Voss et al., 1999). An important set of criteria to evaluate the 
argumentative underpinnings of proposed solutions are those characteristics which are used 
to achieve representation-management goals, namely, maintaining consistency, accuracy and 
plausibility of the representations (Alpay et al., 1998). These criteria are quite consistent with 
those formulated by Voss c.s. Before we consider how CSAV environments might help to 
meet the cognitive and communicative demands of the three stages of the problem solving 
process we recap them in Table 2.1. In the following sections we will show how the cognitive 
and communicative demands of collaborative problem solving may be translated into 
requirements on CSAV environments. We focus on representational features of CSAV 
environments. 
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Table 2.1 
Cognitive and Communicative Demands of the Problem Solving States 
Problem 
solving states 
Cognitive demands Communicative demands 
Orientation Problem Representation 
Constraints 
Problem structuring 
Establish shared representations 
Issue-based communication 
Brainstorm  
Build trust 
Establish common ground 
Solving Apply macro-operators to produce 
solutions 
Use topic and control representations 
Maintain coherence 
Maintain accuracy  
Maintain plausibility 
Topic-based discussion 
Maintain common ground 
Maintain focus 
Conflict detection and 
resolution 
Knowledge negotiation 
Evaluation Evaluate solutions 
Evaluate constraints 
Evaluate process 
Negotiate criteria 
Characteristics of external representations 
CSAV environments aim to support collaborative problem solving by making shared 
external representations of their argumentation available to the problem solvers. These 
external representations are construed using a limited set of objects and relations and 
adhering to certain rules on their use and combination. To this end, Suthers (2001), 
distinguishes between representational notations for representing the objects and relations, 
representational tools for implementing the notation, and representational artifacts which are the 
products constructed with the tools.  
The representational notation contains the primitives - the objects and relations that can 
be used in the representation of the argumentation and the rules that govern their use. Such 
a notation may define objects like claim, data, warrant, as well as the type of relation 
between these objects and associated features like strength of belief, hierarchy, or causality. 
Finally, the notation specifies which combinations of objects and relations are allowed. It can 
stipulate, for example, that data can be related to one or more hypotheses and that no 
relation is allowed between hypotheses. Before such a representational notation can be used 
it must be (and is) implemented in a piece of software, the representational tool. Several design 
decisions are then made to implement the notation such as the choice of symbols used to 
denote the objects and the relations and tools used to handle them. A decision, for example, 
needs to be made with respect to what would happen if the user (following the example 
used before) tried to relate two hypotheses? Would the system allow this, ignore it, or 
ask/force the user to remove the relation? Functionalities can be added to the tool (e.g., 
focusing and zooming) and future usage considerations are taken into account (e.g., if the 
tool will be used in a synchronous or asynchronous setting, whether users will work alone or 
make use of joint workspaces). Using the representational notation embedded in the 
representational tools, the users create the representational artifacts: the argument maps, 
Toulmin structures, evidential diagrams, et cetera. 
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A number of characteristics of external representations were identified by De Jong et al. 
(1998). Their work aims to cover a broader gamut of external representations than we need 
and we therefore use only a subset of their characteristics. 
Ontology 
The ontology of a representation defines what can be seen in the domain represented and 
how it will be seen. The ontology “refers to the content, to the objects and relations one uses 
to represent a domain, not so much to the symbols by which objects and relations are 
denoted” (De Jong et al., 1998, p.11). Selvin (2003) refers to this characteristic as the ‘depth of 
palette’ and indicates that having a smaller set of objects and relations can be an advantage. 
The development of the Belvédère® environment (Suthers, Weiner, Connelly, & Paolucci, 
1995; Suthers, 1999) corroborates these observations. Early versions of the Belvédère® 
environment were developed as a tool to represent the argumentation in scientific inquiry 
and had a rich set of objects and relations. Learners, however, were disturbed by the richness 
of the representation and were often lured into off-task discussion. Later versions of 
Belvédère® have a smaller set of those objects and relations so that learners may better 
concentrate on the core concepts. Alpay et al. (1998) as well as Selvin (2003) indicate that the 
ontology of CSAV environments needs more than primitive objects and relations. It also 
requires complex structures such as the components of a task or a Toulmin argument 
structure that can be used as frames to represent interrelated data or as process control 
structures. These authors also stress the importance of re-use of these structures, thus in 
Selvin’s terms enabling rigor and repeatability.  
Perspective 
Closely related to the ontology is the perspective or view. This term is multivalent, and can be 
related to views on systems from, for instance, a functional, a behavioral or a physical 
perspective (see De Jong et al, 1998 for examples). In CSAV the term is most often used in the 
sense used by Stahl (2001) for describing the different conceptualizations of a problem. One 
stakeholder, for example, may have an environmental perspective on a problem, whereas 
another may conceptualize the nature of the problem as technological or economic. 
Differences between these perspectives correspond to differences between conceptual 
representations (Stenning, 1998), that is the underlying conceptual systems are different. 
Specificity 
A third characteristic is specificity, defined as “the demand of a system of representation that 
information in some class be specified in any interpretable representation” (Stenning & 
Oberlander, 1995 p. 98). The specificity of a representation may require disambiguation: we 
cannot, in a diagram, represent that an object is ‘next to’ another object, it has to be 
represented at a particular locality. Thus, graphical representations limit abstraction and aid 
processibility of the information. We will not use the concept specificity in the formal sense 
used by Stenning and Oberlander, but following Suthers (2001) we will apply the concept to 
denote the categorical choices that the representational notation forces the user to make. For 
example, in Belvédère the specificity enforces the learner to make the basis distinction 
between theory and data. 
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Precision 
Another characteristic of external representation, and one which is strongly related to the 
representational notation, is the precision or accuracy with which the representation reflects 
the underlying model. In science and mathematics this is related to quantitative vs. 
qualitative models. In other domains it will reflect the nature of the objects (e.g., 
differentiating between a hypothesis and a prediction) and their relations (e.g., making 
various relation types available). Obviously, the precision of a representation is limited by 
the ontology. A limited set of objects and relations does not allow detailed, precise 
statements in most domains. It is difficult to draw a line here for determining how specific a 
CSAV environment should be, although Alpay et al. (1998) point to a number of interesting 
directions that can help, including the use of shared (partial) models. 
Modality 
The last characteristic of external representations is its modality, the form of expression used 
for displaying information such as text, animation, graphs, et cetera. The modality 
corresponds with the way the representational notation is implemented in the 
representational tools. Thus notational systems with the same set of underlying concepts and 
relations (the ontology) may be expressed, for instance, as graphs, hypertexts or feature-
comparison matrices. Suthers (1999) has drawn attention to the effects that these different 
notations may have on the learner discourse and ultimately on learning, and as he points 
out, these effects may even be greater if learners operate in a joint workspace. 
CSAV environments 
Services of CSAV environments 
CSAV environments offer a number of services to their users. We make a distinction between 
representation services that enable the users to prepare an external representation; 
communication services that enable the users to share representations and exchange 
information and finally, guidance and support services where the system takes the initiative to 
point the users to issues that need further attention. The representational services correspond 
to what Suthers (2001) calls the representational tools: an implementation of the notation. 
Suthers’ Belvédère® (version 2) environment is an example of a system that provides all 
three types of service. It offers a number of representation services in that users can put 
together diagrams using a limited set of objects and relations and can express how certain 
they are about these objects and relations. It offers communication services such as inquiry 
diagrams which are created in a shared workspace so that students may share their work 
while at different locations and a chat window real-time communication. It also allows 
individual students to open a previously shared joint discussion and add to it, thus working 
in an asynchronous mode. Finally, Belvédère® offers guidance and support services such as 
invoking an intelligent coach that inspects the structure of the diagram and pinpoints certain 
weaknesses in the diagram. The coach highlights the parts with the weaknesses (i.e., uses a 
communicative function), presents its diagnosis, and offers advice on how to improve the 
diagram (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. Belvédère® coach offering a diagnosis and remedy. 
Translating demands to services 
The cognitive and communicative demands of collaborative problem solving formulated 
above can be translated, although they may be hard to implement in combination, as 
requirements on the services offered by the CSAV environment and, as far as the 
representational services are concerned, as requirements on the characteristics of the 
representational notation. We will present these in more detail when we discuss CSAV 
environments. Here we present some of the more salient issues in translating the demands 
Synchronous communication services allow participants to freely exchange ideas as 
loosely related issues during orientation. Here initial ideas about causes and possible 
solutions are generated. When different viewpoints on the problem exist, the representation 
services should not be biased for particular views. Representations that meet those 
requirements are IBIS (see Figure 2.7) and more general models to represent argumentation 
(but note that these as well are biased against formal models, for example). These are weak 
methods to represent a domain and it is likely that they trade-in accuracy for applicability. 
All CSAV environments assume that, eventually, a substantial overlap in the viewpoints on 
the problem can be realized. Maintaining a wide variety of viewpoints for a prolonged time 
in a computer-based environment is still extremely complex (Stahl, 2001). 
For the solving state a first communicative demand required that the solvers can now 
focus on topics to explore in depth. Asynchronous communication may be best suited to 
meet these demands (Sloffer et al., 1999) because the activities in this state require reflection, 
gathering information, and deeper exploration. A second demand is to maintain task-
oriented collaboration, that is maintain common ground, focus, find areas of conflict, and 
negotiate or co-construct knowledge. This requires frequent evaluation and coordination 
best done in synchronous mode since synchronicity allows swift reaction and repair to 
emerging problems or conflicts A combination of asynchronous communication with 
external representations has been found to help learners maintain focus and coherence 
(Herring, 1999). 
Maintaining coherence, accuracy and plausibility translate to representation services. 
Some of the demands formulated here translate to complex requirements on representation 
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services. Control representations (Alpay et al., 1998) guide the solvers through a series of 
topics. Most of the systems do not offer process support. As will become evident in the next 
chapters, this may be one of the crucial supports to add to a CSAV environment. Partially 
shared representations require at least a similar sort of administration as plausibility. Their 
visibility for others may become problematic. Some systems (e.g. Crocodile®) go further and 
offer guidance and support services that warn users that coherence is being lost or that 
plausibility has dropped below a certain threshold (Wessner, Pfister, & Miao, 1999).  
Evaluation, finally, uses a number of criteria (such as plausibility) already discussed and 
examples of systems that support these criteria will be given in the next section. Other 
criteria, such as ‘the problem as intended was solved; the correct operators were applied 
correctly’ are not supported by the majority of CSAV environments.  
Types of CSAV environments 
The ultimate goal of this research is the design, development and implementation of a tool 
for CSAV in a CSCL environments which can be used for ill-structured and wicked problems 
in an educational setting. For this reason we briefly discuss some CSAV-environments 
developed for use in different settings, in particular for CSCL and planning and design. For a 
more in-depth discussion of different CSAV-environments the reader is referred to 
Buckingham Shum and Hammond (1994) and Van Bruggen and Kirschner (in press). The 
systems themselves are of varying nature (from industrial strength to research prototype) 
and have to serve different users and different purposes (from product design in multi-
nationals to touchy problems in local government and community to collaborative learning 
in schools).  
There are, for example, systems and methodologies like Compendium® (Selvin, 2003) 
that are used to support problem solving in synchronous business and public administration 
settings, facilitated by experts in using the system. These are settings where professionals - 
experts in their areas - solve problems and where a number of requirements formulated by 
Alpay et al. (1998) apply. These will not be discussed here. 
In contrast to this synchronous, facilitated mode of operation to support problem solving 
by experts, argumentative CSCL systems are usually operated by students, novices or 
beginning experts, who learn how to solve problems using argumentative devices. Their 
activities are not facilitated but are - at most - supported by a teacher. The CSCL context puts 
a number of additional demands on the functions, the interface and the representations used. 
According to Kolodner and Guzdial (1996), the interfaces emphasize structure for novices 
who need guidance to succeed and flexibility for students with diverse needs, the systems 
offer (multiple) representations that lend themselves to extrapolation and discussion, and the 
software can support different logistic functions in that it can be used synchronously or 
asynchronously for either local or remote collaboration. 
Kolodner and Guzdial (1996) further note that CSCL systems can fulfill a number of roles, 
namely: (1) promoting inquiry and sense-making; (2) facilitating knowledge building by 
providing a forum for collaboratively presenting arguments, raising learning issues, and 
reaching consensus on new knowledge; (3) keeping records and/or functioning as an external 
memory; (4) enabling communication with distant communities; (5) promoting reflection of 
alternative perspectives, solutions, and critiques; and (6) supporting teacher planning and 
implementation of collaborative activities. Except for the support of teacher planning, these 
seem to be roles that may apply to CSAV environments in general. 
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CSAV environments in CSCL 
Bell (1997) makes a distinction between discussion-based tools and knowledge 
representation tools in CSCL. Discussion-based tools support dialogical argumentation in a 
group while knowledge representation tools not only support the dialogical argumentation, 
but also support the representation of the argumentation by the individuals. (Suthers & 
Weiner, 1995; Suthers, Toth, & Weiner, 1997) 
Discussion based tools 
Discussion-based tools offer students an asynchronous environment in which they can 
exchange arguments. The structure of the argumentation is not explicitly represented, but is 
usually embedded in the threads of an electronic discussion.  
One of the best known discussion-based environments is CSILE® (Scardamalia, 
Bereiter, Maclean, Swallow, & Woodruff, 1989; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994), now 
commercially available as Knowledge Forum®. In Knowledge Forum® (see Figure 2.2) 
students use a communal database of interrelated text and graphical notes. When working 
with a recognized problem, students are required to enter notes with an identified type of 
content: ‘My Theory’, ‘New Information’, ‘Comment’ or meta-cognitive notion: ‘I Need To 
Understand’. Notes are related by links like ‘References’, ‘Build-On’, and ‘Quotes’. A special 
note is the ‘Rise-Above’ note that subsumes a number of nodes. All notes are entered in the 
communal database and are available to other students for search and comment. Knowledge 
Forum® offers a number of views (diagrams, maps) to which a network of related notes can 
be attached.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Knowledge Forum®. 
Another well known environment is Collaboratory Notebook® (Edelson & O'Neill, 1994; 
Edelson, O'Neill, Gomez, & D'Amico, 1995) which is a shared workspace where learners can 
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enter pages and relate them to each other through the use of hyperlinks. There are several 
types of pages, including questions, conjectures, evidence for, and evidence against. In the 
table of contents for a Collaboratory Notebook® (see Figure 2.3) the icons represent different 
types of nodes and the indentation represents the threads in the discussion. Discussion in the 
Collaboratory Notebook® is scaffolded by an interface that monitors the semantic links 
between nodes. Scaffolds suggest particular follow-up pages (e.g. an ‘evidence for’ page as a 
follow-up to a 'conjecture page'). In this way the structure of the argumentation is modeled 
to the students. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Collaboratory Notebook®. 
The major characteristics of these environments that make use of discussion-based tools is 
that they offer functionalities to engage learners in an asynchronous discussion. By the use of 
particular types of nodes the nature of the contribution to the discussion can be signaled to 
others. The content of the contributions is contained within the nodes which limits the 
possibilities of more advanced services. 
Knowledge representation tools 
Two well-known examples of knowledge representation tools are SenseMaker® (Bell, 1997, 
2001) and Belvédère® (Paolucci, Suthers, & Weiner, 1995; Suthers & Weiner, 1995; Suthers et 
al., 1997). SenseMaker® (Bell, 1997; Bell, 2001) is that part of the Knowledge Integration 
Environment / Web-based Inquiry Science Environment - KIE/WISE® (Bell, Davis, & Linn, 
1995) developed for inquiry based learning in the natural sciences. KIE is a learning 
environment that uses the Internet to help middle and high school students develop an 
integrated understanding of science and a critical eye toward the complex resources found 
on the Web. It is the product of extensive research and classroom trials exploring innovative 
uses of the Internet and World Wide Web for K-12 science instruction. It supports learners in 
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investigating rival hypotheses by guiding them to claims and evidence. SenseMaker® (see 
Figure 2.4) collects a hypothesis and its supporting or refuting evidence in a so-called ‘claim 
frame’. Evidence that supports one explanation while refuting another is not explicitly 
signaled. SenseMaker® offers a basic agenda function (see the ‘to be sorted’ list in Figure 2.4).  
 
 Figure 2.4. SenseMaker®. 
The Belvédère® environment is also committed to scientific inquiry. Its representation and 
communicative services aid learners in formulating scientific explanations in ‘evidence 
maps’. The ontology of the evidence maps is implemented in the objects and relations that 
students may use in creating those maps (e.g., principle, hypothesis, data, and unspecified). 
The relations are reduced to a basic set of ‘for’, ‘against’, and ‘and’. Students can express the 
strength of their beliefs in the objects and relations. Belvédère® supports discussion of rival 
hypotheses by linking evidence (data) or by undercutting the link. It does not support direct 
refutation of data. 
The specificity of the representational system of Belvédère® forces learners to indicate 
which type of object they add (Suthers, 1995), not allowing entry of objects of a ‘not-yet-
decided’ type. This has often led to epistemological discussions between learners rather than 
task related discussion. Suthers notes that a weaker representational structure (e.g., one with 
a ‘not-yet-decided’ type) could evade the issue, but would leave room for different 
interpretations of the representation3. 
                                                     
3 There were a number of drawbacks associated with the earlier representational scheme of 
Belvédère®. The early versions had far more objects (theory, claim, warrant, observation, law) and 
relations (supports, causes, explains, then, AND, conflict, negates) than current versions and it offered 
a very explicit Toulminian perspective on argumentation. It was noted that the detailed level at which 
relations could be presented led to interference with the task and sidetracked students to deal with 
non-goal tasks (Suthers, Toth & Weiner, 1997). In subsequent versions of Belvédère® (version 2 until 4) 
the number of objects and especially the different types of relations (precision of the representation) 
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A third example is the Text Composer, Computer supported & Collaborative (TC3® -
Figure 2.5) environment for collaborative writing (Kanselaar et al., 2003) which integrates a 
number of tools, including a diagram tool that represent the argumentative structure to be 
further developed in the text. The diagram contains diverse nodes (Information, Position, 
Argument (pro and contra), Support, Refutation and Conclusion) that correspond to a more 
general purpose argumentation. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. TC3® Diagrammer. 
The major characteristics of these environments that make use of knowledge-representation 
tools is that they offer synchronous means of explicit argumentation and that the type of 
content is known to the system. This allows more advanced services. The Belvédère coach is 
an example in case: because the systems knows the structure of hypotheses and data entered 
into the diagram, it can give feedback and hints.  
Representation services encountered 
Most of the CSCL environments presented here are concerned with scientific explanations. 
The systems were developed for children or young students and therefore use a basic set of 
objects and relations to express and discuss scientific explanations. This basic set also limits 
what can be expressed and how accurate. There is, for example, no object ‘prediction’ in 
Belvédère®. 
Knowledge representation tools offer a single representational system for expressing 
scientific explanations and the vocabulary offered is confined to that domain. There are no 
facilities for expressing (partially) shared representations or different perspectives. Despite 
this limitation, graphical representations make loss of coherence easy to spot, at least in a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
were reduced by eliminating redundant relations and concentrating on those topics that were 
considered core to learning (make a distinction between facts (data) and suppositions (hypotheses). 
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superficial way. There is also some evidence that working with graphical argument 
representations improves focus (Veerman, 2000). One of the most obvious ways in which 
such graphical environments offer assistance in maintaining focus is by allowing deixis (i.e., 
the ability to point to or highlight the topic under discussion). In the Belvédère® environment 
the coach can help students to focus on those parts of the evidence diagram that need further 
work as described above. 
Discussion-based tools focus on the types of entry –message or node – that can be entered 
and how these entries can be combined. The Collaboratory Notebook® allows students to 
take a number of predefined steps, but there are limits to the actions that can be taken. One 
cannot, for example, respond to a hypothesis entry by adding another hypothesis entry. On 
the other hand, discussion-based tools impose virtually no limitations on what can and can’t 
be expressed in the entries. This freedom to enter almost any text in the messages or nodes 
makes conflict detection and thus knowledge negotiation very difficult. Conflict detection and 
knowledge negotiation are considered important in CSCL environments, because conflict is 
seen as an important trigger for collaborative argumentation in which learners engage in 
knowledge negotiation and eventually in knowledge construction. Miao, Holst, Holmer, 
Fleschutz and Zentel (2000), for example, point out that the information needed to spot the 
location of conflicts, individual comments or opinions is hidden in textual descriptions in 
many text based CMC-systems. This means that, in general, there is no way for the system to 
know where a conflict exits, let alone offer support to resolve it. Their Crocodile® system 
collects measures of ‘degreement’ - degree of agreement – to measure shared knowledge as 
well as knowledge where participants disagree. 
Maintaining coherence and focus in discussion-based tools, or computer-mediated 
conferencing systems is also problematic. Discussions tend to lose coherence (Herring, 1999). 
Hewitt, Scardamalia, and Webb (1997) implemented the 'Knowledge Map': a tool that allows 
CSILE® (see Figure 2.6) notes to be related to more than one other node and offers several 
views on the relations between nodes, like ‘history’, ‘refers-to’ and ‘referred-by’. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Enlarged CSILE® Knowledge Map from Hewitt, 
Scardamalia, and Webb (1997). 
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Conclusion 
CSCL environments are designed to be used by learners to increase their knowledge by 
engaging in collaborative problem solving or argumentation. Because they are meant for 
learners / novices, they are easy to (learn to) use and often have to offer simplified views on 
domains. Those environments that offer graphical argumentation were primarily developed 
to support novices in scientific inquiry and explanation. They offer objects and relations 
specific to these purposes (TC3® diagrammer, that offers more general argumentation 
facilities is an exception here). Their orientation towards novices is reflected in the 
representational services that they offer, namely the learners can use a basic and limited set 
of objects and relations with which typical ‘why’- questions can be explored. Services to 
maintain different problem perspectives or support the use of (partially) shared 
representations, as well as more advanced services to help maintain coherence and detect 
conflicts are rarely found. Most of the systems support only one way of communication and 
representation in collaborative problem solving and in no way support learners moving back 
and forth between different styles of communication and representation in different phases 
of problem solving. 
Considering all this, it is no wonder that CSCL environments offer only a glimpse of what 
is needed to support collaborative solving of social science problems with the help of CSAV. 
Two things are missing. First, the representation needs to be able to represent more than only 
the ‘Why’-side of as problem, the analysis. It needs to support the representation (and 
discussion) of such topics as constraints and criteria, possible actions and likelihood of 
success. Second, the representation cannot be limited to a particular domain, as is often the 
case for CSCL environments. Different perspectives, stakeholders with particular 
viewpoints, are involved in ‘social science’ problems. In other words, the representation 
needs to be able to deal with broader domains, covering topics dealing with constraints, 
criteria and ‘How’-questions. Before drawing any final conclusions, we discuss a number of 
CSAV environments for deliberations dealing with typical ‘How’-questions. 
Representation and support for argumentation in design-based environments 
A series of computer-based tools have been developed within the planning and design 
tradition to support the solving of wicked problems or to record design rationale. Design 
rationale is a systematic approach to lay out the reasons for and the reasoning behind the 
decisions that led to the design of an artifact (Buckingham Shum & Hammond, 1994; Carroll 
& Moran, 1991). Tools to support expression of design rationale allow or force users to state 
alternatives, evaluate these against criteria and constraints, and finally decide on alternatives 
that best reach the goals given the constraints in which the designer has to operate. Thus, 
these systems represent a type of argumentation dealing with several of the topics that were 
not, or not sufficiently, covered in the CSCL environments discussed in the previous section. 
We will not discuss the research in design rationale and the systems to record design rational 
at length, but rather concentrate on two (representational) notations frequently used in the 
field, since these notation are at the roots of most systems and they provide us with the 
objects and relations for argumentation dealing with the ‘How’-questions. 
The IBIS notation 
Most design rationale systems are rooted in Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS), 
introduced by Kunz and Rittel (1970) to support argumentative problem solving. IBIS invites 
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the participants to raise questions (Issues), formulate alternative answers (Positions), to which 
pros and cons (Arguments) may be attached. Decisions as to which answers are accepted or 
rejected are called Resolutions. IBIS uses several types of links between the nodes, such as 
responds-to, questions, supports, specializes, and generalizes. IBIS is not a freeform method. 
It has a small grammar that specifies how objects may be related and the environments 
enforce correct use of the objects and relations that help keep the representation coherent. 
Examples of computer implementations that stick close to the original notation are gIBIS® 
(Conklin & Begeman, 1988), QuestMap® (Figure 2.8) and Mifflin® (Selvin, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The graphical IBIS (gIBIS®) notation and an example, 
showing how Issues, Positions and Arguments are combined 
to cumulatively build graphical argument spaces  
(Buckingham Shum et al., 1997). 
IBIS can represent deliberations on a starting question, like ‘How can we reduce school drop-
out?’ This question is the start Issue, to which specializing questions can be attached. One 
might for instance start a discussion on problem constraints by raising the Issue ‘How much 
time and budget do we have?’ or raise the analytical Issue ‘What causes drop-out?’ 
Hypotheses regarding the causes, formulated as Positions and Arguments, can be added to 
support or refute these hypotheses. Issues may be added to raise questions on the validity of 
certain Arguments, other questions asking for facts can be added and in a similar way an Issue 
object can be formulated to start a discussion of the constraints or criteria that any solution 
has to meet. 
IBIS implementations are less dedicated in their ontology than the CSCL-based systems 
discussed: the IBIS-notation is non-committal to specific uses, which has the advantage that 
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it can serve to represent different views of a problem in the initial stages of problem solving. 
Not surprisingly, IBIS-based systems are strongest where CSCL-based systems are weakest. 
The IBIS style supports issue-based communication, brainstorming and other activities 
found in the orientation state more easily than the CSCL-based systems. But there are 
drawbacks, especially in educational settings. The issue structure is weak and the 
representational notation does not force important categorical choices (for instance between 
alternatives, constraints, and interventions). IBIS is a method that supports initial problem 
structuring, but offers no specific means for formulation of solutions (specializations of IBIS 
were proposed to offer more specific support in design which we will not discuss here). In 
the Compendium methodology (Selvin, 2003) IBIS is used in conjunction with formal 
modeling. Here the facilitator can introduce pre-defined data structures or even create data 
structures that offer a more accurate representation than standard IBIS can. Note that this 
implies that partially shared representations may be used. None of the IBIS implementations 
we know of has other computational means to ensure coherence, detect conflicts or manage 
plausibility. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. QuestMap® IBIS skin. 
Decision Representation Language 
Decision Representation Language (DRL) is a notation developed to support qualitative 
decision making (Lee, 1990). The most important objects in DRL are Alternatives, Goals and 
Claims. Alternatives are the options between which a decision has to be made. Goals specify 
the desirable properties of an option. The top-level node of the goal hierarchy is a Decision 
Problem. Claims in DRL are used to represent arguments that are relevant to a decision 
between alternatives, and all relations in DRL are specializations of the claim object. A claim 
is related to another claim by a support, denies or qualifies relation. In other words, all objects 
and relations in DRL are refutable. Figure 2.9 presents the main elements of the DRL 
notation.  
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Decision
Problem
Alternative
claimQuestion
GoalGoal
Alternative
Goal
claim
denies
is-a-subgoal-of is-a-subgoal-of
is-a-subgoal-of
facilitates
facilitates
supports
claim claimclaim
supports qualifies
denies
queries
Question
influences
Decision
Problem
is-a-subdecision-of
claim
answers
 
Figure 2.9. Part of the DRL notation adapted from Lee, 1990 p. 112). 
 
SIBYL®, a prototype of a qualitative decision management system (Lee, 1990) is a computer 
implementation of DRL that offers a number of guidance and support services including 
plausibility management. The system manages plausibility by updating the a-priori plausibility 
of a claim once new claims are added that support, qualify or deny the original one. 
Plausibility management is a special form of dependency management that maintains a 
consistent state in the knowledge base when changes are introduced. In SIBYL® users can be 
associated with a claim, and the number of associated users can be used as a parameter in the 
procedures that update plausibility measures. Consider an example of SIBYL’s services 
applied to the arena of scientific inquiry. Here one might qualify the claim that data D 
supports hypothesis H by pointing out that D is measured using an unreliable instrument. If 
the plausibility of this statement surpasses a certain threshold, plausibility management will 
set the plausibility of the claim supports (D,H) to zero. On the larger scale of dependency 
management the effects may be further propagated. 
SIBYL® is a highly advanced implementation that requires strict use of the formalism of 
DRL. We do not intend to use DRL in such a way. The notation has a number of advantages 
that also in informal use allows users to express more than the notations encountered in 
CSCL or in IBIS. In DRL, for instance, one can discuss whether a piece of data is really 
supporting a hypothesis and one can even refute the data. Belvédère®, in contrast, treats 
‘data’ more or less as givens, that cannot be refuted by other data, because only evidential 
relations are supported (Chryssafidou, 1999). A first approximation of a DRL-based 
representational notation is presented in the next section of this chapter. 
A representational notation to support social science problem solving 
One of the goals of the present research is to develop a representational notation to support 
collaborative solving of social science problems. In the previous sections we saw how CSCL 
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and design-based environments using external representations each support particular types 
of problem solving. Most CSCL environments concentrate on the ‘Why’-aspects of problems, 
allowing their users to express claims about causes (hypotheses) and bring forward 
supporting or contradicting evidence (data). Design-based environment put more emphasis 
on the ‘How’-side. DRL for example supports reasoning about a number of alternative 
solutions to solve a problem. A combination of the representational notation found in the 
literature is needed to cover the full area of social science problem solving. 
Here, we present a first attempt at a representational notation to support collaborative 
solving of social science problems. The notation aims at allowing representation of the 
argumentation underlying the analysis and solution of the problem. It does not contain the 
kind of meta-cognitive scaffolds found in CSILE® or Knowledge Forum®. We are specifying a 
representational notation to capture claims and arguments about the analysis and solutions 
of problems. Whether all objects and relations of this notation are used and whether the 
notation as a whole is usable needs to be addressed as a separate issue (and one that we 
address in chapters 4 and 5).  
The notation is based on the DRL notation just presented. According to DRL all objects are 
specializations of a claim object. Thus, if one introduces a hypothesis (or cause) X, this in fact 
means that a claim is made that X is a cause. All claims can be challenged and they all are 
open to debate and refutable. The notation uses a number of standard relations of DRL such 
as ‘supports’, ‘denies’, ‘qualifies’, ‘influences’, ‘queries’, ‘answers’ and ‘facilitates’. We will 
not discuss these in detail. Remember, that these relations are also claims. So, if a ‘data 
object’ is connected to a particular hypothesis by means of a ‘support’-relation, then a claim is 
added that the data supports the hypothesis. This claim may be challenged by other claims, 
for instance one that asserts that the data is not measured in a valid way. An impression of 
the notation is presented in Figure 2.10. 
 
problem
scope
hypothesis
experiential
data
authority
Data
features
constraints
conditions
risks
intervention
outcome
assumptions
effect
assumptions
supports
question
queries
claimdenies
 
Figure 2.10. DRL-based representational notation. 
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We used concepts from the CSCL inquiry environments as well as from the design-based 
systems. From the inquiry environments objects such as hypothesis and data are used to make 
claims about potential causes and add data to support these claims. In order to allow 
differentiation between personal experience and data sources open for inspection, we have 
made a further subdivision between experiential and authority data. Neither the CSCL-
inquiry environments, nor the design-based systems offer means to express constraints to the 
problem or other statements indicating the scope of the problem. Experts, however, typically 
spend a substantial amount of time in getting these aspects of the problems clear (Voss, 
Tyler, et al., 1983). For that reason constraints and features as well as problem scope were added 
to the objects of the representational notation. 
The expert solution to a social science problem is, according to Voss, Tylor, et al. (1983), 
often abstract (‘improve the infrastructure’) and needs further detailing before it is a 
executable plan. Such a plan can become a complex set of interventions grouped into a 
project or a program. In order to support making statements (claims) about such a plan the 
representational notation contains concepts from Logical Framework Analysis (Sartorius, 
1996) and evaluation theory. Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) is a set of tools and methods 
for analyzing the causes of a social problem and formulating interventions that, through a 
chain of effects, is thought to solve the problem. LFA emphasizes the importance of the 
‘project logic’ that should exist in for instance the causal relations between interventions, 
short term and long-term effects. Objects in the notion such as interventions, their short-term 
outcomes and long-term effects as well as (pre)conditions and risks are based on LFA. LFA does 
not encourage or force participants to explicate the ‘theory’ behind the project as theory-
driven evaluation demands (Chen, 1990; Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999). To encourage 
statements about the program logic the object assumptions was added to express the reasons 
(empirical or theoretical) why the intervention may be expected to have the expected effects 
on the target population. By making different groupings of interventions, outcomes, effects 
and assumptions alternative plans can be created. A simple example of the application of this 
notation is presented in Figure 2.11. 
 
The representational notation can be considered an eclectic blend of several other notations. 
Its combination of characteristics make it suitable to represent the argumentation underlying 
the analysis, solution and its evaluation of social science problems. First, there is explicit 
support for problem orientation: objects are made available to express the scope of the 
problem (only highway accidents are considered) as well as its constraints (no changes to 
infrastructure). Preliminary ideas about the causes (high speed) can be formulated as 
hypotheses. When causes are further explored, authority (incidents statistics) as well as 
experiential data can be added to substantiate or weaken statements about causes. A question 
(are there statistics for highways?) can be added to focus attention to a pending issue. The 
formulation of a solution consists of an intervention (obligatory speed governor) accompanied 
by claims about the short-term and long-term effects (slower cars, less fatalities). The 
intervention is tested (evaluated) against stated constraints and, more or less as a rebuttal, 
(pre)conditions and risks that accompany the interventions can be described (speed governor 
will be rigged). Assumptions, assumed intervening mechanisms of the program’s theory or 
important ceteris paribus clauses, can be stated (driving habits will remain unchanged; impact 
speed will be reduced). Experiential as well as authority data can be added to support or 
weaken the claim that the solution will work, aiding evaluation. 
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problem scope:
highway 
accidents
hypothesis:
high speed causes
fatal accidents
exp. data:
'know that from 
my home town'
auth. data:
incidents 
statistics
constraints:
no change in 
roads
condition:
device cannot
 be rigged
intervention:
obligatory speed 
governor
outcome:
slower cars
assumption: 
driving habits 
unchanged
effect:
less fatalities
reduce impact 
speed
supports
separate for 
highways?
queries
people will 
override it
denies
 
Figure 2.11. Application of the representational notation to a  
fictitious example. 
Conclusions 
To get a clearer understanding of how external representations can be used to support 
collaborative solving of social science problems, we reviewed research in the psychological 
as well as the design approach to these problems. We tried to derive a number of demands 
from the description of problem solving activities and translate these in terms of 
requirements on services to be performed by a CSAV environment. We then compared these 
requirements to actual services found in some well-known CSCL environments. Finally, we 
concentrated on the core issue of the representational notation and discussed two of these 
notations that emerged from the design tradition. An implementation of the Decision 
Representation Language (DRL) was briefly discussed and shown to offer at least the same 
level of guidance and support as found in the CSCL environments. 
The core element of a system using external representations is the representational 
notation: the set of objects and relations and the rules of how to combine them. We derived 
such a representational notation from a number of sources. As stated above, we need to find 
out whether the notation as a whole is usable. The representational notation developed here 
is rich and rather complex. Elsewhere (Van Bruggen & Dekeyser, 2001; Van Bruggen, 
Kirschner, & Jochems, 2002) we have argued that rich representations may effectively put an 
additional cognitive burden on the learner, rather than offering off-loading effects (Duffy & 
Cunningham, 1996). Two questions have to be answered. First, are learners supported by 
such a complex representations when they try to derive adequate solutions? Or are simpler 
representations sufficient? Second, how usable is this complex representation for learners? In 
chapters 4 and 5 we address the second question by using the representational notation to 
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analyze the dialogues of students that are solving problems. The assumption being that if 
students already use concepts contained in the notation, the notation is probably easier to 
learn and apply. 
Before plunging into an implementation of the rich representational notation, we will 
consider whether more modest alternatives might work as well. In the next chapter we 
report on an experiment in an existing CSCL environment. A slightly adapted 
representational notation was introduced to find out whether that adapted notation 
supported collaborative solving of a social science problem.  
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 3 Using Belvédère for social science problem solving4 
The experiment discussed in this chapter is concerned with the use of computer-supported 
argument visualization (CSAV) in collaborative solving of social science problems (Voss, 
Greene, et al., 1983; Voss, Perkins, & Segal, 1991). These are problems where the problem 
solvers need to rely on informal reasoning to reach a solution that seems likely to solve the 
problem and is acceptable to the problem solvers. We used an existing tool (Belvédère®) for 
collaborative inquiry, but added slightly different meanings to its symbols to not only 
represent the analytical or Why-side (Why did X occur?), but also the more practical How-
side (How can we reduce X?). 
Belvédère® was developed to support scientific inquiry. Its representational notation 
corresponds to that domain: there are hypotheses (H) and data (D) and the relations between 
objects are evidential. One can express that D is consistent with H. One cannot express that D 
refutes H, or that D is a likely event. In our case, one can do the ‘Why’-side of the problem 
using the representational notation of Belvédère®, but there are no specialized means to 
express the ‘How’-side. Notwithstanding its dedicated nature, Belvédère® has been used as a 
more general tool to express argumentation (e.g., Veerman, 2000). One may ask whether the 
‘lack of fit’ between the task of solving a social science problem on the one hand, and the 
ontology and specificity of the representation on the other has any notable effect on problem 
solving. In this study we are interested in whether changes in the ontology and specificity of 
the objects in the external representation have any notable effects on the Belvédère® 
diagrams and the solutions that are proposed as a result of solving a social science problem. 
We restrict ourselves here to the representational notation and its representational guidance 
and do not address changes in the problem solving process or process guidance. 
The core hypothesis of this study is that (1) by incorporating objects in the 
representational notation of Belvédère® that are pertinent to ‘how’-questions and (2) by 
defining the meaning of other objects in such a way that ‘how’-aspects are included, a 
guidance effect is triggered that will bias the learner towards the ‘how’-questions rather than 
to merely analyzing the problem. There are a number of predictions related to this 
hypothesis. First, we do not expect that the richer ontology and higher specificity will lead to 
an easier processing of the material. On the contrary, these changes to the notation will 
require more processing, because participants have to make more categorical choices. This 
may affect such variables as time needed to process the material, the mental effort required 
to process the material et cetera. We do not address all of these effects, but concentrate on the 
effects on the external representations prepared by our participants, and their retention of 
the background material and their recommendations. We expect that a richer ontology and a 
higher specificity will lead to richer and more connected diagrammatic representations 
because participants need more objects and relations to represent the background material 
and their recommendations. As stated above, we expect higher specificity to require more 
processing and we expect this to be reflected in higher retention rates of the material and the 
results of their work, their recommended solutions to a social science problem. 
                                                     
4 We would like to express our gratitude to prof. dr. Martin Valcke, University of Ghent, for making 
this experiment possible and to our colleague Henk Münstermann for suggesting the topic and 
making available material on special and inclusive education. Parts of this chapter were presented at 
EARLI 2001 (Van Bruggen & Dekeyser, 2001) 
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Design and methods 
Participants 
Second year Education students (N=95, 86 female, 9 male) studying at the University of 
Ghent, Belgium participated in this study. The participants were randomly assigned to pairs 
(43) or occasionally to triplets (3), to work together on the experimental task. Pairs or triplets 
were randomly assigned to a High or Low Detail condition (see below). 
Design 
Participants, in pairs or triplets, worked on the solution of a social science problem, namely 
how to swiftly implement inclusive education in Belgium. Inclusive education is defined as 
the inclusion of pupils with (severe) handicaps in ‘normal’ schools. The alternative is 
maintaining special education schools or classes for these pupils. The pairs and triplets 
worked on solving the problem with the aid of a modified version of Belvédère® version 2. 
The experiment had a High Detail and a Low Detail condition. In the Low Detail 
condition participants were instructed to only use the objects Hypothesis - to represent 
assumptions - and Data to represent facts in their argument visualizations. In the High Detail 
condition participants were instructed to use the Belvédère® objects as follows: “Hypothesis: 
assumptions, in particular assumed problems for implementation”; “Principle: solutions to 
problems”, “Data: facts about the assumptions or the solutions”, “Unspecified: use this object 
to indicate where you need additional information”. Thus the High Detail condition had 
more objects (i.e., a richer ontology) as well as objects with a more specific meaning. An 
example of the use of this richer ontology is presented in the Belvédère® diagram in Figure 
3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Belvédère® diagram from a High Detail group. 
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Procedures and Materials 
Each group (pair or triplet) participated in one of the six sessions in which the data were 
collected. Each session lasted two hours. In these sessions the participants, after receiving 
instructions and filling out questionnaires, started to work using Belvédère®. Assistants were 
available to help students get acquainted with the Belvédère® environment. The second set of 
data was collected in a post session which took place five to seven weeks after the 
experimental session. 
The participants were instructed to compile recommendations on a rapid implementation 
of inclusive education in Belgium. We selected this subject because we assumed that 
Education students would find the topic interesting and we expected them to have some 
general knowledge of inclusive education, but not on the level of specific methods used in 
special education, specific implementation strategies et cetera. Participants were instructed 
that they should take into account criticism of inclusive education in their recommendations. 
They were given background material covering diverse aspects of inclusive education. Some 
of the material was considered not to be essential to compiling recommendations. It was 
added to ensure that participants would have to make a selection from the material for 
further consideration. 
The participants were instructed to use the Belvédère® environment to process the 
background material and to formulate their recommendations. The participants each worked 
on a computer that was running Belvédère® in ‘client mode’. In this mode the computers are 
connected over the Internet to a central Belvédère® server, which updates the client machines 
and stores the data (diagram, chat and conclusions). For the experiment we used a 
Belvédère® server located at the Open University of the Netherlands. Because the Internet 
connections to the Belvédère® server were not available for two of the sessions due to 
technical problems, we instructed the students in those sessions to work side-by-side at a 
single computer that ran a stand-alone version of Belvédère®. This affected ten groups, with 
in total twenty students. We decided to keep these students within the analyses since the 
way they had to cooperate – using a shared computer – is the modus operandi in most 
Belvédère® research. We contrast this collaboration mode (shared mode) with one in which 
students each operated their own computer (separate mode). 
Data collected 
A diverse set of data was collected during the experimental sessions and one post-session. 
First, a simple prior knowledge test was used to determine whether students had specific 
prior knowledge with respect to inclusive education. Considering the task (compile 
recommendations on the implementation of inclusive education) we do not expect general 
knowledge to be helpful in completing the task. We asked the participants to rate, on a 4-
point scale (1 = no knowledge of the concept, 4 = well known concept), their familiarity with 
general concepts related to special and inclusive education (e.g., Down’s Syndrome) as well 
as with concepts related to specific policies, projects and methods. 
Second, we gathered data on the experience the participants had with different types of 
computer applications. Although Belvédère® is very intuitive to use, it still may be hard to 
use for the complete computer novice or for someone without any typing skills. We therefore 
asked the participants to rate their experience with different types of computer applications 
(e.g., word processing, mail, chat, discussion groups) on a 4-point scale from no experience 
(=1) to very experienced (=4). 
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A third set of data was collected at the end of the session. Participants used rating scales 
to describe how relevant, new and difficult the background material was, and whether the 
time allotted was sufficient to complete the task. 
The core of the data was collected on the outcomes of the problem solving process, 
namely the recommendations and the Belvédère® diagrams that the participants compiled. 
The Belvédère® diagrams that the students created during the sessions were recovered from 
the Belvédère® server or from the stand-alone systems (sessions 1 and 4). Participants 
entered their recommendations into the Belvédère® conclusion window or put them down 
in writing in the sessions where stand-alone systems were used (1 and 4). Data loss due to 
data-transport problems restricts us to reporting on only a subset of the diagrams and 
recommendations entered. For similar reasons we cannot report on the Belvédère® chats. 
Obviously there are no chat records for the two stand-alone sessions, but the data of the 
other sessions were affected as well by data transport problems and subsequent hardware 
failures that left only pieces of the chats. 
The last set of data was collected during one post-session that came five to seven weeks 
after the experimental sessions. During this session students answered three factual 
questions on the background material and produced a written recall of the 
recommendations, problems and solutions that they had compiled during the experimental 
session. 
Results 
Prior knowledge of special and inclusive education 
Prior knowledge of special and inclusive education was measured using a questionnaire in 
which participants rated their knowledge of a number of general concepts (1, 2, 6, 9, 12), 
policies and projects on implementing integrated or inclusive education (4, 5, 8, 11) and 
pedagogical methods (3, 7, 10) found in special and inclusive education. The main statistics 
of the items in the prior knowledge scale are reported in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 
Statistics of the Items on Prior Knowledge of Special and 
Inclusive Education (N=95) 
 Concept M Md SD 
1 Special Education 3.31 3 .64 
2 Down’s Syndrome (n=94) 3.25 3 .71 
3 Feuerstein method 1.39 1 .59 
4 Normally different project 1.20 1 .47 
5 Integrated Education  3.01 3 .89 
6 Inclusive Education (n=94) 3.65 4 .50 
7 Instrumental Enrichment 1.09 1 .29 
8 Mentor project 1.37 1 .62 
9 Psycho-Medical Social Center  3.67 4 .52 
10 Gesture-supported speech  1.49 1 .91 
11 Salamanca declaration 1.33 1 .57 
12 Learning handicaps  1.06 1 .35 
Note. 1 = unknown, 4 = well known 
 
Table 3.1 shows that students reported greater familiarity with the concepts related to 
inclusive and special education in general and with the Integrated Education initiative than 
with the specific policies, projects and methods to foster inclusive education. Since the task 
did not require the participants to come up with implementation plans specific to certain 
learning or behavioral handicaps, but rather for more general implementation plans for 
inclusive education, we decided to use all the items in an index for prior knowledge. The 
index was calculated by totaling the scores of the items and dividing them by the number of 
valid responses (M = 2.15, SD=.28)5. The reliability of this index in terms of internal 
consistency was found to be acceptable (α = .67). 
Experience with different types of ICT applications 
Prior experience with ICT was measured by having participants rate their experience with 
different types of computer applications. The results are summarized in Table 3.2. 
                                                     
5 Although the calculations and analyses reported here and elsewhere in this chapter may require – 
formally speaking – interval level measurement of the ratings, we have decided to treat the ratings, 
according to statistical practice, as interval data (see Lord, F.M., & Novick, M.R. (1968). Statistical 
theories of mental test scores. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, p. 22). 
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Table 3.2 
Statistics for the Items on ICT Prior Knowledge (N=95) 
Type of Application M Md SD 
Text processing 3.19 3 .57 
Spreadsheets 1.45 1 .63 
Presentation software (n=94) 1.72 2 .72 
Database 1.45 1 .60 
Drawing 1.66 2 .69 
Email (n=94) 3.44 4 .66 
Web browsers 1.72 1 .88 
Discussion groups  2.53 3 .93 
Chatting (n=94) 2.41 2 1.04 
MUDS and MOOs 1.06 1 .24 
Collaborative software 1.24 1 .56 
Note. 1 = no experience, 4 = lot of experience 
 
The summary statistics of Table 3.2 show that the participants are most experienced with text 
processing, email, discussion groups and chatting. All this suggests that there is no reason to 
assume that lack of computer handling skills could bias the results of the experiment. For 
further analyses an index for prior experience on the mean of the valid scores was prepared. 
This index has a mean of 1.99 and an SD of .36. The reliability in terms of internal consistency 
(α = .71) is acceptable for the purposes of the research. 
Ratings of the background material and available time 
We asked participants to rate (in percentages) how much of the background material was 
relevant and how much of it was new. We further asked them to rate the difficulty of the 
material on a 5-point scale ranging from “(1) very difficult” to “(5) very easy”. Finally 
participants used a 5-point scale ranging from “(1) far too little time” to “(5) far too much 
time” to rate whether there was sufficient time allotted to complete the task. Summary 
statistics of these measures can be found in Table 3.3. The table contains a breakdown of the 
data according to Detail condition as well as one according to Collaboration condition. 
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Table 3.3 
Ratings of the Background Material and the Time Available 
for the Task per Detail and Collaboration Conditions 
  Detail  Collaboration  
  Low High  Separate Shared Total 
 Percentage of material considered relevant 
M 53.44 59.69 56.32 57.69 56.70 
Md 50 60 60 60 60 
SD 22.07 18.80 21.15 19.30 20.56 
N 45 49 68 26 94a 
 Percentage of material considered new 
M 53.78 53.64 51.84 58.65 53.71 
Md 50 53.5 50 55 50 
SD 16.89 18.54 17.78 16.77 17.69 
N 45 50 69 26 95 
 Difficulty of the material 
M 3.07 3.12 3.07 3.15 3.09 
Md 3 3 3 3 3 
SD .62 .66 .65 .61 .64 
N 45 50 69 26 95 
 Time available for the task 
M 2.24 2.60 2.32 2.73 2.43 
Md 2 2 2 2 2 
SD .98 1.03 .93 1.19 1.02 
N 45 50 69 26 95 
a  One student did not answer this question 
 
Most of the material (53 – 60 %) was considered relevant and the majority (54% overall) of 
the material was rated as new by the participants. The difficulty of the material was rated as 
average (M = 3.1 on a 5-point scale). Finally, the time available for the task is rated as being 
limited (M = 2.4 on a 5-point scale). There is no statistically significant relation between these 
ratings and the prior knowledge index (r varied from -.08 to .13). 
We expected that higher specificity of the notational system would make the material 
harder to process and that this would result in participants perceiving the material as more 
difficult and the time available as less adequate. However, students in the High Detail 
condition rated the material as easier and the available time as more adequate. Only the 
ratings of the relevancy of the material by students in the High Detail condition were higher 
than those in the Low Detail condition. We explored the latter contrast and the ones in the 
Separate-Shared conditions using analysis of variance, that is, assuming interval scale 
measurement. No contrast was statistically significant. Thus, contrary to our expectations, 
specificity (and ontology) had neither an influence on the perception of the relevancy, 
difficulty or novelty of the material, nor on the evaluation of the time available for the task. 
Recommendations 
The participants’ main task was to draw up recommendations on how to implement 
inclusive education. The recommendations and the diagrams that they created reaching 
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those recommendations are the joint products of two or three participants working together. 
Therefore, our analysis uses the group as observational unit. Data are available for only 28 
groups (59 participants) due to loss of data on the server. The recommendations were copied 
from the Belvédère® server or, if they were handwritten, typed out after which they were 
scored by one trained and experienced coder. This coder had already done the coding of the 
recall of the recommendations (reported in Table 3.11) where the same coding protocol was 
used. Considering the high correlations that were achieved at that coding, we considered the 
coding procedure to be reliable enough to have only this one experienced coder code the 
data. The protocol asked the coder to differentiate between recommendations and problems 
and their respective elaborations. The basic statistics of the results are shown in Table 3.4. 
The most remarkable result is the low mean for problems identified for implementation of 
inclusive education. Although they were instructed to identify problems for the 
implementations, participants mention and elaborate only a few problems (on average less 
than one), while more than five recommendations on average are given. 
 
Table 3.4 
Statistics for the Number of Recommendations and 
Problems and their Elaborations of the Groups (n=28) 
 M SD 
Recommendations  5.29 3.79 
Elaborations 1.29 1.12 
Problems .79 1.34 
Elaborations .21 .50 
 
We predicted that more recommendations and more elaborations would be made in the 
High Detail condition. Table 3.5 reports the means and standard deviations for the number 
of recommendations and problems and their elaborations. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
balance due to technical problems; we have 9 Low Detail groups versus 19 High Detail 
groups. The differences between the means of the conditions are small and none of the 
differences approaches statistical significance. 
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Table 3.5 
Recommendations and Problems for 
Low and High Detail Conditions 
 Detail Condition 
  Low 
(n = 9) 
High 
(n = 19) 
 Recommendations 
M 5.78 5.05 
SD 4.84 3.31 
 Elaborations of 
recommendations 
M 1.11 1.37 
SD 1.36 1.01 
 Problems 
M .67 .84 
SD 1.12 1.46 
 Elaborations of problems
M .11 .26 
SD .33 .56 
 
 
Table 3.6 
Recommendations and Problems and their Elaborations 
broken down by the Conditions of the Experiment 
 Collaboration mode 
 Separate Shared 
Detail Low 
(n = 4) 
High 
(n = 11) 
Low 
(n = 5) 
High 
(n = 8) 
 Recommendations 
M 4.50 3.91 6.80 6.63 
SD 4.20 1.97 5.54 4.21 
 Elaborations of recommendations 
M 2.00 1.36 .40 1.38 
SD 1.41 1.03 .89 1.06 
 Problems 
M .75 1.09 .60 .50 
SD .96 1.70 1.34 1.07 
 Elaborations of problems 
M .00 .27 .20 .25 
SD .00 .47 .45 .71 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance showed no statistical effects for any of the main or 
interaction factors, although the main effect of Collaboration Mode nearly reached the 5% 
limit (Λ = .663, F (4,21) = 2.67, p = .06). Subsequent univariate analyses revealed no significant 
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differences between the means, but hinted to the low number of elaborations of the 
recommendations in the low detail-shared condition as causing the ‘near-effect’. All in all, 
the data do not confirm the prediction that the High Detail condition would lead to 
formulation of more recommendations and problems or to more elaborations.  
Belvédère® diagrams 
There were 43 Belvédère® diagrams available for analysis across the different conditions (see 
Table 3.7).  
Table 3.7 
Number of Diagrams Obtained in the Conditions 
of the Experiment 
 Detail Condition 
Collaboration mode Low High 
Separate  15  15 
Shared  5  8 
Note. There were 89 participants in the 43 groups 
 
The content of the diagrams varied widely. Whereas some groups entered several concepts 
and relations to diagram substantial portions of their analysis of the background material, 
others produced diagrams with very few concepts and relations. For the scoring of the 
diagrams, it is important to realize that the diagrams here are not used to represent a 
scientific argumentation. Measures that are based on a balance between pro- and contra 
arguments (e.g. as used by Veerman, 2000) are therefore not satisfactory for our purpose. 
Moreover, since the groups used different sets of objects, we cannot use measures that are 
dependent on the existence of one underlying object set. We have therefore adopted a very 
simple scheme and rated the diagrams in terms of the richness and connectivity of their 
content. Richness is defined as the total number of objects and relations in the diagram and 
connectivity is measured as the number of relations per object in the diagram6.  
The main characteristics of the Belvédère® diagrams are reported in Table 3.8. Looking at the 
Detail conditions, we see that students in general did what they were instructed to do. In the 
Low Detail group the diagrams contain fewer objects of the principle type. The same holds 
true for the number of unspecified objects (the number of the Low Detail group reported 
here is inflated by one diagram that has 17 objects of type unspecified). Other outcomes are 
less obvious. Diagrams in the Low Detail condition show higher richness than those made in 
the High Detail condition. The same difference exists between the Separate and Shared 
collaboration mode. 
 
                                                     
6 Strictly speaking, the maximum number of relations is the combination NC2 where N is the number of 
objects. This correction makes sense if the number of objects is very small. For somewhat larger 
numbers the correction looses sense both computational - the combination grows rapidly – and 
semantically as the correction implies a comparison to a representation where all possible connections 
between all objects are made. 
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Table 3.8 
Overall means of the characteristics of the Belvédère® diagrams for the detail 
and collaboration condition 
Detail Collaboration mode 
Low  
(n = 20) 
High  
(n = 23) 
Separate
(n = 30) 
Shared 
(n = 13) 
Objects20.45 16.30 19.90 14.38 
Relations18.40 15.52 18.93 12.08 
Richness (Σ objects + relations) 38.85 31.83 38.83 26.46 
Connectivity (relations per
object)
.88 .90 .93 .80 
Disconnected objects .95 .48 .57 1.00 
    
Data objects12.05 6.78 9.47 8.69 
Hypotheses 6.65 5.30 7.07 3.31 
Principles .70 2.91 1.77 2.15 
Unspecified 1.05 1.30 1.60 .23 
For relations 9.60 8.74 10.07 7.00 
Against relations 4.90 3.78 4.90 2.92 
AND relations 3.90 3.00 3.97 2.15 
 
The High Detail groups produced diagrams with less richness than the Low Detail groups. 
The results for connectivity are almost the same for both conditions. Thus with the exception 
of a slightly higher number of relations per object for the High Detail condition all data point 
to an opposite direction than the one predicted: higher specificity and richer ontology did 
not result in richer diagrams with higher connectivity. The evidence suggests that exactly the 
reverse is closer to the truth. Inspection of the collaboration mode data in Table 3.8 shows 
that the differences between the means here are larger. This is reported in more detail in 
Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9 
Means of Diagram Characteristics and Number 
of Groups for the Two Conditions 
Collaboration mode 
 Separate Shared Total 
Detail Richness 
Low 41.20 
(n = 15)a 
31.80 
(n = 5) )a 
38.85 
(n = 20) 
High 36.47 
(n = 15) )a 
23.13 
(n = 8) )a 
31.83 
(n = 23) 
Total 38.83 26.46  35.09 
 Connectivity 
Low .92 .78 .88 
High .95 .82 .90 
Total .93 .80 .89 
a The number of observations for connectivity are equal to 
the data presented here and are not repeated. 
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The data in the table suggest that both Collaboration Mode and Detail have an effect on the 
richness and connectivity of the diagrams. Collaborating at separate workstations using a 
representational notation with low specificity appears to lead to diagrams with the highest 
richness, while working at a shared workstation with high detail leads to diagrams with the 
lowest richness. A multivariate analysis with richness and connectivity as dependent 
variables and Detail and Collaboration Mode as factors showed no overall significant effect 
for Detail (Λ = .925, F(2,38) = 1.54, p = .23), but the effect for Collaboration Mode (Λ = .865, 
F(2,38) = 2.965, p = .06) was such that we explored it further. Univariate tests of the between-
subjects effects revealed a statistical significance for the Collaboration Mode factor for 
richness (F(1,39) = 4.229, p = .05) and connectivity (F(1,39) = 4.83, p = .03). Apparently, 
collaboration mode affects the richness of the diagrams. These results, however, have to be 
interpreted with caution: the Collaboration Mode condition was introduced more or less by 
accident and it resulted in an unbalanced design. The univariate analyses exhaust the 
degrees of freedom available for independent testing and the underlying data show large 
differences in the number of observations per cell with substantial differences in standard 
deviations between the cells as well. Replication of this study is therefore necessary.  
Retention of recommendations 
During the post-session we asked the participants (n = 75) to recall and write down the 
recommendations they had compiled at the experimental session, the problems they had 
expected and the solutions to those problems. These written recalls were typed out and 
scored according to a detailed scoring protocol. Separate scores were given for the number of 
recommendations, number of identified problems and number of solutions in the written 
recalls. For each of these categories the number of different elaborations that the participants 
added to these topics was counted. Note that this is a coding scheme that does not take into 
account the accuracy of the retention, but is solely based on the recall written down at the 
post-session. Thus the imagination of the participants may have led to recommendations that 
are beyond the ones they produced during the experimental session. On the other hand, this 
is a bit of a moot point, because we do not know what participants discussed during the 
experimental session. 
The data were coded independently by a trained coder who was experienced in coding 
problem solving protocols and the author. Inspection of the raw scores showed that there 
were major discrepancies in 6 of the first 61 cases, that is, in 6 of the 366 scores given. These 
discrepancies were checked with the coder and led to a recoding of three items. The codes of 
the other items were discussed, but no changes were made. All analyses are based on the 
(corrected) codes of the trained coder only. The correlation between the coders is reported in 
Table 3.10.  
Table 3.10 
Number of Participants who provided Data and the Pearson Correlations 
Between Coders on the Counts of Recommendations, Problems and 
 Solutions 
 n a Number  Elaborations Total 
Recommendations 61 .87 .75 .89 
Problems 66 .87 .50 .82 
Solutions 45 .87 .78 .84 
a n is the number of participants who provided data on this topic 
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The results for the retention of recommendations, problems and solutions are summarized in 
Table 3.11. Note that the number of recalls is rather low, especially for solutions (where 
many students indicated that they had no idea whatsoever) and the elaborations. The data 
was analyzed to see whether there were differences between the sessions one to four (that 
took place seven weeks before the post-session) and sessions five and six (that were five 
weeks before the post-session). The groups with the seven week interval indeed showed less 
retention of the material, but no such effect is visible for the recommendations. All 
differences have significance levels of .30 or higher, thus there is no indication that the 
additional two weeks to the post-session have biased the results for participants of the 
sessions 1 to 4. 
Table 3.11 
Counts of the Recommendations, Problems 
and Solutions Stated and their Respective 
Elaborations 
 Stated Elaborations Total 
 Recommendations (n = 61)a 
M 2.57 .89 3.46 
SD 1.87 1.25 2.60 
 Problems (n = 66) a 
M 1.92 .50 2.42 
SD 1.19 .77 1.60 
 Solutions (n = 45) a 
M 1.62 .47 2.09 
SD .91 .79 1.28 
a n is the number of participants who provided 
data on this topic 
 
Considering the drop in responses we focused further analysis on the retention of 
recommendations and problems and worked further with a total score for number and 
elaboration. In Table 3.12 the results of the retention of recommendations and problems and 
their respective elaborations are reported for the Collaboration and Detail conditions.  
Table 3.12 
Counts of the Total (Number plus Elaboration) for 
Recommendations and Problems 
 Collaboration  Detail 
 Separate Shared  Low High 
 Recommendations 
M 3.36 
(n = 47) 
3.79 
(n = 14) 
 3.33 
(n = 30) 
3.58 
(n = 31) 
 Problems 
M 2.38 
(n = 50) 
2.56 
(n = 16) 
 2.90 
(n = 29) 
2.05 
 (n = 37) 
 
The results suggest that there may be a condition effect. Whereas we found that in the 
Shared Collaboration Mode fewer objects and relations were entered into the diagrams, the 
retention data reported here suggest that this did not lead to less processing of the material 
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or the joint recommendations. On the contrary, we find that participants who were in the 
shared collaboration conditions recall more recommendations, problems and their respective 
elaborations. The results for the Detail conditions are mixed: The retention of 
recommendations for High Detail is higher than for Low Detail. The reverse however, occurs 
for retention of problems. The mean retention results are broken down per condition in Table 
3.13. 
Table 3.13 
Recalled Recommendations (Number and Elaborations) 
by Detail and Collaboration Mode 
 Detail Condition 
 Low High 
 Separate Shared Separate Shared 
 Recommendations 
M 2.96  5.20 3.82 3.00 
n 25 5 22 9 
 Problems 
M 2.61 4.00 2.19 1.70 
n 23 6 27 10 
 
Multivariate analysis of variance indicated significant effects for Detail (Λ = .876, F(2,52) = 3.67, 
p = .03) as well as for the interaction between Detail and Collaboration mode (Λ = .891, F(2,52) = 
3.19, p = .05). Subsequent univariate tests show that the significant effects are due to the 
effects on recall of the problems. Both the main effect of Detail (F(1,53) = 7.33, p =.01) and the 
interaction between Detail and Collaboration Mode (F(1,53) = 5.938, p = .02) are significant, that 
is (1) Low Detail recall of problems is significantly higher than High Detail recall and (2) the 
interaction between Detail and Collaboration Mode as shown in Figure 3.2 is the result of the 
different trends in the Shared condition. Low Detail recall shows an increase from Separate 
to Shared Collaboration, whereas High Detail recall decreases. 
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Figure 3.2. Recalled problems by collaboration 
mode and detail condition. 
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In summary: We found a main effect of the detail condition on the recall of the problems. 
More problems and/or their elaborations were recalled in the Low Detail condition, in 
particular when participants worked in Shared Collaboration Mode (the interaction effect). 
Again, the results contradict the predictions: higher specificity and a richer ontology did not 
lead to a better retention and recall of recommendations and problems. Our data indicate 
that the opposite effect is closer to the truth: Low Detail is associated with more recall, 
especially for Shared Collaboration conditions. 
Retention of material 
At the post-session we asked the participants three factual questions on particular parts of 
the background material that they had used in the experimental session. For example 
“Scheepstra did research on social integration of children with Down syndrome in regular 
education. What were her main conclusions?” or “What are the objections of the Flemish 
Board of Education against effect evaluations and what type of research are they proposing 
as an alternative?” The hand-written answers to these questions were typed and scored by 
the coder and the author using a detailed scoring protocol that assigned points for particular 
topics in the answers. In general, the participants recalled very few items of the material. 
This is reflected in the number of data available (declining from 40 to 12 answers) which also 
influenced the agreement between the coders: correlations for the scores on the three 
questions were .815 (n = 40), .411 (n = 34) and -.127 (n = 12). The summary statistics for the 
scores on retention of background material are given in Table 3.14. The numbers of available 
data and the low means indicate that participants had a very limited retention of the 
background material (Note: Students were not instructed at the time of the experimental 
sessions to try to remember the material). 
Table 3.14 
Summary Statistics for Retention of 
Background Material 
 
 
Question 1
(n = 40) 
Question 2
(n = 34) 
Question 3
(n = 12) 
M .50 .69 .08 
SD .72 .58 .29 
 
We analyzed the effects of condition on retention of material and got some puzzling results: 
Whereas on question 1 the Low Details scored significantly lower than the High Details, no 
difference whatsoever was found on question 2. The type of question was the same and the 
content of the questions does not give a hint. However, the retention scores are so low in 
general that we should not put too much emphasis on their meaning even if there is, 
statistically speaking, a significant effect. 
Discussion 
There is one clear picture emerging from the data collected in this experiment: the ontology 
and specificity, at least as operationalized here in the Detail condition, had none of the 
predicted effects. We found no effect on the perceived difficulty, no effect on the recall of the 
material, and no effect on the evaluation of the time available for the task. Further, no effect 
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could be demonstrated on the richness and connectivity of the Belvédère® diagrams 
produced by the participants (Low Detail was rich and exhibited more connectivity). Finally, 
no effect of the experimental condition could be demonstrated on the recommendations and 
problems (and their elaborations) compiled during the experimental session or their recall 
several weeks later. Although the experiment was hampered by technical problems, these 
results come out very consistently in all parts of the data. One of the few statistically 
significant effects found pointed in an opposite direction: Low Detail recall of problems was 
higher than High Detail recall and even more so in a Shared Collaboration Mode. 
Most teams worked in ‘separate’ mode with team members sitting at their own computer 
running a Belvédère® client. As stated previously, for two sessions of the experiment this 
condition could not be realized and here Shared Collaboration Mode was introduced, an 
‘accidental’ condition that however mimics the conditions under which most research with 
Belvédère® is done. We found that students working in Separate mode in general entered 
more objects and relations in the diagrams than those who worked together using one 
computer (Shared mode). The results corroborate earlier results found with Belvédère® 
(Suthers, 1999): when students work together using the same computer they tend to use the 
diagram to consolidate the results of their discussion, rather than to bring forward their 
individual opinions. This may result in fewer objects being added to the diagrams. 
Subjects working in this Shared Mode have another advantage in that they have more 
powerful coordination mechanisms (i.e., plain ordinary speech and gestures), whereas in the 
Separate Condition students have to use a chat window to do the coordination. Veerman 
notes that students using Belvédère® needed to spend a high amount of effort to co-ordinate 
their communication and they “(…) spent half of their messages to technical issues and 
planning aspects, mainly considering the co-ordination of actions in order to construct a 
diagram” (Veerman, 2000, p. 121). This observation suggests that the communication service 
that Belvédère® offers (a chat-box) is at odds with the communication demands of the task. 
In chapter 2 we identified a demand for issue-based, conversational type of communication 
for the problem orientation state. For the problem solving state a demand for a topic-based 
type of communication was formulated. We can see that Belvédère® offers a mixture of 
conversational communication in the chat box and topic-based communication in the 
diagram. However, there are no facilities to create a link between objects in the diagram and 
the chat box. Moreover, the diagram window only contains a representation of an argument, 
one cannot use it to discuss planning or co-ordinate actions as would an agenda with actions 
to work on the diagram. 
We, unfortunately, do not have the data on the chats or the dialogues that allow us to 
determine whether the contributions of objects and relations to the dialogue differentiates 
between the conditions (for example because students working separately generate more 
ideas), or whether the coordination processes make the difference (the same amount of ideas 
is generated but more of them are discarded in the coordination dialogue and never enter the 
diagrams).  
The experiment failed to produce evidence for a number of predicted effects of specificity 
and ontology. Most of the data in fact pointed to directions contrary to the predictions. A 
number of alternative explanations for the lack of effect of specificity and ontology can be 
offered. In the first place we may consider the idea that the complexity of the High Detail 
condition requires so much additional coordination that students enter (or keep) fewer 
objects and relations in the diagrams. Even without studying the actual coordination 
processes of the learners, this is not a very likely explanation, because even in the shared 
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condition where students can coordinate more easily we find that Low Detail is accompanied 
by higher richness and connectivity. 
A more basic explanation is that students in the High Detail condition simply require 
more time for decision making on the categorical choices. This however is at odds with the 
reports of the students themselves: those in the High Detail condition were more positive 
about the available time than those working in the Low Detail condition. 
A second type of explanation to consider is that our definition (i.e., our representational 
notation) of the objects in Belvédère® did not focus students or did not help them in making 
the categorical choices they needed to make to complete the task. Remember that in the Low 
Detail condition participants were instructed to only use hypothesis - to represent 
assumptions - and data to represent facts. In the High Detail condition objects were added 
that differentiated between analysis and the formulation of a solution or at least drew 
attention to the distinction: the meaning of the hypothesis symbol was illustrated with 
respect to implementation problems and the principle object was defined as ‘solution to 
problems’. It seems that in the definition of the objects a number of relevant distinctions are 
being made but not sufficiently to support the students in formulating recommendations. In 
the instructions to the participants we stipulated that they were to present recommendations 
on the implementation of inclusive education, not their vision or opinion on inclusive 
education. We instructed participants to consider problems and dissenting views in their 
recommendations, but as we saw in the analyses, students formulated only a few problems. 
They concentrated on mapping the background material and often formulated - as their 
solution - a position (‘we are in favor of inclusive education’) and an example 
implementation (‘as done in…’). This suggests that more is needed than changing the 
representational notation alone – in particular process support may be necessary, cf 
Kanselaar et al. (2003) on computer-based environments to support collaborative 
argumentative writing. 
 Conclusions 
The experiment presented here has some ‘one-shot’ features: we used an existing system 
with its symbols, although we changed some of the meanings, to support solving a different 
type of problem than the system was designed for. In the High Detail condition we added 
some interpretations to the symbols to make them more usable for the ‘how’-aspects of 
problem solving. One may argue that the results reported here were, certainly with the 
wisdom of hindsight, predictable: one cannot assume that minimal changes to a system for 
scientific inquiry will make it usable in other contexts and especially for other purposes. 
The results reported and an informal inspection of the content of the recommendations 
give no reason to assume that adding a more specific and somewhat richer set of objects to 
an environment such as Belvédère® will ultimately lead to better solutions. Both the content 
of the representational notation as well as the process in which its use is embedded need 
scrutiny. Considering the type of problems that we are interested in, the representational 
notation and the process are to be derived from areas like social science problem solving or 
evaluation, rather than that of scientific inquiry. Such a representational notation was 
presented in the previous chapter, but it is more complex than the one used in the current 
study. There are reasons however that lead us to believe that it is not necessary to directly 
abandon the use of a more complex scheme. It might, in a different setting, still yield good 
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results. A more dedicated scheme would signal to the students what sort of topics they need 
to address. This sort of process support seems desirable, if students, as was the case with the 
second year students of this study, had little prior knowledge of the specifics of the problem. 
In the next chapter we present a first, modest step to research the usability of a richer 
representational notation among beginning experts.  
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4 Towards a representational notation for social science problem 
solving7 
One of the conclusions of the previous chapter was that students needed more than an add-
on notation for tackling ‘social science’ problems in a CSCL-environment. We also concluded 
that they encountered problems because they had insufficient knowledge of the problem 
area. It is clear that direct translation of an external representation with an inquiry ontology 
to a different one (social science problems) is not the answer. At this point the research took a 
different route, namely the development and testing of a notation instead of an external 
representation tool for asynchronous CSCL. 
Here we report on a first attempt to validate a representational notation that may support 
students who collaboratively solve ‘social science’ problems or analyze proposed solutions to 
these sorts of problems. The representational notation was introduced in chapter 2 and here 
we are concerned with its usability. As a first step we are interested to know whether 
students, without being instructed in the notation, already use concepts that are part of the 
notation. The idea is that if the concepts are already used by the participants, then the 
representational notation will be easier to learn and use. We do not expect students to use the 
exact terminology of the representational notation: they may, for instance, refer to ‘actions’ 
rather than to ‘interventions’. The essential question is whether the concepts of the 
representational notation can be used to express the content of the student dialogue and 
whether these concepts help us understand their problem solving process. If that is the case, 
it supports the idea that the representational notation contains concepts and distinctions that 
the students are able to handle and that these are important concepts to help students solve 
these problems. The next step then is to incorporate the representational notation in an 
environment where students collaboratively solve problems. Figure 4.1 presents the notation 
in all details. 
                                                     
7 We like to express our gratitude to prof. dr. Tom Duffy, Indiana University, for making available the 
data on which we report here. The development and testing of the coding scheme were done in 
cooperation with dr. Chad Carr. A shortened form of this chapter was presented at CSCL 2003 
(Kirschner, Van Bruggen, & Duffy, 2003). 
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Figure 4.1 A Decision Representation Language (DRL). 
representation scheme for analyzing complex problem solving. 
Design and methods 
Method 
To initially determine the usability and usefulness of the representation notation we 
discussed in chapter 2, we used it to analyze a small set of discussion protocols of students 
trying to find a solution to the continued increase in the number of drop-outs from school. 
The participants were 9 American university students with different educational 
backgrounds (debating, philosophy, education; each group consisting of three participants 
with the same background). The groups were selected because of the specific expertise that 
they were supposed to bring to the task. The Educators brought content knowledge of the 
educational system and educational policies. The two other groups brought process 
knowledge to the tasks. The Philosophers supposedly brought expertise in the areas of 
systematic analysis, valid reasoning and argumentation. The Debaters were supposed to 
bring process expertise in systematically discussing problems and arguing for specific 
solutions. 
The participants were confronted with the following problem: The annual meeting of the 
Board of State Governors has asked a team of experts, you, to prepare recommendations to 
reduce school drop-out and to present those recommendations to the Board within a month. 
Participants were further instructed that they would have one other meeting shortly before 
the presentation to the Board of Governors, and that they could compile a list of research 
questions to be answered before that meeting. Their goal was to prepare a 10 minute 
presentation for the governors.  
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We prepared an analysis scheme based on the external representation described above to 
code the content of the typed written protocols of the first 90-minute sessions (see the 
Appendix). The scheme used four main categories: (1) problem analysis and problem scope; 
(2) features and constraints for the solution; (3) interventions (including expected outcomes 
and assumptions) and (4) the planning of the presentation. Each category had several 
subcategories. In the coding scheme all statements relating to a topic, including critical 
remarks or questions are scored. The coding scheme with examples for the categories and 
subcategories are in the Appendix. 
The typed-written protocols were segmented on the basis of the speech turns taken in the 
dialogue. This is a somewhat ‘defensive’ segmentation strategy and certainly one that could 
lead to loss of data if subjects expressed different topics within one turn. It has the advantage 
of being objective, whereas alternatives would have implied that we would either have to 
rely on the segmentation put in by the typists (segment on punctuation) or use a fine-grained 
segmentation based on clauses, many of them, likely, containing elaborations of the same 
content. 
Since a turn may address different topics, coders were instructed to code for the main idea 
expressed in the turn. In addition, we asked them to indicate where they would have 
preferred to segment a turn to make it easier to code. Their additional segmentation (less 
than 10% of the turns) was, however, not used in the analysis reported here. 
Each of the three protocols was coded by two of the three trained coders that were 
available. The coders who were unaware of the backgrounds of the participants each coded 
two protocols. The coding was based on the typed protocols only (no audio or video data 
were available). Coders were instructed that, only in cases where the protocols contained 
explicit notes on intonation, they could use these notes to derive the meaning of interspersed 
affirmatives, negations, et cetera. The turns themselves were all coded as ‘other’. We made 
no attempts to have the coders resolve disagreement. The results reported here, with the 
exception of reliabilities, are based on one coded protocol for each of the groups. 
Results 
Quantitative results 
Coders classified the segments in one of four main categories (Analysis, Constraints, 
Intervention, Presentation). The category Analysis was used for statements relating to the 
scope of the problem, the causes of the problem, including statements about these causes 
(hypotheses) and evidence (data) brought forward in support of these hypotheses. In this 
category we also included statements about principles and the research questions that could 
be formulated. The main category Constraints was used to code for statements about 
desirable or necessary features as well as preconditions and risks. The main category 
Intervention was used for statements dealing with interventions proposed, their expected 
short-term and long-term effects and statements about how the interventions would lead to 
these effects. The Presentation category was used for statements relating to the preparation of 
the presentation that the subjects, according to their instruction, had to deliver. Further 
details and examples are given in the Annex. 
Each main category had two to six minor categories. Agreements between the two coders 
on the main categories was 72%, 77% and 79% for the Philosophers (P), Educators (E) and 
Debaters (D) protocols. Kappa’s for the protocols were .59 (P), .66 (E) and .69 (D) 
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respectively, which is sufficient to further explore the data. Agreements for the minor 
categories range were 66% (P), 69% (E) and 72% (D). The Kappa’s for the total of minor 
categories were 0.53 (P), 0.57 (E) and 0.62 (D); per category the Kappa’s differ greatly. 
Table 4.1 presents the number of segments coded overall and the subset of those segments 
in one of the four main categories. As the table shows, the coders were able to classify over 
50% of the segments into one of the four main categories. The number of segments, the total 
number of words and the mean number of words per segments in the protocol, reported in 
Table 4.2 indicate that the Debaters were considerably more verbose than the Philosophers 
and Educators, using roughly twice as many words across the segments. However, as the 
stereotype would have it, the Philosophers tended to produce much longer turns – at least 
50% longer than the Educators or Debaters. 
 
Table 4.1 
The Proportion of Segments Classified into each of the 
Main Topic Categories or as ‘Other’ for the Philosophers (P), 
Educators (P) and Debaters(D) 
Categorya P E D 
Analysis 12.4 19.5 22.8 
Constraints 14.8 3.3 1.4 
Interventions 21.6 15.0 25.0 
Presentation 5.6 11.9 2.8 
Other 45.6 50.2 48.0 
Segmentsb 250 452 921 
a Category scores are in percentages 
b Segments are absolute number of segments in the protocol 
 
Table 4.2 
The Number of Segments, Total Number of Words and Words per 
Segment for the Philosophers (P), Educators (E), and Debaters (D) 
 P  E D 
Segments 250 452 921 
Words 7548 8479 15098 
Words/segment 30.19 18.76 16.38 
 
Table 4.1 presents the proportion of segments that fall into each of the four main categories 
as well as those classified as ‘other’. Each of the segments classified in one of the main 
categories was classified into between two and six subcategories as reflected in Table 4.3. The 
percentages are in terms of the total for valid categories, that is the total excluding the turns 
that were scored ‘Other’. 
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Table 4.3 
The Percentage of Segments Classified into each of the 
Topic Subcategories for Philosophers (P), Educators (E), 
 and Debaters (D) 
 P E D 
 Analysis 
Data Authority 2.2 .9 .6 
Data Experiential 4.4 23.2 18.6 
Hypothesis 2.9 10.3 14.2 
Principle .0 .2 .0 
Problem Scope 9.6 3.1 10.2 
Research Question 3.7 1.8 .0 
 Constraints and Features 
Features 16.9 4.0 1.7 
Risks 10.3 3.1 1.0 
 Interventions 
Assumption 4.4 1.3 7.9 
Effects .0 .0 1.9 
Intervention 30.9 25.9 32.4 
Outcome 4.4 2.2 6.1 
 Presentation 
Content 4.4 2.2 2.1 
Goals .0 4.5 .6 
Plan 5.9 17.4 2.7 
 
Inspection of the minor categories shows that some type of content was rarely mentioned in 
one or more of the protocols. For instance few statements were coded as Data Authority. This 
might be attributed to our strict definition which only accepted stated sources as authorities, 
yet even in the protocol of the Educators – who had a beginning expert on the subject of 
drop-out on their team – there is little explicit mention of data based on authorities. 
Although this applies to the Philosophers in particular, none of the groups seemed very 
much concerned with stating or gathering (viz. the frequencies of Research Question) data 
based on authorities. The category Principle was posing problems to our coders. It was meant 
as a warrant to link the relation between observables (data) and drop-out. Coders found it 
hard to identify warrants and, of course, warrants are often left implicit in dialogues 
(Toulmin, 1958). 
The subcategories in Constraints and Features show remarkable differences between the 
groups that we will discuss in more detail below. The categories under the heading 
Interventions deal with the program logic of the proposed interventions: what actions will be 
undertaken, what are the expected short-term effects and how will these actions lead to the 
long-term effects? What we see in the data for this category is that all groups expend 
considerable effort in discussing interventions (which is of course what we asked for) and 
very little in discussing the final effects (which were given: reduce drop-out). It is interesting 
to see the differences between the groups in the effort spent on relating interventions to the 
ultimate effect. Here again, we may hope that some guidance can be offered to help students 
realize that they must argue why an intervention is likely to produce the intended results. 
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Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 suggest that the groups followed different approaches with the 
Educators and Debaters concentrating more on Analysis and the Philosophers concentrating 
on the Constraints of the solutions. Proportional data, however, are not the best metric for 
making comparisons. We have therefore rank ordered the data in Table 4.3 from most to 
least frequently occurring segments for each of the three groups of problem solvers. Those 
rankings are shown in Table 4.4. For ease of comparison, we have prepared a separate table 
(see Table 4.5) with the ‘top 5’ rankings in each group.  
 
Table 4.4 
The Rank of each Subtopic Category in Terms of 
Frequency of Occurrence in the Protocols of the 
Philosophers (P),  Educators (E), and Debaters (D) 
 P E D 
 Analysis 
Data Authority 12 13 13 
Data Experiential 7.5 2 2 
Hypothesis 11 4 3 
Principle 14 15 15 
Problem Scope 4 7.5 4 
Research Question 10 11 14 
 Constraints and Features 
Features 2 6 10 
Risks 3 7.5 11 
 Interventions 
Assumption 7.5 12 5 
Effects 14 14 9 
Intervention 1 1 1 
Outcome 7.5 9.5 6 
 Presentation 
Content 7.5 9.5 8 
Goals 14 5 12 
Presentation plan 5 3 7 
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Table 4.5 
The Five most Frequently Occurring Subtopic Categories (those Unique to a Group in Bold) and 
Subtopic Categories Missing in the Top Five for a Group but Present in the Top Five for the Other 
Two Groups. 
rank Philosophers Educators Debaters 
1 Intervention Intervention Intervention 
2 Features Data Data 
3 Risks Presentation Plan Hypothesis 
4 Problem Scope Hypothesis Problem Scope 
5 Presentation Plan Features Assumptions 
    
missing Hypothesis (11)a 
Data (7.5) 
Problem Scope (7.5) Features (10) 
Presentation Plan (7) 
a Numbers in parentheses indicate rank order scores for missing 
 
The top-5 rankings for the groups represent 73.5% (P), 81.3% (E) and 83.3% (D) of the non-
trivial (= Other) turns in the protocols. In Table 4.5 we have typified the groups by indicating 
their unique top ranking (in bold). The Philosophers have a unique high ranking for Risks 
and the Debaters for Assumptions. A group is not only typified by unique characteristics it 
possesses, but also by characteristics that it lacks. We have therefore added the unique 
missing categories, i.e., the other two have it, and indicated these missing categories along 
with their ranking (in parentheses). 
Table 4.5 shows us that all groups focus on interventions, which is what we could expect 
considering the instructions given to the participants. The Educators and the Debaters share 
a focus on Hypotheses and Experiential Data, that is the causes of drop-out and data to support 
or refute these hypotheses. In contrast Hypothesis has rank 11 for the Philosophers. Their 
focus is on Constraints, Features and Risks of the solutions. Both Debaters and Philosophers 
focus on Problem Scope (rank 4), which was at rank 7.5 for the Educators. The Debaters spend 
less time on Presentation Plan (rank 7) than the other groups.  
The picture that emerges from these rankings and the missing categories is that of 
different problem approaches. The Philosophers approach the problem, not by analyzing its 
causes, but by concentrating on the scope of the problem and defining desirable features of 
the solutions as seen in their rankings for features and problem scope. Put slightly 
differently: their work is focused on constraints and criteria by which proposed solutions can 
be evaluated. Both Educators and Debaters focus on causes, but the Educators don’t seem to 
address problem scope, but rather focus on the presentation (as seen in their high ranking for 
Presentation Plan). Debaters share with the Educators the focus on analysis and interventions, 
yet they seem more focused on establishing the scope of the problem and to discuss the 
outcomes of the intervention. This is seen in their high rankings for Effects and Outcomes. 
Preparing a plan for the presentation – which directly relates to the instruction given – is not 
among their highest ranks. 
At this point we collide with the limitations of the coding scheme. Whereas the 
frequencies and rank orders reported give an idea about the relative amount of dialogue 
spent on the different types of content categories and thereby allow a glimpse of different 
approaches taken by the three teams, they cannot give us an indication of the depth and 
breadth of the content covered in the dialogues. In the metric used, stating three different 
hypotheses, that is breadth in terms of content topics, results in the same score as repeating 
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one single hypothesis three times. Note that this limitation of the coding scheme does not 
apply to the intended use of the representational notation in collaborative problem solving, 
since we may expect participants to describe the content of an object. 
In order to cope with the shortcomings mentioned, a fourth coder was used to identify the 
content topics in the segments that were previously coded as hypothesis, interventions or 
constraints and features. These categories seemed most promising to reveal details of the 
approaches used. The coder was not involved in the original coding of the protocols and she 
was unaware of the backgrounds of the groups. We asked her to identify all the content topics 
within the segments so her coding could lead to several codes per segment.  
Table 4.6 reports the number of content topics, that is the number of different hypotheses, 
proposals for interventions and constraints that the three groups mentioned and how often 
these content topics were mentioned in the protocol (numbers in parentheses). The number 
of content topics formulated is an indication of the breadth of the approach. For instance, the 
Philosophers formulated two different hypotheses, whereas the Debaters formulated no less 
than ten hypotheses. The number of segments in which a content topic occurs is an 
indication of the depth of its coverage. The Philosophers, for example, referred no more than 
four times to their two hypotheses. In contrast, the Debaters formulate ten hypotheses to 
which they refer in 90 segments. 
 
Table 4.6 
Number of Different Content Topics for each of the Main 
Categories and Number of Segments referring to them 
(Between Parentheses) 
 Philosophers Educators Debaters 
Hypotheses  2 (4) 9 (25) 10 (90) 
Interventions 8 (42) 9 (54) 5 (124) 
Constraints 11 (37) 8 (11) 11 (38) 
 
Table 4.6 corroborates a number of observations made before. First, it shows very clearly that 
the Philosophers concentrate on different constraints for their solution rather than on the 
potential causes of drop-out. First, they formulate no more than two different hypotheses 
and address these in four segments. In contrast to this, they formulate no less than eleven 
different constraints and refer 37 times to them. In the second place the table gives us a first 
hint at the approach of the Debaters. The breadth of the Debaters and Educators is, by and 
large, comparable. The Debaters, however, address the content topics more often than the 
two other groups. As an example, consider Interventions: the Educators describe nine 
different interventions to which they refer 54 times. The Debaters mention five different 
types of interventions but refer to them a 124 times. If the number of different content topics 
together with the references to them make a good indicator of the importance of the topic 
category (hypothesis, constraint, intervention) then the Debaters seem to assign almost equal 
importance to hypotheses, constraints and interventions.  
 
Unfortunately, the aggregate data in Table 4.6 conceal that some content topics get no follow-
up in the discussion, whilst others are discussed over and over. Before making any 
statements about the actual breadth, depth and focus in the protocols, we have to check 
which content topics are really discussed. The following figures relate the number of content 
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topics with the references to them, they plot the number of content topics (y-axis) against the 
minimum number of references (x-axis) made to them in the protocols.  
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Figure 4.1. Breadth of coverage for Constraints: the number of  
constraints in relation to the minimal number of references made 
to them in the text for Philosophers, Educators and Debaters. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the Debaters formulated eleven different constraints (eleven 
constraints were mentioned at least once), but only four of these are mentioned twice or 
more. The Educators mentioned eight different constraints but focused on two. All groups 
show the same type of ‘decay function’: a fast drop after the first occurrence and a steady 
decrease after that. Note that the Philosophers formulated the same number of constraints as 
the Debaters, but they kept more constraints in focus for a longer time. 
 
Figure 4.2 on Hypotheses and Figure 4.3 on Interventions are the most interesting, because they 
clearly illustrate the different approaches of the groups. From Figure 4.2 the approach of the 
Philosophers seems clear: they pay little attention to the causes of drop-out: two different 
causes are mentioned, one of them three times. Compare this to the approaches of the 
Debaters and the Educators. They formulate almost the same number of hypotheses (10 vs. 
9), but there is only one hypothesis that the Educators refer to five times or more. In fact, this 
single hypothesis is mentioned nine times. The reason why we only plotted the data that 
demonstrate the drop in focus will become clear when we consider the Debaters’ data. As the 
figure shows there is hardly a drop in the number of hypothesis that the Debaters keep in 
focus. In fact, there is one hypothesis that is mentioned nine times and two other hypotheses 
are even mentioned 22 and 23 times. We would of course expect that the Debaters, whose 
protocol is much longer than that of the Educators, produce more references to the topics. It 
is the ‘decay pattern’ that is so different: the Debaters seem to keep a very broad focus on the 
causes, rather than concentrating on a small set of causes. 
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Figure 4.2 Breadth of coverage for Hypotheses: the number of 
hypotheses in relation to the number of references made to them 
in the text for Philosophers, Educators and Debaters. 
The tendency to maintain a broad focus is also demonstrated in the next figure that has the 
content topics on Interventions. All groups concentrated on Interventions reflected in the 
number of references to the concept topics. The Philosophers and the Educators reduce their 
initial focus although less drastically than they did on the other topics. The Debaters again 
keep a very broad focus and keep returning to a larger number of topics. We cannot even 
plot the turns for the remaining four Interventions (they were referred to 13, 26, 30 and 47 
times). 
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Figure 4.3. Breadth of coverage for Intervention: the number of 
interventions in relation to the number of references made to 
them in the text for Philosophers, Educators and Debaters. 
To get a clearer picture of this supposed pattern, we plotted the occurrences of content topics 
in the protocols. In the following three figures we can view this pattern. The x-axis of figures 
4.4 through 4.6 represents the Segment Number (0 is the beginning of the session, maximum 
is the end of the session). The Y-axis represents the topics discussed. The final letter of the 
Topic signals whether the topic was a Constraint (C), a Hypothesis (H) or an Intervention (I). 
The crosses and vertical strokes on the line of a topic represent the segments in which the 
topic was discussed. The horizontal strokes are added to increase readability. In Figure 4.4 
qualC is the Constraint that the Quality of education may not be impinged upon. This was 
the second constraint discussed (after retrC) and we can see that it was discussed, left for a 
while (for about 30 segments) while other constraints were discussed and then returned to 
for a number of segments. In Figure 4.4 we see that the Philosophers formulate several 
constraints, most of them in the early part of the protocol. As we saw above several of these 
constraints get no follow-up, but a few are referred to more often. An example of the latter is 
their constraint that no solution shall compromise the quality of education (content topic 
qualC in the graph). A similar pattern can be noted in the content topics covering 
Interventions. The Philosophers have one type of Intervention that is brought up throughout 
the whole protocol. Others are more concentrated in smaller series of segments. 
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Figure 4.4. Occurrence of Constraints (the names on the Y-axis 
ending with C), Hypotheses (names ending with H) and 
Interventions (names ending with I) in the protocol of the 
Philosophers. 
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the focused approach of the Educators (we omit Constraints from 
the graph, because the Educators and Debaters formulated only a few). In the first part of the 
protocol several hypotheses are formulated of which only two are kept in focus. From here 
several interventions are mentioned, but the Educators focus on three interventions until, in 
the middle of their protocol, a number of other hypotheses and interventions appear without 
any visible follow-up. 
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the broad focus, or rather the lack of focus, of the Debaters. The 
Debaters, as inspection of the protocols teaches us, used the results of their initial brainstorm 
– a list of potential causes – as a guide for their further discussion. They worked down that 
list: systematically and in great detail, discussing implementation issues without checking 
the effectiveness of the interventions they discussed. If there is lack of focus in their protocol, 
there is method to it. 
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Figure 4.5. Occurrence of Hypotheses (the names on the 
Y-axis ending with H) and Interventions (names ending 
with I) in the protocol of the Educators. 
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Figure 4.6. Occurrence of Hypotheses (the names on the 
Y-axis ending with H) and Interventions (names ending 
with I) in the protocol of the Debaters. 
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We started with the question whether students use the concepts in the representational 
notation when they engage in collaborative problem solving. We expected that a coding 
scheme based on the notation would account for a substantial part of student dialogues and 
would help us understand the problem solving process of the students. We found that the 
scheme can account for about 50% of the turns in the dialogues. The inter-rater reliabilities 
are modest, but acceptable for the current purpose. Improvements for the purpose of 
understanding dialogues may be achieved if we include codes for process control and 
reconsider the codes that were rarely used. The analysis of the content topics indicates that 
the groups followed different problem solving strategies that corresponded to a combination 
of concentration on particular content (solution features, or causes) and the breadth and 
depth of focus: the number of content topics and the number of references to them. To check 
these suppositions we carried out a qualitative analysis of the protocols that is reported in 
the next section. 
Qualitative results 
A qualitative inspection of the protocols corroborates the inferences drawn from the 
quantitative analysis of segments. The Philosophers discussion starts with delineating the 
problem: they discuss the meaning of drop-out and how high the retention rate should be 
[segments 3-18]. This leads to a first potential recommendation: expand the number of 
alternative high schools other than college prep schools. In segment 19 and following the 
Philosophers develop general characteristics for the intervention (incentive / punitive) 
[segment 20] and features, leading to what they call a meta-recommendation: no 
recommendation should “sacrifice the quality of education or the standards that someone 
has to meet in order to graduate” [segment 31]. This is the important constraint that emerged 
from the quantitative analysis. Their next step is to define targets for intervention: schools, 
parents and “governmental, societal, environmental” actions [segment 36]. They elaborate on 
this by giving examples of potential actions, noting that these will often be socially and 
politically difficult to realize [segments 37-56].  
What the Philosophers are doing can be described as structuring the solution space in 
terms of constraints and features, target groups and intervention methods. Beyond their 
initial scoping statements there is no sign of an analysis of the causes of the problem or other 
problem structuring activities in the beginning of the protocol. In segment 57 they formulate 
a research question on drop-out figures related to geographical area and background data, 
such as race, gender, class, and in segment 102 another research question is stated as to 
“what programs and things worked and what are the best sort of incentives (…)”. It is only 
at segment 130 that they start considering causes. Before that they have considered in some 
detail incentive approaches, concluding that there will be a huge pressure on the teachers to 
award the incentives, and punitive interventions, concluding that a similar pressure will 
invalidate this approach as well.  
The approach of the Debaters is completely different. They start with a brainstorm on a 
number of possible causes (drugs, gangs, pregnancy, jobs, homelessness, et cetera) adding 
some experiential data to support these claims (see Figure 4.5). Their subsequent approach is 
best summarized in segment 74: “… we have to like, find solutions to all these problems and 
present it in 15 minutes anyway”. After some debate they agree on including at least a 
recommendation dealing with the curriculum and then proceed to systematically work 
down the list of causes. For each cause on the list they try to define an intervention that will 
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eliminate the cause or reduce its effects. The results on analysis and interventions that we 
previously presented are produced by them enumerating (and repeating) the list of causes, 
and discussing the details of the implementation of the interventions for each of the separate 
causes. 
In their approach, the Debaters try to formulate school-based interventions for problems 
that they perceive as being more social in nature, and this leads to a sort of breakdown later 
on in the protocol (see discussion below). Interestingly enough, they often fail to formulate a 
particular recommendation (probably the reason why Features only reaches rank 8 in the 
coded protocol). For instance, the last segments devoted to the drugs as a cause of drop-out 
[segments 149-280] bring forward underlying causes, but without any noticeable influence 
on the overall approach. Similar discussions appear at the end of their discussion on how to 
reduce teenage pregnancy (they only consider distribution of free condoms through the 
school) [segments 282-385] and at the end of their discussion on homelessness [segments 386-
435]. This leads them to reconsider how much they can actually achieve – “(…) we don’t 
have social programs (…) or solutions for these social problems that’s causing drop-out” 
[segment 442]. The Debaters then decide to narrow their scope – maybe the 
recommendations should target only those learners who can be helped directly by making 
changes to the school [segment 529-533], possibly even writing off other learners [segment 
590]. The Debaters in the following part of the protocol come up with several school related 
recommendations: teacher quality, improve resources, more extra-curricular activities and 
others. 
It is interesting to note how both the Philosophers and the Debaters run into problems 
caused by their initial approach: the Philosophers don’t analyze causes, but formulate 
constraints and intervention-strategies that turn out to be incompatible. The Debaters 
analyze the causes and try to define school-based interventions for each of them that turn out 
to be at variance with the social nature of the stated causes. Debaters also loose track of the 
larger goal of reducing drop-outs and begin to focus on how to implement (or whether to 
implement because of social considerations) the intervention. For example, the 
implementation of support for pregnant girls looses track of how big of a drop-out problem 
this is or even if the solution addresses the drop-out problem and focuses more on the 
practical and social issues in implementation. 
The Educators obviously have more background knowledge to substantiate their analysis 
and recommendations and their protocol has lengthy passages in which (research) data are 
summarized and explained by one participant to the others. The analysis of the problem is 
very short, or even shallow. A number of hypotheses are formulated: low social economic 
status, families and communities, motivation, but already in segment 21 the core of their 
analysis and recommendation is formulated: community and parental involvement. 
Authority data are presented that relates involvement to reduction of drop-out. That 
participant, who is a beginning expert in the field, points out that parental involvement is a 
goal in a program most governors have already adopted [segments 32-34]. Even when 
explicitly asked for innovative approaches or approaches that have failed [segment 42] the 
dialogue turns into reaffirming the importance of community involvement, and after a 
number of short exchanges the core recommendation, stimulate foundation of charter 
schools, is introduced in segment 70. This is followed by a series of lengthy exchanges in 
which that participant gives all sorts of information on charter schools, while another 
participant tries to formulate the points that are appealing to the governors [segments 71-
126]. 
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In segment 131 the Educators start planning their presentation and anticipate reactions of 
the governors, including the issue of standardization [segments127-219]. This leads to a 
number of innovations they would like to include in their recommendations (alternative 
assessment, portfolios, multiple intelligences) although the relation with drop-out is not very 
clear. In segment 220 the issue of drop-out is raised again and a participant asks for other 
approaches and programs that could be included. It is here were the Educators briefly 
consider causes mentioned by the Debaters: family problems, low opportunity areas, crime, 
gangs et cetera. They make an important scope decision to not address external factors 
beyond their control [segment 258] and stick to their educational recommendations. 
There is some sort of ‘confirmation bias’ in the Educators protocol: no alternative causes 
or interventions receive substantial attention and the participant who questions whether the 
recommendation would reduce drop-out is mostly ignored. The Educators seem to test their 
recommendation not on whether it will actually reduce drop-out but on whether it will fit 
stated policies of the Governors. 
Discussion 
The results presented here show resemblance to the analysis of social science problem-
solving by James Voss and his colleagues (Voss, Greene, et al., 1983; Voss, Tyler, et al., 1983). 
Voss, Greene, et al. had experts, novices and beginning experts solve the problem of how to 
increase Soviet agricultural production. Experts described the causes of the problem in more 
abstract terms (infrastructure) and they stated more general abstract solutions to which 
lower level problems were subordinate. Novices decomposed the problem in low-level sub-
problems to which solutions were proposed; an approach that the Debaters (who are novices 
in the area of expertise needed) seem to follow. Novices failed to evaluate solutions in terms 
of constraints and they did not specify sub-problems that could be encountered when 
proposed solutions were implemented. Failure to evaluate solutions against constraints is 
also found in the Debaters’ protocol and the sub-problems that they identify emerge during 
their discussion on how to implement a recommendation. The Debaters discussion is guided 
by the potential causes that they mentioned during their initial brainstorm. They 
systematically work down this list, without checking for effects or constraints. The 
Philosophers, as did Voss et al’s experts, stated constraints and general solutions and tested 
these solutions against the constraints (and found out they were incompatible). In contrast to 
Voss’ experts the Philosophers and the Debaters did not relate their solutions to an abstract 
problem definition. The Philosophers did not analyze the causes of the problem to any depth 
and the Debaters in essence generated a list of unrelated causes and, working down this list, 
tried to formulate interventions for the individual causes. 
Finally, the Educators, whom we may consider beginning experts, more or less structure 
the problem space in the expert way, that is they soon concentrate on two underlying factors 
that they consider crucial in school drop-out: community and parental involvement. The 
constraints they adopt are to the point and pragmatic: they test the solutions that they 
propose against policies that the governors have already adopted. Their solution is strictly 
educational – although this was not a stated constraint – and when they realize that other 
factors may be important as well, they explicitly decide to restrict the scope of their solutions 
to the educational arena. 
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There are some indications that the participants followed the problem solving states and 
the associated communication styles identified in chapter 2. Both Educators and Debaters 
start with a brainstorm on potential causes. The Educators hit on their solution within 
minutes however. The Debaters start with a rapid brainstorm on the causes of drop-out. 
They then prioritize this list and use it as an agenda of topics to be further explored. A 
substantial part of their protocol consists of defining the interventions that will eliminate the 
individual causes and finding ways of implementing these interventions. The Debaters’ 
protocol demonstrates that a topical agenda (as was suggested for Belvédère® in the 
previous chapter) alone will not suffice as support and guidance. The Debaters had the 
topics to discuss but got entangled in the details of implementation. They obviously had no, 
or failed to apply, a stopping rule, such as the level of detail required for a recommendation 
to the Board of Governors. Moreover, they did not consider the relation between cause and 
drop-out and the effectiveness of their recommendations. The Debaters worked 
systematically, but as we analyze their activities from the perspective of our representational 
notation, we see that they address topics in isolation. In a similar way the Philosophers 
worked on the constraints that their interventions needed to satisfy, without analyzing the 
problem in any detail. All this demonstrates that having a topical agenda by itself will not 
suffice, we need guidance and support that stimulates students to work on the whole fabric 
of constraints, causes, data, interventions and outcomes to only mention the core objects. 
 
Now all this was done as a first step towards the use of a representational notation to 
support collaborative problem solving: we have attempted to determine whether we could 
use the scheme to analyze problem solving protocols. Before we present our conclusions 
with respect to usability, we need to enumerate a number of limitations associated with the 
approach that we have taken. 
First, we have concentrated on the content of the dialogues and tried to model it using the 
concepts of the representational notation. To be more specific: we used the objects, and not 
the relations, of the representational notation, and as a consequence of that approach we 
cannot model the structure of the argumentation of the students. Furthermore, we have 
analyzed the individual segments only and have not looked at larger structures such as 
episodes devoted to a particular topic. The way in which the student dialogue progresses 
through a number of topics and how the students maintain focus are not modeled in the 
coding scheme used. However, the analysis of the content topics, gives us an accurate 
estimate of the focus for particular types of content. 
Second, the reliability of the coding schema is a concern. The moderate Kappa’s point to 
potential conceptual ambiguities in the coding scheme and indeed the coders reported 
difficulties with certain distinctions. They felt that some categories were lacking such as a 
category to cater for dialogues in which actions to be taken are discussed. They also 
mentioned a need for a category, such as “Intervention Strategy” to cater for statements 
dealing with types of interventions rather than concrete, individual cases. These problems are 
not related to lower reliabilities however (the new categories would be coded as ‘Other’ and 
‘Intervention’). Coders, however mentioned that they found it hard to make a distinction 
between constraints and features. Now it may indeed be difficult to decide from the 
protocols alone whether a participant is considering something a constraint or a feature. The 
ultimate criterion is, however, not whether the coding of the protocols is reliable enough, but 
whether students can use the objects of a representational notation in a systematic way. For 
the current analyses, however, the Kappa’s nevertheless remain a concern. 
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Third, there are several important aspects of the dialogue that we do not capture, for 
instance the means (speech acts) by which students express their ideas and arguments, how 
they coordinate their actions, and how they negotiate knowledge. We expect that the use of 
an external representation will eventually help students to maintain focus and coordinate 
their actions, but this is not modeled in the coding scheme that we used. 
Finally, the empirical base for the different approaches identified is small. We may be able 
to add to it however. In December 2002, too late to analyze and report the results here, we 
received material from six parallel groups (two Philosophers, two Debaters and two 
Educator groups) who had worked on the same assignment.  
Conclusions 
The analysis presented here is the result of a first step towards the use of a representational 
notation to support collaborative problem solving. In this first step we are interested to know 
whether the concepts in our coding scheme correspond to those used by students when they 
solve problems. In the long run we want to find out whether the representational notation 
can support collaborative problem solving. 
In our analysis we found that the coding scheme can account for an important part of the 
content of the dialogues. In other words, students use, at least, a number of the concepts that 
are behind the representational notation. That seems to make it more likely that students can 
master the objects and relations contained in the notation. However, the reliabilities that we 
observed force us to be more cautious in these conclusions.  
We noticed that there were important differences in the problem solving strategies of the 
three groups. The representational notation must be robust enough to support these different 
approaches. First, we noticed that the coding scheme could cater for the contents of the three 
teams. Moreover, we could typify their problem solving approaches using the concepts 
contained in the coding scheme. The approaches of the Debaters and Philosophers can be 
described in terms of the particular objects they ignore and the subset of objects they focus 
on. The Debaters, for example, got bogged down into implementation details of a set of 
unrelated causes that was the result of their initial brainstorm. They ignored the relation of 
the interventions they considered with drop-out (effects) and they ignored constraints on the 
nature of their recommendations (what sort of recommendation do the governors expect). 
Similar observations can be made regarding the Philosophers. They as well concentrated on 
particular aspects of the problem, in particular constraints, while ignoring others, in 
particular the causes, almost completely. Although their instruction made it clear that they 
had to compile and present recommendations to the Board of Governors, this constraint did 
not lead to any discussion in these two groups. 
Considering that the groups concentrated on particular contents, while ignoring other and 
that their recommendations were not very convincing, there is also an opportunity that in 
particular these groups may profit from more process support. 
We do not assume that making available a representational notation alone, will be 
sufficient to provoke more systematic problem solving activities. As we described above, the 
support should stimulate to address the topics along with their relations. That is, a kind of 
guidance and support is needed that, for example, encourages the groups to engage in a 
more structural analysis of the problem as well as the solution. Students should be 
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encouraged to formulate a more coherent and concise set of interventions that is checked 
against constraints (in this case, does it fit with known policies) and the intended effects. 
In the next chapter we will further explore the issue of process support. There we will use 
multi-disciplinary teams that were trained in techniques to support the process. 
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 5 Logical Framework Analysis as process support 
In the previous chapter we took the first steps towards a representational notation for 
collaborative solving of ill-structured problems using non-novice students. We analyzed a 
number of protocols to determine whether students already used concepts that were 
included in the notation. Furthermore we checked whether absence of concepts indicated 
places were the problem solving process could be supported. 
Analysis of the protocols showed that the students participating in the experiment 
demonstrated beginning-expert behavior in their areas of expertise: The Philosophers spent a 
considerable amount of their deliberations on defining the scope of the problem and refining 
the constraints of the solution. They more or less approached the problem as an ethical one 
and tried to delineate what solutions would be acceptable. The Debaters demonstrated their 
expertise by their methodical approach. They first brainstormed on possible causes, next 
they drew up a list of causes which they then prioritized and finally they worked down this 
list. They discussed, one by one, the causes and the potential solutions that might remedy the 
cause or alleviate the problem. 
Despite their systematic approaches, both groups failed to produce acceptable solutions: 
The philosophers ended with a number of very weak recommendations and the debaters got 
entangled in details of implementation questions and forgot to check whether their 
recommendations had any credibility as to their effectiveness. The Educators, who had 
knowledge of the specific area, came up with a sensible solution within the education realm 
(foster creation of charter schools), but failed to look at non-educational aspects of the 
problem or their solution. We concluded that these results indicated that the non-education 
students would certainly profit from more process support in their problem solving activities 
and that this support had to emphasize the structural relations between the components of 
the analysis and solution. For example, support and guidance should stimulate that causes 
would be substantiated with data, interventions checked against stated constraints et cetera. 
Process support can be offered in a variety of ways. Duffy et al. (1998) describe how they 
support Problem Based Learning by offering different modes of communication and types of 
representation (issue, topic) for the phases of Problem Based Learning. During an orientation 
phase, the problem-solvers may engage in conversation that is issue-based. Here they move 
freely from one issue to the other and make a first inventory of the problem and potential 
solutions. In a problem-solving phase the students are communicating topic-based so as to 
explore potential solutions more deeply. This is a phase where an asynchronous mode of 
work allows students to explore the topics more profoundly than the synchronous mode 
used in the exploration phase would allow. These observations were incorporated in the 
demands of the different problem solving states that we formulated in chapter 2. 
Process support in the form of offering communication modes alone or a topic based 
agenda alone will not suffice. Consider the example of the Debaters of the previous chapter. 
They had an initial brainstorm, issue-based, that returned a list of possible causes. They then 
went to a topic-based approach, addressed one by one the causes on their list and formulated 
interventions for each of these causes to, finally end up with a set of unrelated interventions 
whose potential effectiveness they did not test. Process support should also help students 
maintain more coherence between the problem, the perceived causes and the solutions 
specified. 
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Logical Framework Analysis 
Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) was developed for US-AID in the 1970s to improve 
project management of development projects. In current use the tools of LFA are embedded 
in more cyclical project management approaches as ZOPP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 1997) or Project Cycle Management (European 
Commission, 2001; Team Technologies Inc, 1999) that are used by organizations as EU, 
Worldbank and OECD to define, manage and evaluate projects and programs (Sartorius, 
1996). LFA applies a number of steps, tools and techniques from which we only discuss those 
we have used. 
LFA contains a number of steps from problem analysis to problem definition, with each 
step leading to a defined product. The problem analysis results in a cause-and-effect 
representation, called ‘problem tree’. An example of such a problem tree for the problem of 
high infant and material mortality rates is given in Figure 5.1. 
 
High infant and 
maternal mortality 
rates
High rates of 
infection 
among babies 
& infants
High incidence 
of acute birth 
complications
High rates of 
post-partum & 
neo-natal 
infection
Poor nutritional 
status of 
babies & 
infants
Few babies & 
infants 
vaccinated
Birth 
complications 
diagnosed late 
or not at all
Low standards 
of hygiene & 
patient care by 
staff
Low 
attendance at 
rural clinics
Commercial 
pressures to 
use milk 
supplements
Poor seasonal 
availability of 
high protein 
foods
Mothers 
unwilling to 
attend clinics
Infrequent & 
inadequate 
coverage of 
clinics
Shortage of 
drugs Low staff skills
Effects
Causes
  
Figure 5.1. Problem tree adapted from EU project cycle management training handbook, 
Brussels, May 1999. 
 
The components of this tree are then reformulated as objectives, subgoals to be achieved in 
order to solve the problem. The objectives tree corresponding to the problem tree reported 
above is presented in Figure 5.2. As can be seen one of the causes of infant mortality ‘birth 
complications diagnosed late or not at all’ is reformulated as the objective ‘increased/earlier 
diagnosis of birth complications’. 
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Infant and maternal 
mortality rates reduced
Rates of infection 
among babies & infants 
reduced
Reduced incidence of 
acute birth 
complications
Reduced rates of post-
partum & neo-natal 
infection
Nutritional status 
of babies & 
infants improved
Increased no. 
babies & infants 
vaccinated
Increased earlier 
diagnosis of birth 
complications
Standards of 
hygiene & 
patient care by 
staff improved
Attendance at 
rural clinics 
increased
Increased 
proportion of 
babies brest fed
Seasonal 
availability of 
high protein 
foods increased
Mothers willing 
to attend clinics
Increased & 
regular coverage 
of clinics
Sufficient drugs 
available
Improved staff 
skills
Ends
Means
  
Figure 5.2. Objectives tree adapted from EU project cycle management training handbook 
Brussels, May 1999. 
A next, important, step is to make a distinction between the objectives that the project can 
attain (the IN-objectives) and those that it cannot attain (the OUT-objectives). The ‘IN-
objectives’ are grouped so as to decide which common interventions can be defined to reach 
the objectives. Eventually a so called ‘logframe’ is constructed. This is a matrix that specifies 
the interventions, the expected short-term, mid-term and long-term effects and how to 
measure these (performance indicators) and the external (risk) factors, called ‘assumptions’. 
As can be seen, LFA scaffolds the use of particular types of information. In the first place 
LFA emphasizes the difference between the (surely attainable) short-term goals and the 
assumptions that come into play before any long-term goals may be reached. Other features, 
in particular the use of performance indicators and means of verification, may have less 
effects on the process but still guide the users towards particular solutions, because they hint 
at constraints for the solutions. 
There are shortcomings to LFA (Eggers, 1998; Gasper, 2000) that have to be considered 
here. We will limit ourselves to the shortcomings relevant to the current context. First, LFA 
emphasizes the importance of the logical nature of the analysis and resulting project design, 
but it offers no means for expressing arguments that support the causal decomposition of the 
problem, the objectives or the interventions. Although LFA guidelines emphasize the 
importance of the ‘project logic’, and especially of the causal relations between interventions, 
short term and long-term effects, they do not force participants to explicate the ‘theory’ 
behind the project, as in theory-driven evaluation (Chen, 1990; Rossi et al., 1999). From the 
perspective of evaluation one may assert that LFA endorses the idea of a project theory 
without offering the proper means of formulating such a theory. This makes the approach 
vulnerable to what Gasper (2000) has called ‘lack frames’ where the logic is lacking. Second, 
the constraints for acceptable solutions are not represented in one place but, if expressed at 
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all, are dispersed over stakeholder analysis, performance indicators and assumptions, and 
are (implicitly) applied at the moment the IN-objectives and project strategy are determined. 
 
The study to be reported here is a second step in testing the representational notation. It is a 
small-scale and exploratory study.  
Design and methods 
Participants 
The participants of this study were sixteen students enrolled in an International Masters 
Program on European Public Affairs (EPA) at the University of Maastricht. The students 
came from a wide diversity of national and educational backgrounds. Most students had 
completed Bachelor Programs in Public Administration, International Relations, Politics, 
History and Art. There were no Education students in the teams, but there was one 
Psychologist. The students were confronted with the same problem of reduction of school 
drop-out with a few changes to make it applicable to the European Union context. Before the 
experimental session, the students were trained by the author in the basics of LFA. The data 
were collected in a session that followed a full day of training in core elements of LFA and a 
two week period in which the participants had worked in four teams and used LFA to define 
a project on traffic safety (to which they had not yet received feedback). The session was 
followed by half a day of training with feedback on their assignments and discussion on 
some of the weak points of LFA presented above. 
 
Design 
The four existing teams were instructed to compile recommendations for the Commission of 
the European Union on efficient policies to reduce school drop-out in the countries of the 
European Union. They were instructed that they would have to present their results within a 
month to representatives of the Commission and that they would have only one more 
meeting before this presentation. Finally, they were told that they could formulate research 
questions to be answered before their next meeting. The instruction was formulated so as to 
match the one from the experiment reported in the previous chapter. 
Two teams (B and D) were instructed to use Logical Framework Analysis and to create a 
problem tree and an objectives tree on the wall of the experimental room using colored Post-
its. The teams were also instructed to decide on the IN and OUT-objectives. They were 
discouraged to produce a detailed logframe, because we expected that working out the 
details of, for instance, the performance indicators would be too time-consuming. 
The two other teams (A and C) were told that they were free to choose the method they 
preferred and they were instructed as well to use the Post-its to represent their analysis and 
solution. 
 
Scoring 
The four 1-hour sessions were videotaped and the contents of the discussions were 
transcribed by a typist and independently coded by two trained coders. The scheme used to 
code the protocols was slightly adapted from the one used in the original study. The most 
important additions were the categories ‘Planning’ to code for dialogues in which students 
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discussed the tasks and actions to be taken and ‘Intervention strategy’ to code the segments 
that were dealing with types or classes of interventions rather than with individual 
interventions. As in the first study all statements relating to a particular topic, including 
critical remarks or questions were coded the same. 
The typed protocols were initially segmented on the basis of the turns in the dialogue. If 
the coders agreed that a turn needed further segmentation, the turn was split in segments 
(this affected less than 5% of the turns). Both coders were unaware of the backgrounds of the 
participants or the particular instructions of the groups8. The coders were instructed that, 
only in cases where the typed protocols contained explicit notes on intonation, they could 
use these notes to derive the meaning of interspersed affirmatives, negations etcetera. We 
have not tried to have the coders agree on the coding of the segments to get uniform data for 
subsequent analyses, because that would only suggest better reliability. We decided to base 
the subsequent analyses on average values over the coders. 
The representations that the students prepared using the colored Post-its were transcribed 
for analysis using flowcharting software (see the example below). 
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Figure 5.3. Group C's analysis and solution. 
 
                                                     
8 Coding and analysis of the protocols were done with the MEPA program made available to us by dr. 
Gijsbert Erkens of the University of Utrecht. 
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Expectations 
If these students follow the LFA steps in analysis, definition of objectives, and selection of 
interventions they will demonstrate a more evenly distributed pattern of the sort of topics 
they address than we found by the previous groups, who tended to concentrate on particular 
topics. We also expect these protocols to show a clearer division in stages: analyze the 
problems, state the objectives, select objectives, as described above. 
We have also noted weak point of LFA and we expect to see that mirrored in topics that will 
receive less attention in the current protocols. For example, LFA emphasizes building a 
problem tree but does not pay attention to its underpinning – that is data presented as 
evidence for causes. There is no obvious way in which constraints to a solution can be 
expressed in the LFA structures, that is they could be expressed in stakeholder analysis, but 
that was not part of the training. LFA emphasizes the outcomes of the interventions and we 
expect those to be visible in the dialogues. 
Results 
Approaches adopted 
As stated before, groups A and C were instructed that they were free to select any method 
they preferred and did not have to use LFA. Group A adopted a target group method that 
one of their participants had worked with before. In this approach groups at risk (target 
groups) are identified as well as programs (intervention strategies) to address these groups 
and the persons and/or organizations (actors) that have to be involved in executing the 
programs. Group C adopted some LFA notions and produced one representation (see Figure 
5.3 above) that contains a ‘problem tree’. Groups B and D followed the LFA approach more 
to the letter and produced a problem tree and an objectives tree. Group D did an attempt to 
formulate a logframe as well. Both groups did not make an explicit distinction between their 
IN and OUT-objectives. 
Analysis of the protocols  
Using the coding scheme the coders could code more than 70% of the segments in the 
protocols. The agreement percentages on the main categories for the four protocols were 
75.3%, 78.1%, 73,4% and 77,3%. Inter-rater reliabilities calculated as Kappa’s for the main 
categories were .65, .69, .63 and .68, which is sufficient for a further analysis of the data. 
Although the reliabilities found are more homogeneous than in the previous study the 
Kappa’s for the subcategories show a similar variety as in the study reported in the previous 
chapter. In particular the Kappa’s for the categories ‘Constraints and Features’, and 
‘Recommendations’ are low for three of the four protocols and statements on segments with 
these codes are to be treated with caution.  
The total number of segments and the proportions of the main categories in the protocols 
of the four groups are reported in Table 5.1. 
84 
Chapter 5 
 
Table 5.1 
Proportion of Main Categories in the Protocols 
 Non-LFA instruction LFA instruction 
 A C B D 
N( segments)a 454 545 452 547 
Analysisb 29.5 33.6 38.5 26.0 
Constraints 2.6 0.5 0.3 1.3 
Intervention 36.9 28.9 25.8 41.0 
Planning 4.9 5.9 6.2 5.6 
Recommendation 0.2 1.6 1.7 0.1 
Research Question 0.0 0.1 1.4 0.8 
Other 25.9 29.5 26.1 25.2 
a Segments are absolute numbers 
b ‘Analysis’, ‘Constraints’ … ‘Other’ are percentages 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the number of segments of the groups is less diverse than was the case 
with the beginning experts in the previous study (where they ranged from 250 to 921). The 
frequencies of segments coded as ‘Other’ ranged from 25% to 30%., whereas it ranged from 
45% to 50% in the protocols of the beginning experts of the previous study. More of the 
segments could be coded as being ‘on-task’. Although two new coding categories were 
introduced, they alone cannot account for the difference. The new category ‘Planning’ was 
used for 5 to 6 % of the coded segments. The new category ‘Intervention Strategy’ was coded 
as ‘Intervention’ in the previous version of the coding scheme. Our conclusion is that the 
four EPA groups worked more on-task as compared to the beginning experts. 
As was the procedure in the previous study, we have rank ordered the proportions of the 
main categories, excluding the segments coded as ‘Other’ to get a clearer picture of the 
relative importance of the main categories. The rank orders presented in Table 5.2 give a very 
homogenous picture of all four groups. The order of the most important categories is very 
clear: ‘Analysis’ and ‘Intervention’ on ranks 1 or 2, followed by ‘Planning’. Then there are 
slight variations. Group A then addresses ‘Constraints’ (Features and Risks) – it reaches rank 
4. As we indicated above, constraint and features are aspects of a project that cannot be 
expressed easily using LFA notation. In the rank orders of the LFA groups this category 
reaches rank 4, 5 and 6. Recommendations are rank 5 for the Target-A group, but reaches 4 
for two and 6 for 1 LFA group. Research question is on rank 5 or 6 for all groups.  
Table 5.2 
Rank Order Scores of the Main Categories 
 Control LFA 
Categories A C B D 
Analysis 2 1 1 2 
Constraints 4 5 6 4 
Intervention 1 2 2 1 
Planning 3 3 3 3 
Recommendation 5 4 4 6 
Research question 6 6 5 5 
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We calculated rank order scores for the minor categories which are presented in Table 5.3. 
The category ‘Intervention’ is less prominent, because the coding scheme now contained a 
category ‘Intervention Strategy’. The table shows that there are a few minor differences 
between the groups. For instance the rank order of ‘Intervention Effects’ for Group B is lower 
than in the other groups; i.e. group B spent - relatively - more fragments on the effects of 
interventions than the other groups. Group A spends most of its fragments on ‘Intervention 
strategy’ (1) and concrete interventions (2) whereas the other groups emphasize hypothesis 
analysis. 
Table 5.3 
Rank Order Scores of the Groups on the Minor Categories 
 Control LFA 
Categories A C B D 
Analysis Data Authority 10 10.5 10.5 11 
Analysis Data 
Experiential 
4 4 3 4 
Analysis Hypothesis 3 1 1 2 
Analysis Problem Scope 5 5 5 5 
Constraints 8 9 10.5 9 
Features 7 8 8 8 
Intervention Assumption 9 7 9 7 
Intervention Effects 11 10.5 7 10 
Intervention 2 2 2 1 
Intervention Outcome 6 6 6 6 
Intervention Strategy 1 3 4 3 
 
The top 5 categories of the groups are represented in Table 5.4. There is a remarkable 
homogeneity between the groups. In the previous chapter differences between the groups 
became better visible by comparing the ‘top 5’ categories of the groups and the categories 
that were unique to the groups by their presence or absence. The picture for the EPA groups 
however is very clear: there are no categories that are unique (whether present or absent) to a 
particular group.  
Table 5.4 
Top 5 Rank Order Categories 
Control LFA 
A C B D 
Intervention Strategy Analysis Hypothesis Analysis Hypothesis Intervention 
Intervention Intervention Intervention Analysis Hypothesis 
Analysis Hypothesis Intervention Strategy Analysis Data Experiential Intervention Strategy 
Analysis Data Experiential Analysis Data Experiential Intervention Strategy Analysis Data Experiential
Analysis Problem Scope Analysis Problem Scope Analysis Problem Scope Analysis Problem Scope 
 
In order to compare these results with those presented in the previous chapter we corrected 
the data to handle the differences between the versions of the coding scheme used. For the 
current groups, we refer to the as EPA groups, we joined the categories Intervention 
Strategies and Intervention and dropped codes related to the presentation of the 
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recommendations. For the beginning experts the code category Principle was dropped and 
we removed codes related to the preparation of the presentation. For reasons that will 
become clear when we discuss the data, we present the data in Table 5.5 sorted on the rank 
order for the first LFA group (LFA-B). 
 
Table 5.5 
Rank Orders for the Minor Categories for the Beginning Experts and the EPA Groups 
 Beginning Expertsa  EPA groups 
 P E D  A C LFA-B LFA-D
Intervention (-strategy) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Analysis Hypothesis 8 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Analysis Data Experiential 6 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Analysis Problem Scope 4 5.5 4 4 4 4 4.5 
Intervention Outcome 6 7 6 5 5 5 4.5 
Intervention Effects 9 9.5 7 10 9.5 6 9 
CF Features 2 4 8 6 7 7.5 7 
Intervention Assumption 6 8 5 8 6 7.5 6 
CF Risks 3 5.5 9 7 8 9.5 8 
Analysis Data Authority 10 9.5 10 9 9.5 9.5 10 
a Beginning expert groups are Philosophers (P), Educators (E) and Debaters (D) 
 
Inspection of the rank orders for the EPA groups shows a number of homogeneous results. 
Except for one tie, the rank orders 1 thru 5 are the same. For the EPA groups C and D this 
even holds (considering ties) for all rank orders. The remaining differences between the EPA 
groups are very small and they deal with a small percentage of the original coding. Ranks 1 
to 5, which are the same for the EPA groups, cover 95.5% to 98.4% of the on-task coded 
segments in these protocols. 
If we compare and contrast the beginning experts with the EPA groups we could repeat 
the observations made in the previous chapter on the unique characteristics of the 
Philosophers’ approach. More interesting, however, is the comparison between the 
Educators and Debaters and the EPA groups. The first three categories (‘Intervention’, 
‘Hypotheses’, ‘Data Experiential’) are shared, with the EPA groups having hypotheses at 
rank 2 and ‘Data Experiential’ on 3. Although this is a small difference in rank it is 
considerable in terms of the proportion of the dialogues. The proportion of the dialogues that 
the EPA groups spend on hypotheses ranges from 21% (A) thru 29% (B) and 30% (D) up to 
37% (C). In the previous chapter we reported for the Educators and Debaters proportions of 
10% and 14%. These values however are underestimated, because the Educators, in 
particular, spend 17% of their dialogue on the preparation of their presentation. 
Nevertheless, even after a correction for this underestimation the difference remains 
substantial. It is also what we would expect, because the problem tree of LFA focuses 
students on the causes of the problem. With the exception of group A, we would expect that 
hypotheses are often mentioned in the dialogues. 
The results for the dialogues on Data are also as we predicted. In the previous chapter we 
reported that the Educators and Debaters spent (underestimated values of) 24% and 20% of 
their dialogues on ‘Authority’ and ‘Experiential Data’. For the EPA groups we find 14% 
(Target-A), 17% (B), 9% (C) and 5% (D) of the dialogues spent on ‘Data’. This is what we 
87 
Explorations in graphical argumentation 
expected for the LFA groups, because LFA does not encourage specification of the 
underpinnings of the problem analysis. The result also demonstrates that improvements can 
be made here. 
Qualitative analyses 
The position of the EPA students is somewhat different as compared to that of the beginning 
experts of the previous chapter. First, the EPA students are from different national 
backgrounds and not all of them are fluent in English. In several episodes in the protocols 
the students are trying to find the correct wording, or they explain formulations to each 
other. Second, they come from countries with different educational systems. The protocols 
contain several episodes in which the participants share information on the educational 
systems and regulations of their countries. Finally, the recommendations that they compile 
cannot assume a uniform educational system, because the EU member states have different 
educational systems. 
The protocols all contain segments where the participants try to delineate what drop-out 
is. The participants try to define drop-out in terms of the level of schooling at which a learner 
leaves the educational system, that is where does leaving school count as drop-out. This is a 
rather shallow understanding of drop-out and why it is a problem. There is only one 
statement in the protocols that indicates a deeper understanding of the problematic side of 
drop-out: “It’s that you don’t have the right education to actually start any kind of career” 
(protocol A, segment 61). 
Groups B, C and D all tried to create a problem tree to represent the drop-out problem. 
Inspection of the trees learns that, rather than cause-and-effect chains, as LFA would have it, 
these trees have abstract problem categories, such as ‘family problems’ or ‘social 
environment problems’ directly connected to the major problem, that is drop-out. Below the 
abstract categories we find the more concrete causes (‘drug abuse’, ‘gangs’, ‘teenage 
pregnancy’). Note that this is not the structure one should define when using LFA. The 
problems tree in the example reads (according to LFA) as “drug abuse, together with gangs 
and teenage pregnancy, causes social problems; social problems cause drop-out”. The use and 
position of the abstract problem categories will lead to problems in the next step of LFA, the 
formulation of objectives. According to LFA, there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the elements of the problem tree and the elements of the objectives tree. Thus, the abstract 
problem categories have to be rephrased as objectives. We would then find objectives, such 
as ‘less social problems’ that have to be met before the objective ‘less drop-out’ can be 
reached. The LFA style is to either only use more tangible problem and objective statements, 
or put the general categories below the concrete ones. As we will see below, the groups that 
prepared an objectives tree found different solutions to this LFA-based problem. 
In the following discussion we concentrate on the protocols of the LFA groups, but we 
will start with a brief overview of the protocols of groups A and C. Group A is the only group 
that did not create a problem tree. This group decided to identify the target groups that were 
at risk of dropping out and then identify the interventions and the actors responsible for 
them. This is a method one of the participants was familiar with. Their protocol reads as a 
lengthy systematic brainstorm in which various target groups are identified. Working down 
the list of target groups they described interventions as well as the actors. Group C developed 
a problem tree, but then decided to not develop an objectives tree: “I don’t think that we 
need to do objective tree in the moment (…) because we discussed we can just develop 
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recommendations” (segment 304). They return to the issue at the end of the protocol when 
someone suggest to build the objectives tree: “You can try to make the objectives tree. I mean 
it is quite easy to” (segment 541), but someone concludes: “We can do the problem tree (sic! 
JvB) but for us it was much easier to see what is the problem and then think about the 
recommendations” (segment 544). Group C also decided that they would address only two 
of the four major problems identified (‘financial problems’ and ‘motivation’). 
Group B was instructed to apply LFA. They start to delineate the problem by discussing at 
which educational levels drop-out may occur. They then try to address the causes (segments 
25, 26) but get sidetracked by a new discussion on the meaning of drop-out and the 
educational levels (segments 29-41). In segment 42 someone proposes to address causes 
followed by the suggestion that ‘insufficient entrance requirements’ to high school is a 
potential cause. This however leads to exchange of information on entrance requirements to 
university (segments 46-60). New exhortations to concentrate on causes (segment 61) and to 
brainstorm (65) lead to a few minutes during which most of the components in the problem 
tree are formulated. Their analysis is in terms of abstract categories, such as ‘social problems’ 
and ‘family problems’. Concrete, isolated causes are suggested in this phase, but not 
accepted “(…) we should first stick to the bigger causes like family problems”. 
From segment 173 on, eighteen minutes in the session, group B starts to work on the 
objectives. They have used two general problem categories ‘drawbacks of the educational 
system’ as well as ‘social problems’ in the top of their problem tree. They now have to 
reformulate these as objectives. They notice the problem that the abstract categories are 
causing, and react with humor: “So improved educational system … wild”. “And their 
salvation of all social problems in the world” (segments 192-193). They formulate an 
objective for ‘social problems’. “It sounds so ridiculous: reduction of social problems” 
(segment 198). Eventually, they agree on the formulation ‘assistance to victims of social 
problems’ (segment 203). Their objectives tree thus becomes a mixture of objectives and 
interventions (see Figure 5.4). Eventually, they decide on a subset of interventions that can be 
addressed in short term as their IN-objectives. 
Lengthy passages of the protocol are filled with two of the four participants writing out 
the problem tree and the objectives tree, which were used to capture the results of their 
work. 
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Figure 5.4. The objectives tree of group B containing objectives as well 
as interventions. The recommendations are in the grey boxes. 
Group D was also instructed to apply LFA. Their protocol starts with a very brief orientation 
on the task and the meaning of drop-out, before the group starts to brainstorm in segment 7. 
Within the first five minutes of the protocol most of the content of the problem tree is already 
mentioned. Again, we see abstract problem categories appear as top nodes: ‘family 
problems’, ‘social environment problems’ and ‘problems at school’. The brainstorm of the 
group is interspersed with suggestions of possible interventions, such as policies against 
child labor, establishing a psychological counselor at schools, improve second chance and 
evening schools and others. When this group has to address the objectives (late in the 
protocol – at 55 minutes) they decide to drop a number of problems from further 
consideration: “(…) for the family problems we cannot give objectives. They are not 
amenable to change” (segment 421). From then on, they loose the relation between problem 
and objectives completely by adding several interventions to the objectives tree that are not 
related to either problems or objectives. 
 
From the protocols of both LFA groups as well as from their products, the problem trees and 
objectives trees, it is clear that the groups failed to apply the LFA techniques correctly. In 
particular they failed to maintain the direct links between the formulation of problems and 
objectives. There are some other, informal, indications that this is not an incidental failure. 
Before the problem solving session each group had prepared a small project proposal in the 
area of traffic safety that was to be presented during the final session. Group D, for example, 
had addressed the safety topic from the perspective of ‘driver psychology’. In their problem 
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tree three categories of major problem areas are present right below the top of the problem 
tree: ‘perception, cognition and motor skills’. Similar uses of abstract categories below the 
top of the problem trees can be found in the assignments of groups B and C. Only group A 
prepared a problem tree that consisted of cause-and-effect chains only. The data from these 
assignments suggest that the patterns that we observed in the protocols are based on more 
persistent misunderstandings of certain LFA techniques, which leaves room for 
improvement of the LFA course that these students followed. 
More interesting than the mastery of LFA techniques is how our participants approach 
the problem presented to them. In chapter 2 we discussed research by Voss, Tyler, et al. 
(1983). They described how experts when solving social science problems spend a 
considerable amount of time to build a problem representation, delineate the problem 
constraints and develop an orientation as to the type of problem, for example a political or a 
technological problem. Their solution (as well as diagnosis) is abstract and only a few 
solutions are considered. Novices on the other hand mention separate, concrete causes to 
which they directly connect solutions. 
Our participants are not experts. None of them had particular expertise in the area of 
drop-out, so all teams had to rely on there own insights and experience. None of the teams 
formulated a solution that could be compared to the ‘charter school’ that the Educationalists 
came up with in the previous study. This, however, does not imply that they operated as 
novices. Groups B, C and D do not approach drop-out as a simple problem having one single 
cause or a number of unrelated causes. Instead, they use abstract categories of causes from 
which they try to derive more concrete causes. They devote considerable attention to the 
causes (more then the beginning experts did). Although they run into trouble applying LFA, 
at least one of the LFA groups (group B) managed to maintain at least some of the relations 
between the problems identified, the objectives and the interventions. Group A followed a 
different approach by identifying various groups at risk, as such their analysis may look 
closest to that of the Debaters who identified a series of unrelated causes. The important 
difference is that group A did not consider the target groups in isolation. When they were 
defining their interventions they were combining interventions as well as target groups. 
All this does not correspond to the novice behavior described by Voss et al. (1983). Yet, 
the approach is also quite different from the expert problem solving approach. Whereas the 
experts take care to delineate the constraints to the problem, we find, as already noticed in 
the quantitative analysis, that our participants hardly address constraints (less than the 
beginning experts, in fact) except for the question at which educational level drop-out may 
be located. The instruction of the participants did not offer any clear constraints but only told 
them that the Commission was seeking their advice in developing ‘effective policies’, which 
is a statement that leaves room for different interpretations. The protocols contain no 
statements in which the participants are discussing this constraint. Neither can we find 
statements where they are applying it as a criterion to evaluate interventions or 
recommendations. Group C and D define their own constraints when they decide to not 
address some of the problems that they have identified, because they consider them as being 
not amenable to change. Finally, the protocols contain very few statements about the 
effectiveness of recommendations or interventions in reducing drop-out, a point that we 
already mentioned in the quantitative analysis.  
All in all, the EPA groups present a mixed picture of expert-like and novice-like behavior. 
In particular the lack of attention for constraints and effectiveness of recommendations is a 
reason for concern. 
91 
Explorations in graphical argumentation 
Discussion 
In this chapter we analyzed the problem solving protocols of four multi-disciplinary groups 
of students that were trained in the basics of Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). The groups 
worked on a similar school drop-out problem as was used in the previous chapter. We found 
no such pronounced approaches as were identified for the Philosophers and Debaters in the 
previous chapter. Two reasons might explain that. First, our teams were multi-disciplinary 
and this alone may have been sufficient to prevent the sort of mono-disciplinary approach 
followed by the Philosophers and the Debaters. Second, although none of the groups had 
specific expertise in the area of school drop-out, all participants brought the common 
experience of the EPA program that deals with European Policies and most participants had 
educational backgrounds that confronted them with social problems, policies and 
interventions. Therefore our participants, compared to the Philosophers and the Debaters, 
may have brought more relevant knowledge to the session than just the LFA training. 
We found that the LFA groups spent considerable effort discussing the causes of the 
problem – as one would expect given that they all started to develop a problem tree. They 
expressed these causes using abstract problem categories, whose direct relation to the 
problem of drop-out is not always clear, however. They used abstract descriptions of the 
interventions as well. The new category ‘intervention strategy’ received a high ranking (see 
Table 5.3).  
We found that all groups paid little attention to delineating the problem constraints and 
to formulating the underpinning of their analysis and solutions. As we mentioned earlier this 
corresponds to a lack of expressibility in the data structures of LFA. Finally, we noted that 
the LFA data structures were used as a means to consolidate the results of deliberations, 
rather than as representation of an ongoing dialogue. 
The most important question to be answered here is whether Logical Framework Analysis 
offered the process support that we considered necessary for the non-expert groups in the 
previous chapter. Consider how the EPA groups worked in comparison to the beginning 
experts. Three of the four groups tried to apply some of the LFA techniques, and group A 
also worked along systematic lines by applying a target groups approach. None of the 
groups produced solutions comparable to those of the Philosophers or the Debaters. The 
EPA groups more or less ignored constraints, to which the Philosophers devoted their 
attention almost exclusively. The EPA groups did not formulate a number of unrelated 
causes and how to implement measures to eliminate each of them, as did the Debaters. The 
beginning experts, in particular the Debaters, ran into some problems when they came to 
realize how the social nature of some of the causes would prevent direct solutions. The EPA 
groups quickly dismissed a number of problems as being not amenable to change. Of course, 
their analysis of school drop-out is shallow compared to that of the Educators, which makes 
it easier to dismiss complete problem areas. 
We found no evidence that the two LFA groups produced deeper analyses or more 
coherent recommendations than the other two EPA groups. In fact, the quantitative analysis 
already indicated that the differences between the LFA groups were considerable. 
Nevertheless, we may say that LFA at least seemed to guide our participants in addressing 
the problem in a number of separate steps. The groups try to first analyze the causes of the 
problems before they work out interventions. 
More important however is the guidance effect that the representational notation of LFA 
seems to have on the contents of the dialogues. The ontology of LFA addresses causes and 
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their relations (problem tree), objectives and their relations (objectives tree) and 
interventions, outcomes, effects and risks (logframe). We see that reflected in the dialogues. 
As usual, most of the segments are spent on interventions and hypotheses, i.e. causes. In fact, 
the percentage of the LFA groups is higher than what we found for the beginning experts in 
the previous study. Fewer fragments, also less than we found with the beginning experts in 
the previous study, were spent on data. Constraints, assumptions and risks are hardly 
mentioned. So, although we find some indications of process support offered by LFA, it as 
well does not succeed in guiding students to address the structural relations between the 
components of the analysis and the solution. 
Conclusions 
All in all then, LFA could be used to offer a limited type of process support. There are a 
number of serious drawbacks however. First, the methods and techniques of LFA are not 
self-evident, implying that we have to train students in the use of them. And this would 
obviously require more training than the EPA students received in order to prevent the 
common errors that we encountered in the formulation of the problem and objectives tree. 
There are, however, other serious drawbacks associated with LFA that need to be 
considered.  
Second, the ontology of LFA is limited. Although LFA emphasizes the importance of logic 
in a project definition, the method seems to lack the means of ensuring that the data-
structures produced indeed have this quality. LFA offers no means to represent (and 
therefore does not encourage to express) the underpinnings of the relations in its trees (that 
is evidence that A causes B, and that Intervention I will lead to a particular result). One 
might expect this to occur with novices but Gasper (1999; 2000) made similar observations 
about the use of LFA in international programs. In a similar way LFA does not allow or 
solicit the expression of the constraints to the problem, and we see that in the EPA protocols 
constraints as well as underpinnings are rarely used. 
Third, the usability of LFA may be related to the level of domain expertise and the context 
in which it is used. If LFA is used in project development a group of experts may be involved 
in defining the problems and objectives tree. Their joint ordeal may be sufficient for further 
project development.  
In educational settings, however, that level of expertise cannot be assumed. Moreover, we 
often are concerned more with students demonstrating careful analysis with sufficient 
backing and argumentation underlying a solution than with a ‘correct’ solution. Considering 
these drawbacks and the limited guidance that LFA seems to offer we conclude that LFA 
does not need to be incorporated as guidance and support component in the representational 
notation. 
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 6 Towards computer-supported argumentation visualization for 
social science problems 
The work reported here started with the claim that social science problems present to 
students the type of open, authentic tasks needed in the competency-based education that 
the Open University of the Netherlands is aiming to develop. The question that we sought to 
answer in the studies reported here was how collaborative solving of this type of problems, 
can be supported with the use of external representations. Given that the analysis, solutions 
and evaluation of solutions of these problems are processes involving extensive 
argumentation, we concentrated on graphical representations of these arguments. One of the 
most important questions to be answered is what representational notation is needed to 
support collaborative solving of social science problems. That is, what are the objects and 
relations that we offer students to represent the argumentation with? 
The ultimate goal of the research is to offer students support and guidance in their 
collaborative problem solving activities through Computer-Supported Argumentation 
Visualization (CSAV). The development of such a CSAV environment will take a 
considerable amount of time (and money) and here we have attempted only to answer some 
of the initial questions in the design of a CSAV environment. The steps that we took can be 
mapped onto the six stages of the development of CSCL environments described by 
Kirschner (2002). His stages are inspired by the observation that CSCL environments need to 
be carefully designed and developed if we want to ensure that the support contained in these 
environments is perceived and used (as intended) by the learner. Kirschner discusses the 
following stages in the development of CSCL environments: 
 
1. Determine what learners actually do or what they want to do 
2. Determine what can be done to support those learners  
3. Determine the constraints of the learner, learning situation and learning environment 
and the conventions that already exist  
4. Determine how learners perceive and experience the support that we provide  
5. Determine how the learner actually uses the support provided 
6. Determine what has been learnt  
 
The work reported here can be described as concentrating on the first three stages of the 
development cycle. Chapter 2 develops the model to describe what learners do and how 
external representations may support them. Chapter 3 can be considered an intermezzo in 
which we learned that adding-on to an existing CSCL environment does not work. Chapters 
4 and 5 are studies on how learners go about solving social science problems. They are 
intended as a very first step towards testing the usability (and usefulness) of the 
representational notation developed in chapter 2. In chapter 5 we tested Logical Framework 
Analysis as a means for guidance and support. Here, the conclusions of these studies are 
translated in a first set of global functional requirements for a CSAV environment. Before 
presenting these global requirements the next section of this chapter reviews the results of 
the studies reported in the previous chapters and draws a number of conclusions with 
respect to functional requirements and further work. 
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Review of the results 
In the previous chapters we reported a number of explorative studies aimed at improving 
our understanding of how we can (or cannot) use, in a computer-based environment, 
external representations of argumentation to support collaborative solving of a type of ill-
structured problems referred to as social science problems. In these explorations we have 
used results from different areas, including problem solving research, evaluation research, 
research in Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) and project methodologies, 
in particular Logical Framework Analysis. 
 
In chapter 2 we reviewed the literature on solving social science problems and ‘wicked 
problems’. These concepts were developed in different research areas and we attempted to 
synthesize them in a multiple agent, multiple representation model. The different traditions 
have also inspired different lines of CSAV environments. We reviewed a number of CSCL 
environments, that emphasize CSAV for scientific inquiry (addressing ‘why questions’) and 
a number of design-based environments that are more focused on the ‘how questions’ and 
enumerated a number of different services found in these environments. They all offer 
representational services, that is, they have functionalities with which the users (or a 
mediator) can manipulate a graphical representation. CSCL environments offer 
communication services by which learners can communicate in synchronous or 
asynchronous mode. Finally, we identified guidance and support services and we noticed 
that these services often are dependent on the representational service. Whereas discussion-
based tools, such as CSILE®, often hide information in the text of discussion nodes, guidance 
and support services need to have access to information such as plausibility ratings and 
ratings of agreement. 
In chapter 2 we presented a model for problem solving using three states – orientation, 
solving and evaluation – and a number of cognitive and communicative demands related to 
these states. These demands were then related to the services offered by CSAV 
environments. Finally, chapter 2 described a first version of a representational notation to 
support collaborative solving of social science problems. The claims made in chapter 2 are 
summarized below. As can be seen several of them deal with more general descriptions of 
the type of problems and problem solving processes, such as statements 1 thru 5. Others, are 
more directly related to the services we identified. We will reconsider these claims as we 
review the studies reported in this thesis. 
 
1. There is no unambiguous statement of an ill-structured problems or its solutions 
(Reitman, 1965) 
2. Social science problems are ill-structured problems with ‘delayed evaluation’ (Voss, 
Tyler, et al., 1983) 
3. Solving of social science problems involves informal reasoning to establish the goals, 
constraints and solutions to the problem (Voss, Greene, et al., 1983; Voss, Tyler, et al., 
1983). 
4. Solving of social science problems involves different stakeholders (Kunz & Rittel, 
1970) 
5. Stakeholders bring their own viewpoint to, i.e. representations of, the problem (Kunz 
& Rittel, 1970; Rittel & Webber, 1984) 
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6. Different agents / problem solvers may have shared, partially shared and private 
representations of the problem and procedures (Alpay et al., 1998) 
7. The representations of the agents may be temporary or permanent: the latter coincide 
with systems, procedures and models used on a regular basis (Alpay et al., 1998). 
8. Problem solving consists of three states: orientation, solving and evaluation (Newell 
& Simon, 1972) 
9. Each problem-solving state has its own representational and communicative 
demands (Duffy et al., 1998; Sloffer, et al., 1999). 
10. Evaluation of solutions is (also) based on the accuracy, consistency and plausibility of 
the underlying argumentation (Voss, Tyler, et al., 1983) 
11. Maintaining accuracy, consistency and plausibility are important functions of 
representation management (Alpay et al., 1998) 
12. The criteria by which accuracy, consistency and plausibility are evaluated need not be 
the same for all agents / problem solvers (Voss, Wiley, et al., 1999) 
 
Chapter 3 reported a study, conducted at the University of Ghent, in which we used an 
existing CSCL environment, Belvédère®, that was designed to support collaborative scientific 
inquiry. We varied the level of detail of the meaning of symbols to support deliberations on 
concrete actions to solve a problem. This experiment suffered from a number of technical 
problems leading to loss of data that could have given us a better insight in the problem 
solving activities of the student groups. On the other hand, other technical problems forced 
us to introduce a ‘condition’ to the experiment in which students worked side-by-side and 
this condition revealed a number of interesting results. Overall, the results of this experiment 
were clear-cut: whereas we predicted a number of positive effects of the more detailed 
representational notation, the opposite occurred. Students who shared one computer, 
working side-by-side, and using a low detail representational notation outperformed those 
who were working at separate computers using a high detail representational notation. 
These results seem to point to an interaction between the task, the representational 
notation and the communication and co-ordination facilities that Belvédère® offers. Veerman 
(2000) found that students using Belvédère® while working at separate computers had to 
spend considerable effort, about half of their messages in the Belvédère® chat box, on 
technical issues, planning and coordinating actions on the diagrams. What this suggests is 
that the communication services offered by Belvédère® do not match the coordination 
demands that students have. Belvédère® is lacking coordination mechanisms, such as chats 
that are anchored in the diagrams, or a topic-based agenda that indicates existing or new 
items in the diagrams that need to be worked on. The data is sparse however and their 
interpretation is not clear-cut. Therefore a replication of this experiment with balanced 
conditions is needed before we can make any specific claims as to the nature of this 
interaction. 
From the Ghent experiment we learned that we could not expect that ‘transplanting’ 
external representations to Belvédère®, or any other system, would offer learners an 
environment with which they could learn to solve social science problems using external 
representations. This was a clear sign to reconsider the design of an environment intended to 
support such a complex process as the collaborative solving of ill-structured problems. In 
particular we had to put more emphasis on the initial analysis stages of the design. From this 
point on we focused on the development and testing of a representational notation, rather 
than attempting to design representational tools. 
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In chapter 4 we reported on a first study on how students solved a social science problem. 
Protocols of three mono-disciplinary groups were made available to us by prof. dr. Tom 
Duffy. These protocols were collected to study the problem solving activities of groups of 
beginning experts in different domains, namely Education, Philosophy and Debating. The 
Educators were considered beginning experts in the content area (school drop-out). The 
Philosophers were considered beginning process experts in systematic analysis and 
argumentation and the Debaters were considered beginning process experts in systematic 
debate and persuasive argumentation. The groups were instructed to compile 
recommendations to the Board of Governors as to how school drop-out in the U.S.A. could 
be reduced. 
We analyzed the protocols of these three groups using a coding scheme that was derived 
from a first version of a representational notation presented in chapter 2. The 
representational notation is an eclectic blend using results of several research areas. Using 
the coding scheme we were able to analyze a substantial amount of the segments in the 
protocols, which showed that the students used several of the concepts included in the 
representational notation. This is encouraging as far as the usability of such a scheme is 
concerned. 
More importantly, the coding scheme proved robust enough to cater for the different 
approaches that the three groups followed when they tried to solve the problem. Whereas 
the ‘real experts’, the Educationalists in this case, came up with a reasonable solution, 
although ignoring several other possibilities, two other groups that did not have an affinity 
with the problem did not come to coherent recommendations. One group (Philosophers) 
tended to focus on the constraints of the problem only, while the other (Debaters) worked 
almost mechanically along a list of unrelated causes that they had previously identified. 
With the coding scheme these different approaches as well as the shortcomings of the 
approaches could be typified, thus indicating where further improvements could be made. 
Before we state our conclusions from this study we need to consider a number of 
weaknesses in the study. First, the empirical base on which we draw our conclusions is, 
admittedly, a small one (which keeps us close to the tradition of Voss…). Video- and 
audiotapes of six parallel groups were recovered and made available to us in December 2002, 
but could not be analyzed in due time to be reported here. 
Second, the reliabilities of the coding, expressed as Kappa’s, are typically in the range of 
.60’s. This may be sufficient to explore the data, the reliability needs to be improved if we 
want to make more substantial claims on the basis of the dialogue analyses. For our analyses, 
we have not made coders agree on the coding of segments, but rather based the analyses on 
either the means of the codes, or on the coded protocol of one single coder. Admittedly, we 
still could have had coders agree, not to use that agreement as the code, but in an attempt to 
explore why the coding scheme was sometimes hard to use in coding the protocols. 
Third, we may consider a potential weakness resulting from the fact that we analyzed the 
problem solving dialogues completely from the perspective of the type of content addressed 
and have not looked in any detail at the communicative functions of the dialogue exchanges. 
This may seem a reasonable choice as far as one is concerned with the development of a 
representational notation. We have to address content if we need to decide about the 
expressiveness of a representational notation. To validate a representational notation or to 
test its potential usability one has to check whether the intended audience is already using 
some of the concepts contained in such a scheme, or whether those that are trained in the 
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notation use the concepts in their problem solving activities. For that reason the coding 
scheme has to concentrate on the content, rather than on communicative actions. 
One may argue that we have concentrated less on content than we describe here, because 
we have failed to differentiate the statements relating to a particular category of content. All 
statements in a category – for example an intervention - are coded as belonging to that 
category, irrespective of the nature of the speech act: thus, whether an intervention is stated 
or questioned or evaluated makes no difference to the coding scheme. This may seem as a 
serious omission, but the effects will be modest in the contexts in which we use this scheme 
and in the context in which the scheme is implemented as a representational notation. To 
start with the latter: in an implementation one does not ‘state’ an intervention, one adds an 
‘intervention object’ to the external representation. Other objects are used to make further 
statements about related aspects: risks, expected outcomes, data on the effectiveness of the 
intervention, et cetera. In the contexts that we have used the scheme we were not interested 
in the use of particular categories. We are, to put it bluntly, more interested in whether 
participants cover all aspects of the solution process than in the details of the particulars. 
The choice for a content-centered approach is less obvious when we are studying students 
that are working in collaborative situations. It has become almost commonplace to argue that 
we should not expect CSCL to lead to dramatic changes in learning outcome and that we 
may better expect to see changes occurring in the interactions between students. Analysis of 
the communicative functions of speech acts in the student dialogues has become more or less 
standard in CSCL research. As an example, the Utrecht tradition can be mentioned. An 
impressive series of studies has been conducted that all look at the relation between 
constructive speech acts and argumentatives in the dialogues of students and learning 
outcomes (in a very wide sense). In a recent overview (Kanselaar et al., 2003) the authors 
state, however, that the relation is less clear than hoped. 
In contrast to that approach, we analyzed the dialogues between students in order to 
check whether they used the concepts that we introduced in the representational notation. If 
only for that reason, we had no alternative than to opt for a content-centered coding. 
Admittedly, we have driven the content-centered coding beyond this point in those studies 
where the coders not only classified statements in content categories (‘an intervention is 
mentioned’), but also described the content (‘the intervention is ‘pay if they graduate’’). This 
however was the only way of differentiating between the breadth and depth of the ideas 
generated, allowing us to differentiate between the repetitive rephrasing of the same content 
and generating of different content. It certainly helped to better understand the differences 
between the problem solving approaches of students from different background. Admittedly 
however, this approach requires that coders themselves invent coding categories and we 
have not even tried to establish inter-rater reliabilities for this type of coding.  
When we attempt to improve the problem solving processes of students it is not by 
stimulating them to engage in constructive and argumentative actions in general. The notion 
behind the methods and behind the analyses of the dialogues is more precise. We surmise 
that that solving this sort of problems involves the formulation and evaluation of the 
‘program theory’ behind the interventions. The objects and relations that we added to the 
traditional LFA objects correspond on the one hand to a scientific analysis of the ‘why’ part 
and on the other to a specification of the ‘program theory’ for the ‘how’-part. To paraphrase 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) we are interested in having students explain to us beforehand 
whether particular interventions are likely to work in a certain context and what convincing 
reasons they have to believe so. 
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From the study reported in chapter 4 we drew the following conclusions. First, the 
representational notation that we construed was promising, because using the coding 
scheme that was derived from it, a substantial part of the dialogues could be coded. This 
indicates that the students already use concepts contained in the representational notation 
and that is a sign of potential usability. Second, the representational notation proved robust 
for different problem solving approaches. Using the coding scheme the protocols of all three 
groups could be coded, and the different approaches of the groups could not only be 
captured, but typified as well using the categories of the coding scheme. The different 
approaches could be described as focusing on particular categories while ignoring certain 
others. This then brings us to the final conclusion. Considering the solutions produced and 
the biases noted in the approaches of the groups, more guidance and support is needed for 
the non-domain experts. We may notice however that the groups and in particular the 
Debaters worked very systematically. Considering the issues regarding the communication 
services and the agenda function that were raised in the discussion of the Ghent Belvédère® 
experiment, we can say that the Debaters in the orientation state, brainstormed and decided 
on the issues (causes) that they would work on in the solving state and then, in their solution 
state, addressed the causes topically. In other words, what we need is not guidance and 
support to help students maintain focus on particular categories, but support that helps them 
to treat the different categories in their structural relations, for example by testing the 
effectiveness of proposed interventions or by checking proposed interventions against stated 
constraints. 
 
In chapter 5 we reported on a study in which we tried whether the methods and tools of 
Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) could be used to guide the process of solving social 
science problems and the content addressed. Choosing LFA was more or less obvious 
because we had already incorporated elements of LFA in the notation. Moreover, LFA is a 
method that is used in the analysis of the type of ill-structured problems we are dealing with. 
LFA offers a number of tools – trees, matrices – that are to be filled in a series of steps. 
However, there are also a number of known shortcomings to LFA, which we discuss below. 
The participants of the study reported in chapter 5 were students enrolled in an 
International Master program (European Public Affairs) at Maastricht University. The EPA 
program is attracting students with widely different educational and cultural backgrounds. 
There are several advantages to having these students participate in the study. First, they are 
all advanced students, beginning experts, some of them already own a master’s degree. 
Second, they are from different national and educational backgrounds and we can form 
multidisciplinary teams. Third, and finally, a part of the EPA program is concerned with 
policy evaluation and this part includes training in the basics of Logical Framework Analysis 
(given by the author).  
Four groups of EPA students, trained in the basics of LFA, were confronted with the task 
to formulate recommendations on how to reduce school drop-out in the European Union. 
Three of the four groups tried to apply LFA and the analysis of their protocols yielded very 
similar results. The EPA groups tended to spend more dialogue turns on causes than did the 
beginning experts of chapter 4 (Philosophers and Debaters in particular). In their analyses 
they used more abstract problem categories (‘social problems’) than for instance the Debaters 
did. More abstract categories do not imply a deeper view, however: the EPA groups 
produced rather shallow analyses with little underpinning (data) of their analysis and 
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solutions. They spent relatively few turns on constraints and desirable characteristics of the 
solutions. 
We noticed that none of the groups that tried to apply LFA managed to maintain 
consistency within and between the different representations that LFA uses. This can be 
traced back to some of the particularities of LFA and it does not signify a weakness in the 
problem solving activities of the participants. On the contrary, one might say that they 
avoided the typical novice approach of stating several unrelated causes (Voss, Tyler, et al., 
1983). Finally, we noted that the external representations in LFA were used as a means to 
consolidate the results of deliberations. 
 The results of the EPA groups may be related to weaknesses of LFA. One of the most 
outspoken critics of Logical Framework Analysis is Gasper (1999; 2000) whose central theme 
is that Logical Framework Analysis is particularly vulnerable to being applied in rigid ways 
from which little can be learned. Gasper pinpoints his criticism to the logframe because he 
sees that as the core of the method. Gaspers points to several weaknesses, but there is only 
one relevant to the parts of the LFA methods and tools that we use. Gasper uses the poignant 
term ‘lack frame’ to describe a logframe that is construed after the project is defined and that 
is lacking the project logic that is so central to LFA. His criticism is somewhat curious, 
however, because it focuses on those aspects of the logframe that are derived from the 
problem and objectives trees defined previously. In our view a more accurate formulation is 
that LFA neither enforces, nor encourages its users to articulate the project’s logic and the 
evidence that supports the analysis or solution. There are no means in the LFA 
representations to express data that corroborate the analysis in the problem tree or the 
objectives tree. 
Furthermore, there are no facilities in LFA for expressing ‘program theory’, an 
explanation why a set of interventions will ultimately lead to the solution of a problem. 
Unfortunately, the use of common terms can be confusing here. The logframe contains a 
column called ‘assumptions’. These are (pre)conditions outside the scope of the project that 
must materialize for the interventions to work. In our representational notation we refer to 
them as conditions and risks. In program theory the term assumption is used to describe a set 
of presupposed intervening mechanisms that link the direct outcomes of an intervention to 
the long-term effects. These are called assumptions in the representational notation. LFA has 
no object to express this type of assumption. 
In the protocols of the EPA students we find hardly any argumentation on the causes of 
the problem, or on the reasons why proposed interventions are likely to have any effects. As 
we noticed, LFA does not encourage making this reasoning explicit, there is no 
representational guidance towards these categories in the external representations used in 
LFA. 
However, one must also consider that expressing argumentation requires more than 
adding an object to an external representation, it requires domain knowledge. Although our 
students are beginning experts, none of them had any expertise in the field of Education or 
school drop-out. They may have found it difficult to apply their particular expertise (Law, 
International Relations, Economics) to this problem. An indication here is that we found 
almost no sign of different problem representations that could be traced to differences in 
backgrounds. Two noticeable exceptions are a Psychologist in group D who more or less 
persuaded the others in her team to go for psychological interventions, and the participant in 
group A who had worked with target group analysis and persuaded her team members to 
apply that method. So, looking back at the claims that we reported earlier, in particular at 
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those dealing with the multiple agent, multiple representation model we must conclude that 
neither different representations nor operators corresponding to different educational 
background were visible in the protocols of the multidisciplinary groups. Task characteristics 
may have contributed to this effect, however. Students did not prepare for the problem 
solving session and the synchronous mode of operation may have further contributed to 
they not being able to develop a viewpoint on the drop-out problem where their domain 
expertise could be used. Future research should investigate under which conditions, 
including ones in which they can prepare for these sessions, students can be stimulated to 
articulate their specific views on a problem. 
The students of the EPA groups seem comparable to the Debaters of chapter 4, but they 
do have certain process knowledge, which they try to apply. Maybe that prevents them from 
coming up with a list of unrelated causes and maybe that helps them to think of feasible 
interventions, but they lack the domain expertise to produce anything similar to the charter 
schools policy that the Educationalists came up with, or to check their proposed 
interventions against constraints such as EU policies. From these considerations we learned 
that there are important limitations to the usability of LFA as process support, even if we 
consider advanced students as the main target group.  
 
The study with the EPA students suffers from a number of weaknesses that partly overlap 
with those of other studies. First, the reliability of the coding remains a concern. Although 
slightly higher than in the study with the beginning experts, the Kappa’s are still not very 
impressive. Yet, more segments could be coded with a content coding and it seems likely 
that we can make further improvements by including an abstract category for causes as well.  
This study, as did the previous ones, engaged students, most of whom are not experts in 
the problem domain, in a short problem solving session, typically lasting one to two hours. 
We confronted the students with an ill-structured problem where they themselves had to 
define the problem, delineate its constraints, agree on criteria and stopping rules. Moreover, 
they were required to specify a set of interventions that would eliminate the causes of the 
problems, along with an argument why the was likely to work. This is a lot to be 
accomplished within an hour. Only the Education group, reported in chapter 4, came up 
with an analysis and a solution that contained these elements, but both were constrained to 
the Educational realm. 
Our explorations show us what sort of biases we can expect if we have students who are 
less advanced in the relevant domain. With the exception of the Education students all 
groups demonstrated that they focused on particular types of content sometimes completely 
ignoring others. According to the idea of representational guidance (Suthers, 2001) a 
representational notation is also offering a task structure for the students. In ordinary 
language: if you provide them with objects and relations they will tend to use them. So it 
remains to be seen if our students when they are using a full-fledged representational 
notation will manage to use the structural relations between the objects. Considering the 
complexity of the notation, we do not think that is very likely. We therefore propose to build 
guidance and support in the CSAV environment in such a way that (a) problem solving 
states are directly linked to objects that are in focus and (b) objects themselves signal to what 
sort of other objects they can or need to be connected and (c) categorical objects such as 
‘solution’, ‘type of cause’, ‘type of intervention’ are available to represent a number of 
subsumed objects. 
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In the next section we review some of the demands that we formulated in chapter 2 and 
reconsider their translation to services offered in CSAV environments. 
Global functional requirements for a CSAV environment 
Here we present a first version of the global functional requirements for a computer-
supported environment for collaborative solving of ill-structured problems by the use of 
external representations. The CSAV environment offers the users facilities to create external 
representations of argumentation when solving social science problems. 
The general goal of the system is to offer support by helping to explicate the 
argumentation used in the stages of analysis, solution and evaluation in solving ill-
structured problems in a graphical way. This goal is different from the goal of CSCL 
environments. In CSCL environments one tries to evoke argumentation (Veerman, 2000) in 
order to stimulate knowledge co-construction. In our situation two levels apply. On one 
level, the problem-solvers are arguing about elements of the analysis and the solutions on 
which they hold different views or opinions. We have included elements in the 
representational notation to support this type of argumentation, but the evidence in the 
literature and our own results do not indicate that much interaction can be expected here. 
Users at best will consolidate the results in the representation. On the other level we 
stimulate our users – even if they agree on all aspects of the analysis and solution – to 
provide the underlying reasoning, as if they were arguing with an external evaluator. 
Although we did not go through the exercise, the idea behind these specifications is to 
ultimately develop a script (Dillenbourg, 2002) of the problem solving process not with the 
intention to define rigorously how the problem solvers have to operate, but to describe in a 
more precise way the tasks and processes. Note, that by incorporating this aspect, we have 
defined a number of shared representations that problem solvers need to use. Whether they 
actually can, is a different matter. 
We will present the functional requirements per problem solving state identified in 
chapter 2. Before going in to these details, we present a number of additions to the 
representational notation presented in chapter 2. That notation was based on an eclectic 
blend of contributions from different research backgrounds. We do not have the illusion that 
the explorations reported in the previous chapters give us a research base on which we can 
decide what to exclude from the representational notation. We will therefore concentrate on 
the elements that seemed missing. First, as indicated by the EPA protocols, we need a way to 
express more abstract causes, such as ‘social problems’, or ‘infrastructure’. We will refer to 
this category as ‘cause type’. Second a similar category is needed for more abstract 
interventions. The category ‘intervention strategy’ was introduced to the coding scheme 
following the analyses reported in chapter 4. Note that these abstract type categories 
correspond to the way experts describe causes and solutions. Third, the category ‘plan’ is 
added to the representational notation so as to express a set of related interventions that is 
meant as a solution. 
Table 6.1 was presented earlier in chapter 2 as a summary of the cognitive and 
communicative demands of the problem solving states of orientation, solving and 
evaluation. These demands were subsequently translated to the representation, 
communication and guidance and support services offered by CSAV environments. We will 
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reconsider these demands and their translations to services given the results of the studies 
reported in the previous chapters. 
Table 6.1 
Cognitive and communicative demands of the different problem solving states 
Problem 
solving states 
Cognitive demands Communicative demands 
Orientation Problem Representation 
Constraints 
Problem structuring 
Establish shared representations 
Issue-based communication 
Brainstorm  
Build trust 
Establish common ground 
Solving Apply macro-operators to produce 
solutions 
Use topic and control representations 
Maintain coherence 
Maintain accuracy  
Maintain plausibility 
Topic-based discussion 
Maintain common ground 
Maintain focus 
Conflict detection and 
resolution 
Knowledge negotiation 
Evaluation Evaluate solutions 
Evaluate constraints 
Evaluate process 
Negotiate criteria 
 
One of the first things to consider is whether in our studies we see signs that these problem 
solving states apply. From the literature we know that experts typically spend a considerable 
amount of time and effort in problem orientation. They try to explicate problem constraints, 
criteria and try to develop a first representation of the problem (Voss, Tyler, et al., 1983). In 
our protocols, students typically start with a short orientation, sometimes directly followed 
by ideas about solutions, in which they address some, but not all, of the orientation topics 
mentioned in the table. As expected, the protocols show that students spend considerable 
amounts of time on solving, that is formulating interventions that may eliminate the causes of 
the problem. As we saw earlier, the argumentation to support analysis and solution was 
often missing in the protocols. Finally, we saw little evidence of evaluation. Again, this is not 
very surprising: solutions more or less emerge. 
Support of problem solving states 
In this section we detail the functional requirements for a CSAV environment that supports 
collaborative solving of social science problems using external representations of 
argumentation. We will not deal with any of the administrative tasks that a system obviously 
needs to support, such as maintaining project data and status, as well as data on users or 
user groups. 
In chapter 2 we identified a number of problem-solving states and the different cognitive 
and communicative demands of these states. These then were translated into the services 
offered by CSAV environments. The way that the system realizes this support is by offering 
different modes of collaboration, different representational notations and a number of 
functions that allow monitoring of developing solutions. 
We will assume that the environment allows sharing, both in synchronous as well as in 
asynchronous mode of the external representations. One may consider other options 
however in which (a subset of) the graphical data are converted into forms readable by other 
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applications. Compendium® (Selvin, 2003) or Mifflin® as it has been called as well, gives a 
good idea of the current possibilities. The system is based on open standards (Java, SQL, 
XML and others) and offers interfaces to various other tools and environments, such as the 
D3E discussion environment, Word, Excel, Visio and others. Compendium® is extensible, 
that is one can add to the behavior of nodes in the representation and Compendium supports 
meta-data (such as data on plausibility or agreement). The reader is referred to the 
Compendium website for information (http://www.compendiuminstitute.org) about recent 
versions of the tools. 
We also assume that the system maintains an agenda with a list of tasks that the 
participants have to accomplish or objects they wish to include in the representation. Most of 
these tasks are put on the agenda by the participants. If, however, one of the guidance and 
support services notes that particular aspects of the representation need the attention of the 
problem solvers, it can take the initiative to formulate a topic for the agenda. The agenda acts 
as a control mechanism: the problem-solvers can decide on the basis of the topics on the 
agenda what they are going to address and in which mode (if that selection is available). 
Support for orientation 
In this phase initial problem representations are developed and finally issues for further 
exploration are identified. The style of communication in this phase is described as issue-
based or conversational. In the asynchronous environment ACT® this phase is implemented 
as a discussion that has only a chronological order (Duffy et al., 1998; Sloffer et al., 1999). Our 
students, as described above, do not enter into lengthy problem orientation activities, but 
rather they are focusing on one aspect, such as the constraints, or their initial ideas about the 
causes of the problem. In chapter 2 we were rather concerned that in the orientation phase 
representational notations such as IBIS be used to prevent premature commitment to 
particular views on the problem. However, as described in the review of the studies reported 
in this thesis, we have found no substantial evidence in the protocols of any domain or 
stakeholder specific views on the problems. This brings us to the more fundamental question 
whether we need any other representational service in this state than one that allows 
inspections of created representations. This does not imply that the objects and relations 
contained in the representational notation cannot be discussed in this phase. It only means 
that there are no means to make changes to the external representation during this phase. 
What we are proposing here, is that students in an orientation state are stimulated to 
consider specific objects – ‘constraints’, ‘cause type’, ‘intervention type’ and maybe ‘data’. 
Once they decide to add any of these objects to the representation they can create such an 
item on the agenda. When they enter the solving state, the agenda items can be inserted into 
the representation. All this is only meant to stimulate that students consider more than one 
particular aspect of a problem. As reported in the previous chapters we found that our 
students often focused on particular aspects of the problem whilst ignoring others. 
As the Ghent experiment indicated it is important that in this phase, as well as in others, 
the communication services of the CSAV ensure that the communication between the 
learners is anchored in the external representation they are co-constructing. Communication 
services in this state facilitate that learners express basically unordered issues or that they 
engage in structured brainstorm on constraints, or potential causes of the problem. More 
detailed ‘negotiation for meaning’, in which the participants establish initial common 
grounds on the issues that they have to tackle, has to be supported as well. The results of this 
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phase are a list of issues (questions) to be addressed, and objects to be inserted into the 
external representation. The type of support is offered by implementing an interface with a 
tool like GroupSystems® that has all the facilities for electronic brainstorming, raising issues 
and knowledge negotiation.  
Support for solving 
For the solving state we stated demands such as ‘apply macro-operators to produce 
solutions’ and ‘use topic and control representations’. Furthermore, demands where 
formulated for functionalities that maintain coherence, accuracy and plausibility in the 
proposed solutions. In the protocols of the beginning experts, we find no evidence of the use 
of topic and control representations. Obviously the EPA students who tried to apply 
techniques of Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) used both topic and control 
representations, but we also noticed that they did not succeed in maintaining coherence 
within and between the LFA representations they produced. Other topic and control 
representations (Alpay et al., 1998) have not been identified in the protocols. We identified a 
need to support shared and permanent representations, but the protocols contain no 
indications that warrant such a requirement.  
Considering the studies reported in the previous chapters, there is one major issue in the 
way students approach these problems: they tend to focus on a subset of topics, ignoring 
others and they fail to address the structural relations between elements of the analysis and 
solution of the problem. As a starting point to offer support, we intend to use the guidance 
effect (Suthers, 2001) of the external representation to have learners address the structural 
aspects of the problem and its solution. External representations have a guidance effect on 
several levels. At the representational level they support to express particular information 
better than expressing other sort of information. One may expect that what is easier to 
express will more often be expressed. On another level, a representational notation provides 
the learners with a task structure: their interpretation of the task is such that they will use the 
objects and relations offered to them. Finally, the guidance effect manifests itself in the topics 
addressed in the dialogues between the learners. The question here is how this guidance 
effect can be explored. In the previous chapters we saw that students failed to use the 
structural relations between the objects in the representational notation. Expert teams on the 
other hand use external representations as data-structures, that is, as structurally related 
pieces of information (Alpay et al., 1998). Guiding or scaffolding learners to make adequate 
use of the representational services our CSAV offers cannot suffice by signaling the available 
objects and relations alone. Here we propose that the guidance operate on several levels: 
First, the system adapts to the problem solving states that the learners are operating in. 
When the learners enter an orientation state, they can put issues on an issue list and they are 
limited to discussing only a particular type of content: constraints, causes (and cause types), 
interventions (and intervention strategy) and plan. In this state these objects can be created, 
but they cannot be incorporated in the external representation. Only when the learners enter 
a solving state they can work on all elements of the external representation. Newly defined 
objects can be taken from the agenda and incorporated into the representation. 
Second, the objects entered into the external representation ‘know’ about other types of 
objects they can be connected to. Objects have visible connectors that signal to what type of 
object they can be related. Thus the objects afford that learners enter relations to particular 
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types of objects. If the states of the connectors can be checked, the system can alert the 
learner that relations are missing and should be considered. 
There are other functionalities that reach related goals. For example, a Collaboratory 
Notebook® note ‘knows’ which note types are legitimate follow-ups. IBIS-based graphical 
environments can enforce that the diagrams adhere to the grammar of the notation. Finally, 
one might even consider creating complete data-structures (with objects such as Cause, Data, 
Intervention). Whether learners perceive and use the support remains to be seen, however. 
The system supports separate representation and discussion of constraints, features and 
risks. Constraints as defined here correspond to the subgoals defined in DRL. Evaluation of 
the solution involves a discussion of the claim that solution X satisfies the constraints defined 
here. Risks are collections of external threats to the solution, for example intervention X will 
only work, if financing is continued beyond the current schedule. Risks are related to 
interventions, but are collected for inspection so as to allow a risk assessment for the 
solution. Statements about constraints, features and risks are debatable claims. 
In order to support the demands on the coherence, accuracy and plausibility of proposed 
solutions, guidance and support services are needed. We propose that the system collects 
ratings and computes aggregate data that can be used to evaluate the solution and its 
underlying argumentation. Here we mention only two services: agreement ratings and 
plausibility ratings. It is conceivable that other functions are supported, but they will require 
more advanced solutions. As an example, consider monitoring coherence. This requires that 
the system can reason about the relations and dependencies in an argumentation structure, 
for instance by applying truth maintenance mechanisms. Data on agreement and plausibility 
are easier to collect and process. Ratings on agreement are collected at the claims (objects and 
relations) in the representation. The system maintains agreement ratings on individual and 
group level thus allowing to make the differences between stakeholders visible. This 
corresponds to what is called a ‘viewpoint’ in the SIBYL® prototype (Lee, 1990). The system 
will signal disagreements than are larger than a threshold value. 
The system will also collect users’ ratings on the plausibility of claims entered. The system 
maintains plausibility ratings on individual and group level. We do not envisage a 
sophisticated plausibility management system as in SIBYL®; perhaps a simple filter 
mechanism will suffice. The most important function is that the system will signal when the 
variance in the ratings between individuals and / or groups is larger than a threshold value. 
Users as well as the system can generate agenda items in this phase. The system will 
generate items where it spots lacking material (for instance no data to support the causal 
analysis), no criteria to evaluate solutions, no constraints posted) lack of agreement, or 
conflicts. The system can keep track of plausibility levels and report those that are below 
certain thresholds for individuals as well as groups. 
Support for evaluation 
Evaluation, as defined previously, answers the question as to whether the correct problem 
has been solved using the correct procedures and whether the constraints are met. In the 
protocols analyzed for the studies reported in the previous chapters, we find only a few 
segments that can be described as being concerned with evaluation. This does not mean that 
participants do not spend effort on evaluating solutions. In a process in which constraints get 
rephrased, and interventions get refined the problem solvers may be surprised to find that 
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the intervention they agreed on meets the constraints and criteria defined during the 
problem solving process.  
The other evaluation issues identified here are harder to answer: if the problem-solvers 
have not reached sufficient common ground on representations and operators, they will not 
agree on any solution. The only support that the system can offer is to pinpoint to areas in 
the representations where there is no overlap or insufficient agreement. 
Here again we may consider whether we need representational services beside those that 
allow inspection of the representation. Again, we are inclined to believe that such is not the 
case. Finally, we assume that evaluation is a state that is best executed in a synchronous 
mode and we propose that GroupSystems® is a candidate environment to support this state. 
 
This is only a first draft of a global functional requirements specification for a computer-
supported environment that supports collaborative problem solving of ill-structured 
problems. It is an ambitious set of functional requirements for a potentially very advanced 
system if all the requirements are to be supported. According to the six stage model of 
Kirschner (2002) a next step would be to determine how learners perceive the support and 
subsequently whether they actually use the support. A more piecemeal engineering 
approach would address the core representational services first and gradually move to more 
advanced services. The core of the support that we intend learners to perceive and use is to 
not use particular objects of the representational notation in isolation, but to also consider the 
structural relations contained in the notation. 
Directions for future research 
The work reported here has brought together research from different areas to better 
understand how external representations of argumentation can support collaborative solving 
of a type of ill-structured problem called social science problems in the psychological 
tradition and ‘wicked problems’ in the planning and design tradition. The type of problems 
that we are interested in are referred to as ‘ill-structured problems’ or social science problems 
in the psychological literature. The research tradition in design and business problem solving 
has been more inspired by work on ‘wicked problems’. The latter tradition has resulted in 
the first systems that supported argument visualization in problem solving. We built on the 
research tradition of external representation of argumentation in CSCL and planning and 
design, and incorporated insights from policy evaluation to design a first representational 
notation to be used in a CSAV environment. 
In a review of CSAV environments rooted in these different traditions we identified 
communicative services, representational services and guidance and support services. We 
developed a model that identified the cognitive and communicative demands of the states in 
this type of problem solving and we linked these demands to the representational, 
communicative and guidance and support services of CSAV environments. In the previous 
section we have outlined a number of global functional requirements for a CSAV 
environment based on this model and on the results of the studies reported in the previous 
chapters. We can see two directions for future research, one to further test and develop the 
model brought forward here, the other to make progress in the development of a CSAV 
environment that offers the services described globally in the functional requirements. 
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There are several issues related to the model that need additional work. First, the model 
described how solving ill-structured problems involves multiple agents who all bring their 
views to the problem, that is different representations, operators and views on relevant 
constraints and criteria. Our approach, in fact stated as a demand that these multiple agents 
could express their multiple representations. In our studies, we could demonstrate different 
approaches in the mono-disciplinary teams of the beginning experts, but we failed to 
demonstrate any such differences in the multidisciplinary teams of the EPA students. Other 
research in the context of CSAV environments presented by Conklin, Selvin and Van Gelder 
in a recent volume on CSAV (Kirschner, Buckingham Shum and Carr, 2003) as well is all 
based on informal analyses only. 
We need to understand under which conditions we can evoke expression of these 
different views on the problem. The settings that we used in our experiment may have been 
less than favorable in that respect. Other problems and other conditions, including 
individual preparation for the problem solving sessions, may be needed to stimulate these 
different views to be expressed. 
In the functional requirements specified in the previous section of this chapter we 
described how we intend to use the guidance of the representational notation to stimulate 
that students pay attention to the structural aspects of the objects in the external 
representation. To study these and other ´affordances´ of external representations a series of 
well controlled experiments are necessary.  
Our studies have concentrated on the content of the students dialogues only. As we 
indicated above, this was the correct choice as long as the development of a representational 
notation was concerned. Now, this perspective needs to be amended by one in which the 
mechanisms of collaboration can be better understood. Analysis of the communicative 
functions in the dialogue may also help to reveal how the services described in the functional 
requirements influence the collaboration between students. 
We need better understanding of the cost of adding external representations to a problem 
solving context. As we have indicated elsewhere (Van Bruggen, Kirschner, & Jochems, 2002) 
there is no reason to assume that external representations will always result in cognitive off-
loading. There are good reasons to assume that the reverse may occur as well. More work is 
needed to establish the trade-off between the affordances of the representational notation 
and its implementation on the one hand and problem-solving processes and outcomes on the 
other. This requires studies that are better controlled than the explorative studies we 
conducted here. 
 
A second area for future research is more developmental in nature. As we described 
above, we have only touched upon the first stages of a development model for CSCL 
environments. To develop a CSAV environment that will support collaborative solving of 
social science problems many more of these steps need to be taken. We will outline a few of 
the next steps. 
First, we have to address more in full the third stage of the development model of 
Kirschner (2002), that is work out the constraints. We have worked with small scale, 
synchronous problem solving settings. A more realistic setting for students of the Open 
University of the Netherlands however is that of an asynchronous setting, with facilities for 
occasional synchronous work, in which the students spend several weeks to solve similar 
problems. As we described above this may also be a setting in which different backgrounds 
of the students may get expressed in different viewpoints on a problem. Replication of some 
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of the studies in hardware and software constellations in which students can work on 
problems for a sustained period is necessary. Here attention needs to be given to tasks and 
contexts in which different viewpoints on a problem can and will be expressed.  
Second, a next step in the development of a CSAV is to investigate how students perceive 
and experience the support offered by external representations. Before implementing 
services in a computer-based environment, small scale, pen and paper experiments can be 
used to get a first idea of the perception and use of the representational notation and in 
particular the idea of guiding students towards working out relations with other objects. 
Third, we have proposed some rather drastic limitations on the interaction with external 
representation by restricting editing of the external representation to the solving state of the 
problem solving process. In the orientation and evaluation state, learners can use the agenda 
to transfer objects for use in the external representation. This is an attempt to not only keep 
learners focused on activities, but also to encourage them to reflect on the current state of the 
problem solving process. Obviously, we need empirical results to check whether this 
corresponds to the perception and experience of the learners. Ultimately, their activities 
decide on any design we propose. 
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 Summary 
This thesis is concerned with the question how computer-based creation of external 
representations can support collaborative problem solving of social science problems (Voss, 
Tyler, & Yengo, 1983). An example of such a problem is that of how to reduce school drop-
out. This type of problem is ill-structured and ill-defined: the goals, constraints and criteria 
for a solution are either not stated or are ambiguous. Characteristic to social science 
problems is ‘delayed evaluation’. It may take years before the effects of interventions become 
visible. All this implies that solving this type of problem is to an important extent an 
argumentative process that already starts with the first analysis step: Is school drop-out an 
educational problem, or a social-economic problem as well? This argumentative process 
extents to the evaluation of proposed solutions. Since no one can prove that a solution will be 
effective, one can only provide arguments why it is likely to work. The external 
representations addressed in this thesis are informal or semi-formal graphical 
representations of the argumentation found in the analysis and solutions of the problem. 
 
In chapter 2 the backgrounds of the research are sketched. A model of collaborative solving 
of social science problem is presented (based on Van Bruggen, Boshuizen & Kirschner, 2003). 
The model makes a distinction between orientation, solving and evaluation states in problem 
solving. For each state cognitive and communicative demands are formulated and these 
demands are subsequently related to functionalities (services) found in CSCL environments 
and environments aimed at supporting planning and design. 
Most important to our research are the functionalities with which external representations 
can be created and the underlying representational notation, that is the objects and relations 
that can be used in the external representations. Chapter 2 presents a first version of this 
notation that incorporates concepts taken from the literature on evaluation research (Rossi, 
Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999). 
 
Chapter 3 gives a sobering account of an attempt to incorporate elements of the 
representational notation in an existing environment for collaborative inquiry (Belvédère®). 
Second year Education students of the University of Ghent were randomly assigned to pairs 
and to either a Low or a High Detail condition. In the Low Detail instruction they were 
instructed to use no more than two objects in Belvédère® that were described as 
‘assumptions’ and ‘facts’. In the High Detail condition four objects were available that were 
described in more detail. The student pairs were instructed to compile recommendations on 
the swift implementation of inclusive education. They were presented with background 
material to support their analysis and recommendations. It was predicted that in the High 
Detail condition students would prepare richer and denser diagrams, that they would 
remember more of the background material and their recommendations. We also expected 
that in the High Detail condition the processing of the material would be harder and more 
time-consuming. The data however, all pointed to quite opposite directions. 
One of the technical problems that plagued this experiment led to a condition in which 
students worked together sharing one computer. Exploration of the data, using this 
‘condition’ indicated that the type of collaboration may be at least as important as the 
representational tools offered. A better controlled and balanced replication with additional 
data on the coordination processes between students is necessary to substantiate the current 
results. 
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Considering these sobering results, the attention was shifted toward further development 
and testing of the representational notation rather than developing and testing 
representational tools. Chapter 4 reports a first attempt to validate the representational 
notation developed. The notation was adapted to a coding scheme for dialogue analysis. 
Dialogues were coded from three mono-disciplinary teams of American students: 
Philosophers, Educators and Debaters that addressed the problem of how to reduce school 
drop-out. The results of these analyses were encouraging in that the coding scheme could 
not only cater for a substantial amount of the dialogues, but could be used to make visible 
the different approaches of the teams. All three groups addressed subsets of the analyses, 
leaving out other relevant aspects. One of the conclusions therefore is that process support is 
needed that helps the problem solvers to construe and maintain the coherence of the objects. 
Given the small empirical base of these observations and the limited reliability replication is 
needed. 
 
In chapter 5 we report on the results of offering process support by incorporating the 
representational notation and the methods and techniques of Logical Framework Analysis. 
LFA prescribes a systematic procedure in which to work from problem analysis to the 
definition of a solution (project). In the study reported here four groups of four students 
participated who were enrolled in the Maastricht International Masters of European Public 
Affairs. These groups solved the school drop-out problem as well. Two groups were left free 
to select a method, two others were told to use LFA. Their dialogues were analyzed using the 
coding scheme. A remarkable result was that the protocols showed hardly any sign of the 
expertise of the students, who had varying educational backgrounds. The analysis indicated 
that LFA offered some process support, but on the other hand we found indications in the 
protocols that LFA does not encourage students to substantiate the underpinnings of their 
analysis or solution. 
 
In chapter 6 we present first global functional requirements for an envisaged environment. 
The core of the recommendation here is that the environment should encourage students to 
construct and maintain the structural cohesion in the external representation. It is suggested 
that the system should adapt to the different problem solving states. We conclude with 
directions for future research and development. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift handelt over de vraag hoe computergebaseerde externe representaties het 
gezamenlijk oplossen van sociaal-wetenschappelijke problemen (social science problems in 
de terminologie van Voss, Tylor en Yengo, 1983) kunnen ondersteunen. Een voorbeeld van 
zo’n type probleem is de vraag hoe vroegtijdige schoolverlating kan worden 
teruggedrongen. Dit soort problemen zijn zwakgestructureerd en -gedefinieerd: de doelen, 
randvoorwaarden of criteria waaraan een oplossing moet voldoen, en/of de stappen die 
kunnen leiden tot een oplossing zijn niet gegeven of zijn ambigu omschreven. Kenmerkend 
voor sociaal-wetenschappelijke problemen is ‘uitgestelde evaluatie’: het kan jaren duren 
voordat het effect van maatregelen zichtbaar wordt. Dit alles brengt met zich mee dat het 
oplossen van dit soort problemen vooral een argumentatief proces is dat al begint met de 
analyse van het probleem - is vroegtijdige schoolverlating een onderwijsprobleem of (ook) 
een sociaal-economisch probleem? - en dat zich uitstrekt tot de beoordeling van 
alternatieven. Niemand kan bewijzen dat een oplossing werkt, men kan dat hooguit 
aannemelijk maken. De externe representaties waartoe wij ons beperken, zijn informele of 
semi-formele, grafische weergaven van de argumentatie die ten grondslag ligt aan de 
analyse en oplossing van het probleem. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de achtergronden van het onderzoek beschreven. Er wordt een 
model gepresenteerd voor het gezamenlijk oplossen van sociaal-wetenschappelijke 
problemen (ontleend aan Van Bruggen, Boshuizen en Kirschner, 2003). Het model maakt een 
onderscheid tussen oriëntatie, oplossing en evaluatie stadium. Voor ieder stadium worden 
vereisten geformuleerd op cognitief en communicatief gebied. Deze vereisten worden 
vervolgens gerelateerd aan een aantal functionaliteiten die worden aangetroffen bij 
bestaande omgevingen voor computerondersteund samenwerkend leren (CSCL) en/of bij 
omgevingen die zijn ontwikkeld voor zakelijke toepassingen.  
Het meest belangrijk voor ons onderzoek zijn, uiteraard, de functionaliteiten waarmee 
externe representaties kunnen worden vervaardigd en de daaraan ten grondslag liggende 
representationele notatie: de objecten en relaties waarvan gebruik kan worden gemaakt in de 
externe representatie. Gebruikmakend van concepten van ondermeer de literatuur op het 
gebied van evaluatieonderzoek (Rossi, Freeman en Lipsey, 1999) wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een 
eerste versie van een dergelijke notatie gepresenteerd. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de ontnuchterende ervaring die is opgedaan met het incorporeren van 
elementen van de representationele notatie in een bestaande omgeving voor gezamenlijk 
onderzoekend leren (Belvédère®). Tweedejaars Opvoedkunde studenten (N=95) van de 
Universiteit Gent werden random aan paren en aan een Hoog- resp. Laag-Detail conditie 
toegewezen. In de Laag-Detail conditie werden ze geïnstrueerd om gebruik te maken van 
slechts twee Belvédère-objecten die werden omschreven als ‘assumpties’, resp. ‘feiten’. In de 
Hoog-Detail conditie waren vier objecten beschikbaar die in meer detail werden beschreven. 
De studenten werd gevraagd aanbevelingen op te stellen voor een snelle invoering van 
inclusief onderwijs. Ze konden daarvoor gebruik maken van achtergrondmateriaal over 
inclusief onderwijs. Voorspeld werd dat studenten in de Hoog-Detail conditie rijkere en 
hechter verbonden diagrammen zouden maken en dat ze meer van het achtergrondmateriaal 
en van hun eigen aanbevelingen zouden onthouden. Er werd verwacht dat in de Hoog-
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Detail conditie de verwerking van het materiaal lastiger zou zijn en meer tijd zou vergen. De 
data echter bleken in volstrekte tegenspraak met deze voorspellingen. 
Een van de technische problemen waar dit experiment door werd geplaagd had ons 
genoodzaakt studenten samen achter een computer te laten werken. Exploratie van de data, 
gebruikmakend van deze ‘conditie’ wees er op dat de wijze waarop studenten samen moeten 
werken een factor van belang kan zijn. Herhaling van het experiment onder beter 
gecontroleerde omstandigheden en met meer zicht op coördinatie handelingen van de 
studenten is nodig.  
 
Op grond van de resultaten van dit onderzoek is de aandacht in het onderzoek meer komen 
te liggen op verdere ontwikkeling en uittesten van de representationele notatie dan op het 
ontwikkelen en testen van tools. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt verslag gedaan van een eerste poging 
om de ontwikkelde representationale notatie te valideren. De notatie werd omgewerkt tot 
een coderingsschema voor het analyseren van dialogen. Dialogen werden geanalyseerd van 
drie verschillende mono-disciplinare groepen van Amerikaanse studenten: filosofen, 
onderwijskundigen en ‘debatteurs’ die zich bezig hielden met de vraag hoe vroegtijdige 
schoolverlating kon worden tegengegaan. De resultaten van de analyse waren in die zin 
bemoedigend dat het coderingsschema niet alleen een substantieel deel van de dialogen kon 
‘vangen’, maar ook kon met het schema de verschillende benaderingen van de groepen 
zichtbaar worden gemaakt. Alle drie de groepen bleken zich te beperken tot een deel van de 
analyse, waarbij ze andere elementen systematisch buiten beschouwing lieten. Een van de 
conclusies van dit onderzoek is dat meer ondersteuning nodig is die de probleemoplossers 
de samenhang van de objecten laat construeren en bewaren. Daarnaast is, gezien de geringe 
empirische bases en de niet te hoge betrouwbaarheid, herhaling van het onderzoek nodig. 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd onderzocht of de procesondersteuning kon worden gerealiseerd door 
incorporatie van de representationele notatie in de methoden en technieken van Logical 
Framework Analysis (LFA). LFA volgt systematisch een aantal stappen van een 
probleemanalyse naar een definitie van een oplossing (project), waarbij gebruik wordt 
gemaakt van externe representaties om de analyse van het probleem en de werking van de 
oplossing zichtbaar te maken. In dit onderzoek participeerden vier groepen van vier 
studenten die in Maastricht een Internationaal Masters programma volgden over Europees 
beleid (European Public Affairs) en die waren getraind in de beginselen van LFA. Ook deze 
groepen kregen het probleem van de vroegtijdige schoolverlating voorgeschoteld. Twee 
groepen werden vrijgelaten in de te volgen methode; twee groepen werden geïnstrueerd 
gebruik te maken van LFA. Hun dialogen werden geanalyseerd met het coderingsschema. 
Opvallend was de onzichtbaarheid van de specifieke expertise van de deelnemers die 
diverse studieachtergronden hadden. De analyse van de dialogen laat zien dat toepassing 
van LFA wel enige procesondersteuning lijkt te bieden. Anderzijds vonden we ook 
aanwijzingen in de protocollen die er op wijzen dat LFA onvoldoende stimuleert tot 
onderbouwing van de analyse zowel als de oplossing van het probleem. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 presenteren we eerste globale functionele eisen aan een omgeving zoals 
beoogd. De kern van die aanbevelingen komt er op neer dat moet worden bevorderd dat 
studenten de structurele samenhang in de externe representatie realiseren en vasthouden. 
Daartoe wordt tevens voorgesteld om het systeem zich aan te laten passen aan de 
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verschillende stadia in het probleemoplosproces. We sluiten af met aanbevelingen voor 
verder onderzoek en ontwikkeling. 
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 Appendix The coding scheme used to analyze the protocols 
 
ID Code Definition Example 
1 Analysis Statements related to the (causal) 
analysis of the drop-out 
phenomenon. 
 
1.1 Problem scope Statements that address how the 
problem is defined or delineated, 
or which part(s) of the problem 
will be addressed. 
Yeah, secondary schools and does that 
include high school? I don't think that very 
many people, I mean drop-out of 
elementary school 
1.2 Hypothesis Statements that explicitly 
mention (candidate) cause(s) or 
explanation(s) for drop-out. 
Low SES. Um, and that could be families 
and communities. 
1.3 Data Statements that contain explicit 
mentioning of evidence related 
to one or more hypotheses 
Yeah um one of the main ones that that 
worked was just create a more positive um 
student um whatchamacallit um help 
create a positive thing within students 
what's it called 
1.3.1 Experiential 
data 
Evidence based on personal 
experience, observation or 
induction from experience or 
observations 
Well, it's true like I have a really good 
friend who was this woman named Sheryl 
and she was she dropped out and she was 
cool as heck she was really awesome 
person but she just thought that school 
was a big waste of her time.  
1.3.2 Authority data Evidence based on publications, 
empirical data, scholars 
… there's uh studies from James Kohlmer 
who's been working in schools since 1968 
and all the schools that go that go under 
this principle of involving … 
1.4 Principle 
(warrant) 
Statements that contain explicit 
mentioning of the process 
dynamics that relate data and 
drop-out. 
there's a ton of research um out there um 
that that states that with the with more 
parental involvement more positive 
parental involvement there's a increase in 
student achievement and also um it 
minimizes drop-out rates 
1.5 Research 
question 
Statements that phrase (a) 
question(s) for further research.  
Note: participants were 
instructed to compile a list of 
research questions to be 
answered before their 
presentation. Only statements 
that pose a research question to 
be put on this list are coded here.
Has there been anything done about charter 
schools that aid in dropping the reducing 
the drop-out rate or... 
 
we should look at as if we're going to if 
we’re going to even think in terms of 
incentives to finish school, um, that's 
something we should research for the next 
meeting.. 
2 Constraints & 
Features 
Statements that formulate 
(sub)goals that the 
recommended actions should 
satisfy or constraints that the 
recommended actions have to 
meet 
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ID Code Definition Example 
2.1 Features Statements that express desirable 
properties of the 
recommendation.  
Note that this code refers to 
features of recommendations 
that are of a general nature. 
One thing I think is important and might 
help us out too is that if we if we tend to 
focus on trying to um maybe affect 
variables that can be changed instead of 
saying you know we've got this plan that's 
gonna you know do something remarkable 
I mean, maybe we can operate on the 
assumption that we're gonna do what we 
can with what is there right now 
2.2 Conditions and 
Risks 
Statements that express 
(pre)conditions to the 
recommendations or identify 
risk factors.  
I wonder if we have to work within like 
resources. We should ask that question I 
wonder if we're allowed that? 
does our solution have to be like an all or 
nothing, like can they take parts of the 
solution that they liked?  
3 Intervention 
logic 
Statements relating to the 
concrete actions to be taken 
(interventions), their expected 
immediate results (outcomes), 
intervening mechanisms 
(assumptions) and their expected 
long-term effects (results).  
 
3.1 Interventions Statements about concrete 
actions (including critical 
remarks; questions about et 
cetera) 
I mean, I do think that there's something to 
be said though for incorporating into the 
solutions something that some kind of a 
program or an idea or a suggestion that 
does something to try an make school 
better… I mean, because I think you can 
try an address drugs an you can try an 
address teen pregnancy and all of those 
things, but those are long term … maybe if 
we have a combination of solutions … 
3.2 Outcomes Statements that contain 
descriptions of immediate 
outcomes of interventions 
(including critical remarks; 
questions about et cetera) 
there's certain external factors that you just 
you just can't control for you know there's 
you can't control necessarily for the 
population there and the SES and some 
other factors but you certainly can control 
for some other internal factors you know 
like you're saying— teacher training, staff—
we need maybe to think about some things 
we can do to 
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3.3 Assumptions Statements about intervening 
mechanisms that link immediate 
outcomes to results.  
Note: here and elsewhere the 
statement can also mean 
questioning or challenging the 
relation 
… the way that we try to deal with these 
problems like the drug problem for 
example is just scream and holler about 
like, you know, don't use drugs don't use 
drugs which I think is probably good thing 
to do, but all of those things become so like 
moralistic for some high school kid who's 
involved with that I don't know if those 
things are very effective. 
But that might be one of the things that we 
can offer um, the governors is the 
suggestion that uh one way to improve 
retention is to expand the number of 
alternative high schools other than college 
prep high schools. 
3.4 Effects Statements containing 
descriptions of the effects of the 
intervention and the way these 
effects are established 
(operational definitions, et 
cetera). 
guess so so what you're saying is that one 
easy obvious way uh, to like improve the 
school retention rate is to raise the age at 
which you of how long you have to stay in 
school. 
4 Present 
solution 
Statements on how to present 
results 
 
4.1 Goals Statements about desired 
features of the presentation 
 
4.2 Plan and 
outline 
Statements about general content 
and content ordering of the 
presentation 
No, I think with that what we what we 
could do is make up an RFP for the for the 
governors. We'd say, if you want to read it, 
here it is. Um, maybe 4-5 pages long and 
that could include research and stuff. 
4.3 Content Statements about concrete 
content of presentation 
 
5 Other Remaining segments go here  
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